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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to critically examine the development of Community 
Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) in the UK: organisations that lend to 
businesses unable to access finance from mainstream sources. The overall aim 
of the research is to capture the development of a proto-type sector into a 
recognisable and fully-fledged financial sector.  
 
The research found there was considerable interest in CDFIs in the late 1990s 
fuelled by research reports published by the New Economics Foundation. Ideas 
and influences were being transferred to the UK from North American CDFIs 
and from micro-finance lenders in the developing world. While a few CDFIs had 
existed in the UK since the 1970s, from the late 1990s a new generation of 
organisations were being established to help combat what New Labour had 
defined as financial exclusion. The thesis identifies this group of CDFIs the 
‘British New Wave’, because they were developing their own products and 
services to meet local needs.     
 
After 1997, New Labour ideas about a potential Third Way and 
Communitarianism were increasingly influential. This thesis argues that the 
subsequent development of CDFIs can be strongly interpreted as offering a 
Third Way between the market and the state. Their links with local communities 
or sectors (such as social enterprise) also enhanced their importance at district, 
regional and national levels.  
 
The research also analyses a number of individual case studies such as the 
Aston Reinvestment Trust and Street UK, the CDFI sector and government 
policy to highlight the complexity of the challenges facing CFDIs particularly the 
range of issues relating to funding. The thesis argues that the government’s 
initial interest in the sector has waned over time and some of New Labour 
policies aimed at promoting localism have in practice restricted the growth of 
CDFIs.  
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At the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, the UK CDFI sector is 
surviving and offering loans to businesses excluded from finance and offering 
social and economic benefits that should be recognised and supported through 
social investment. However, despite the optimistic note in some areas of the 
thesis, it will be argued many CDFIs remain financially unsustainable precisely 
because they offer small business loans and work with their borrowers.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis will examine the development of Community Development Finance 
Institutions (CDFIs). While looking at the influences from abroad that have 
affected these lending organisations, the major focus will be on capturing, at a 
fine-grained level of analysis, the CFDI experience in the UK. The thesis will also 
capture the political ideas that have influenced the sector, including Third Way 
and Communitarian ideas, and use this framework to scrutinise and critically 
evaluate the sector’s development. The key message of the thesis is that the 
true value of CDFIs lies in being responsive to the needs of local communities 
and helping to reduce financial exclusion. They have an economic value in 
creating and sustaining employment, and are able to invest in additional social 
outputs.  
 
This introduction will be divided into three parts. The initial section will explain 
the author’s motivation for choosing this area of research. The second will 
concisely describe the methodology employed. The final section will be an 
outline of the overall structure of the thesis, with each chapter described and 
placed  within a wider context.  
 
Choice of Topic 
 
This thesis’ starting point was the use of the phrase ‘social investment’ and its 
introduction into the public domain. In his book The Field of Social Investment 
(1987) the North American sociologist S. T. Bruyn had his own interpretations 
and suggested that all investments were made in a social context. Bruyn’s work 
touched on the different forms of community lending organisations in North 
America. Perhaps Bruyn’s most important contribution was when he argued 
that: 
 
‘Social investment is the allocation of capital to advance the social and 
economic well-being of people’ (Bruyn, 1987, p. 13). 
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A decade later, the phrase was also being utilised in a UK context, with Anthony 
Giddens discussing his ideas of a social investment state (Giddens, 1998) and 
the UK’s Social Investment Forum linking it to both ethical investments and 
lending organisations called CDFIs. 
 
In the course of contract research work undertaken in Newcastle in the first part 
of the new millennium, on approaches to promoting financial inclusion (Affleck 
and Mellor, 2005), the author became interested in examining what could be 
viewed as the development of an alternative business finance sector in the UK. 
Researchers were beginning to write about both community development 
finance institutions (Mullineux and Mayo, 2001) and initiatives (Mayo et al., 
1998; BoE, 2000). Conferences such as Small Change for a Better Future 
(2000), held in Norwich, and Money for Change (2001), held in Birmingham, 
also heralded the development of a potential new sector. The combination of 
conferences, research reports, news features in the national press and the New 
Labour government’s policies were all factors influencing the focus of this thesis. 
This has led to a part-time longitudinal study of the UK CDFI sector, analysing 
data, policies and theories.   
 
Methodology 
  
The methodology was initially rooted in desk based research, which quickly 
identified that there was a limited literature of books and academic articles 
about this approach to lending in the UK. If CDFIs were mentioned it was often 
in connection to funding social enterprise (Pearce, 2003) or financing business 
in the developing world (Yunus and Jolie, 1999). However, one important 
source of information was the work of the New Economics Foundation on 
CDFIs (Mayo et al., 1998; Sattar and Fisher, 2000; Brown, Conaty and Mayo, 
2003). As the thesis has progressed, the growth in literature on CDFIs has been 
closely monitored and assessed.  
 
Primary data collection took the form of a series of semi-structured interviews 
with CDFIs and business support agencies. If individuals were unavailable for 
face-to-face interviews questions were emailed to them and they replied in their 
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own time. Open questions were used to allow the interviewee to give additional 
information (Brynner and Stribley, 1979). Some CDFIs were contacted a second 
time (after three or four years) to update the evidence-base. For example Street 
UK was interviewed three times because of their changing circumstances. 
Street UK’s Newcastle branch experienced staff changes and in 2004 it divided 
into two separate organisations. In addition, a number of interviews were held 
with business advisors and a bank business manager to ascertain the demand 
for loan finance. 
 
The research was supported by attending CDFI and social enterprise 
conferences. Listening to practitioners has been an important element of the 
research process. Gathering this information has allowed the thesis to capture 
the (uneven) development of CDFIs over the last decade.  
 
Overview of Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter One of the thesis explores my methodology and explains how my 
research experience and employment influenced the gathering of data. It will 
show that I had two periods of action research when I actively interviewed 
participants. In addition, I was also able to observe meetings with business 
support agencies and discuss funding issues with social enterprises. This 
section explains how I chose my research questions and importantly why I 
decided to perform a longitudinal study. Throughout the PhD process I 
continually carried out desk based research to keep the literature up to date and 
relevant.  
 
The second chapter the Literature Review aims to establish a wider context 
within which the development and role of CDFIs can be assessed. It will cover 
four main areas, beginning with the influence of relevant examples transferred 
from Europe, the USA and the Developing World will be identified, as UK CDFIs 
have been directly and indirectly influenced by the cross-national transfer of 
ideas and policies (SITF, 2000). In the late 1990s the International Association 
of Investors in the Social Economy (INAISE) offered a European perspective on 
lending organisations. In the USA, organisations such as the Brookings and the 
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Woodstock Institutes gave CDFIs a platform to show that they had a beneficial 
role in financial inclusion. Mark Pinsky, the President of the National Community 
Capital Association has written extensively about the history and issues of US 
CDFIs (Pinsky, 1995; 2001; 2002). Similarly Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank 
(Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Yunus, 2003) has been a source of inspiration for 
micro-finance in the UK (Copisarow, 2001).   
 
In the second part I will explore some of the contemporary debates about 
CDFIs. The campaigning and lobbying literature produced by organisations 
such as the New Economics Foundation (NEF) and supported by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (JRF) gave information and ideas about the role of 
CDFIs. NEF’s literature has both explained and lobbied in support of financial 
inclusion through these lending organisations (Mayo et al., 1998; Conaty et al., 
2004; Brown, 2008).  
 
The third part will scrutinise New Labour’s agenda since 1997 and the 
government’s plethora of policy documents, which have shaped the 
contemporary agenda (PAT 3, 1999; PAT 9, 1999, SEU, 2001; 2004). The 
details of these policies will be examined and interlinked with Third Way 
(Giddens, 1998; Blair, 1999; Driver and Martell, 1998; 2000) and 
Communitarian ideas established by Etzioni (1994; 1995; 1996; 2000).  
 
Fourthly, the review will examine the more recent evaluative literature on CDFIs 
(Brown, 2008; Nissan, 2008; Vik, 2009) and also identify the remaining gaps in 
the literature and the pressing research questions that remain. 
 
Chapter Three offers a range of definitions of CDFIs and questions whether 
they are sub-prime lenders or not. Sub-prime lenders like CDFIs have their 
markets in poorer districts with high levels of ethnic minorities (Immergluck and 
Smith, 2005; Mayer and Pence, 2008). The distinction between sub-prime 
lenders and CDFIs with social aims has become more important since the 
failure of the banking sector. The chapter focuses on the international 
influences on CDFIs in the UK. It will explore the policies around social 
investment and support for CDFIs in the USA.  It seems appropriate to begin by 
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looking at CDFIs in the USA because certain North American policies have 
been particularly influential on UK organisations (SITF 2000; Nissan, 2008; Vik, 
2009). Potentially, the USA has offered a blueprint for the development of the 
UK CDFI sector, both in models and supporting policies. The chapter will also 
develop a typology of CDFIs and identify how they can bring about financial 
inclusion. The latter sections will then examine wider influences and explore 
links between the developing and the developed world. It will argue that micro-
finance has travelled from the Indian sub-continent to Eastern Europe and then 
the UK (Copisarow, 2001).  
 
Chapter Four named The British New Wave has two purposes. Firstly, to 
explore the issues and circumstances that led to the developing interest in 
CDFIs in the UK during the 1990s, and also to examine, in detail, the work of 
the Social Investment Task Force (SITF) which tended to produce a wish list for 
the development of these lending organisations. It will then briefly identify some 
of factors influencing financial exclusion in the UK’s cities (Leyshon and Thrift, 
1994; 1995; Hughes, 1997). While alternative lending organisations had existed 
since the 1970s, by the end of the 1990s there were clear links developing 
between lending organisations and the work of campaigning research 
organisations and this combination was helping to create a prototype sector.  
 
Chapter Five will be the first of two case study chapters and will look at the 
development of national bodies such as the Charity Bank, Industrial Common 
Ownership Fund (ICOF) and the Triodos Bank. While two of these national 
lenders have histories going back to the 1970s, the Charity Bank is part of the 
‘New Wave’ of CDFIs with a history commencing in the 1990s. These CDFI 
examples fund the Third Sector made up of social enterprises, charities and 
mutuals. The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the case study 
methodology and will go on to examine each organisation’s development, 
failures and successes as they have developed over time. In addition, it will 
analyse figures from their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. This 
chapter begins to question the sustainability of these CDFIs.      
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Chapter Six focuses in detail on individual examples of three CDFIs at the sub-
national level. The majority of these case studies will come from what I called 
the ‘New Wave’. This name was chosen, because a number of CDFIs were 
established in the late 1990s and around the millennium to supply loans to 
specific areas. During the last ten to twelve years these organisations have had 
to gradually work out their roles through a combination of success and failure. 
While both ICOF and the Triodos Bank have both survived over twenty five 
years of trading, Street UK, the Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART) and the 
Community Loan Fund North East (CLFNE) are more youthful in comparison. 
Both ART and Street UK have been evaluated previously (Enterprise and Tym, 
2001; Copisarow, 2004; NEF, 2005). These CDFIs were selected because they 
offered alternative models and were innovative in different ways. Again, where 
possible the accounts have been used to illustrate the development of these 
organisations.  
 
While chapters five and six analyse a number of individual case studies, 
Chapter Seven takes the research a stage further and looks at the prototype 
sector. It adopts a more holistic approach and maps the Community 
Development Finance Association’s (CDFA) membership in 2004 to give a 
national picture. Mapping has been recognised as an important tool to ascertain 
the size and character of certain organisations such as social enterprises 
(ECOTEC, 2003; East Lothian Council, 2005; Forster et al., 2009). This chapter 
looks for correlations between areas of deprivation and financial exclusion and 
the development of CDFIs. It investigates what products and services were on 
offer in 2004 and 2009. It was important for the research to return to the 
membership after five years to analyse subsequent changes and developments. 
Over time, it can be argued that the prototype sector has matured into an 
established and recognised sector. Finally, the chapter draws out findings about 
the development of the CDFI sector and the CDFA membership. 
 
Chapter Eight: Conceptualising CDFIs acknowledges that while the 
development of CDFIs predates the arrival of New Labour into power in 1997, 
there are still valuable and informative inter-connections to be made between 
New Labour thinking and the later phases of CDFI development. The key ideas 
 19
shaping the Tony Blair government have been extensively covered in the 
literature exploring the Third Way (Powell, 1999; Driver and Martell, 2000; White, 
2001; Goes, 2004; Hale et al., 2004) and Communitarianism (Driver and Martell, 
1997; Barlow and Duncan, 2000; Bevir, 2005; Hale, 2005; 2007).  This chapter 
critically analyses some of the rhetoric about community (Blair, 1999). While 
there has been no political attempt to directly link support for CDFIs to Third 
Way or Communitarian ideas, New Labour’s support for the community sector, 
their attempt to join up social policies (Clark, 2002) and to tackle social 
exclusion, have all served to influence the growth of CDFIs.  
 
Chapter Nine aims to provide an overarching analysis of CDFIs and, in doing so, 
brings together a range of material from the earlier chapters. It also aims to 
cover more recent developments in relation to CDFIs. It charts the rise of the 
Community Development Finance Association and the increasing value of the 
membership’s funds. However, growth and expansion brought a range of issues, 
with funding being transferred from a national to a regional level. During the first 
decade of the twenty first century governmental support has waxed and waned 
and CDFIs have had to restate their case for support (Brown, 2008; Nissan, 
2008). The chapter charts the renewed support and enthusiasm for CDFIs with 
the developing recession and the ‘credit crunch.’  The chapter comprises of four 
interwoven narratives which cover:  
 
• An evaluation of the contribution of CDFIs;  
• An assessment of the problems of micro-finance in the UK;  
• A review of the impact of the uneven and variable nature of government 
support;  
• And the impact of the recession on CDFIs and their future sustainability.  
 
The Conclusion will draw together the findings from all of the chapters, suggest 
further areas of research on CDFIs and discusses recent developments in an 
ever-changing sector. I will make recommendations to support the UK CDFI 
sector. Finally the Postscript will very briefly look at David Cameron’s idea of a 
‘Big Society ‘ and how it may interlink with a Third Way and CDFIs.  
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Chapter One: The Research Methodology 
 
In the introduction I set out the structure and themes of the whole thesis. This 
chapter will explore some of the initial questions I had about CDFIs and my 
planned actions to provide answers. Over time some of the questions altered 
and other ideas were developed.    
 
The following chapter will be divided into five sections. In the first section I will 
briefly mention the foundations of the research. My previous research projects 
influenced the choice of subject for a PhD proposal. The following section will 
look at how I began to address the gaps in my knowledge through desk based 
research.  In the early part of the development of the thesis I had to decide on 
the methods and the timetable for my research. Overall, I needed to find ways 
to answer the initial research questions. These decisions were partially 
influenced by my personal circumstances such as full and part time employment. 
However, I had created a plan to take the thesis forward. 
 
The third section will look at availability of CDFI documents. I had to assess 
what types of documentation were obtainable and decide whether or not to use 
them.  The fourth section will contain two sub-sections looking at the action 
research and participant observation methodologies used during the 
development of the thesis. The final section of this chapter will discuss some of 
the positives and negatives of my research methodology.  
 
The Foundations of the Research 
 
This section will very briefly look at some of my previous research projects and 
illustrate how I became interested in CDFIs. It will show that around the 
millennium there was a lot of interest in the development of CDFIs. 
  
In 2000 I was employed to research various forms of exclusion such as financial 
exclusion in areas of Newcastle and social exclusion amongst asylum seekers. 
The majority of my research was in the North East of England and especially 
Newcastle upon Tyne. During a research project it was discovered within 
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certain areas of the city, the banks and building societies had withdrawn (Fuller 
et al., 2003). Academic research literature confirmed this trend was occurring in 
the UK and the USA (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). I built up an interest in how 
social, economic and financial exclusion seemed to be concentrated in certain 
districts of towns and cities. At the same time the Government were introducing 
localised interventions such as New Deal for Communities (Foley and Martin, 
2000; Dinham, 2005). On a personal level the Government seemed to be taking 
a proactive approach to the social problems in the UK’s disadvantaged urban 
areas. At that time it was too early to know whether New Deal for Communities 
and other measures would have positive affects. 
 
In addition to governmental interventions there were independent organisations 
such as credit unions being established to help address the financial issues of 
an area. While researching the Newcastle Employment Bond I came across 
Street UK, a micro-finance lender working in Newcastle (Affleck and Mellor, 
2005). The Newcastle office was being funded by the Bond and the Northern 
Rock Foundation. The Bond was a form of social investment that offered social 
benefits rather than financial rewards for investors and was funding a series of 
organisations to improve employment within the city. With further desk based 
research I found an element of social investment was associated with other 
lending organisations (Bruyn, 1987; ICOF, 1999). Some of the businesses or 
organisations involved in social investment were members of the UK Social 
Investment Forum (UKSIF). In 2000/2001 it had a mixed membership of ethical 
banks/building societies, a group of lending organisations and financial advisors 
(UKSIF, 2000; 2002). This was problematical, because it was not a cohesive 
group, but three separate strands. Over time the UKSIF membership altered 
(see case studies), which gave the organisation a new focus (UKSIF, 2005).   
 
In 2001 before starting the PhD I attended the Second Annual Community 
Development Finance Conference in Birmingham and some of the UKSIF 
membership attended. Amongst the attendees there were representatives from 
established CDFIs, organisations looking to become CDFIs, a few academics 
and members of the banking sector. At this conference, Paul Boateng as 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, gave a speech about the importance of 
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CDFIs (Boateng, 2001). Amongst some of the attendees there seemed to be a 
developing sector of lending organisations identifying themselves as 
Community Development Finance Institutions or Initiatives. At the same time 
there was a growing quantity of literature about CDFIs produced by the NEF.  
 
It was the combination of factors that led me to making a proposal to begin the 
PhD. At the time the developing CDFI sector was under represented within 
academic literature. I found the idea of supplying loans rather than grants 
interesting. However, anecdotal evidence suggested that there was confusion 
about the role of CDFIs and the recently introduced Phoenix Fund, which will be 
mentioned in later chapters. While researching other subjects I found grassroots 
organisations would mention grant funding not loan finance. Similarly, the local 
authority and other bodies would discuss regeneration through grants. At the 
same time NEF and the Social Investment Task Force (SITF) were looking 
towards loan finance as a way to regenerate areas.      
 
Even though reports had been published by NEF and the SITF there were gaps 
in knowledge about CDFIs and ideas were not permeating down to business 
development workers. Annually the sector was altering as the government 
introduced policies and funds. These changes further attracted me to this area 
of research.  
 
Overall, I wished to have a period of concentrated research to investigate 
CDFIs. I knew the content of the NEF reports, but had difficulty connecting 
these ideas with practice. During conversations with representatives from social 
enterprises, business support agencies and local authorities I found confusion 
about CDFIs. This level of uncertainty made me interested in carrying out the 
PhD study.   
 
The Initial Research Period 
 
This section will discuss some of the methodologies I used in the initial research. 
Some were discarded because they were inappropriate and others were 
developed further. My research questions appeared as I was exploring different 
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ways to carry out the research. My timetable for research was gradually worked 
out during the first year. 
 
During the initial research period I decided to solidify my knowledge through 
further desk based research to assemble sufficient literature. This work has 
contributed to the following literature review chapter. As part of the literature 
search I began looking at how to plan the research. I concentrated on social 
science methodologies to find an appropriate way to examine these lending 
organisations. Bell and Opie (2002) offered ways to plan post graduate 
research and a range of methodologies to carry out the process. 
 
Berger and Patchner (1988) recommended that research should aim to 
investigate variables such as the type of organisation or the level of 
performance or their achievements. During the development of the proposal 
and my initial research I identified different types of CDFIs offering a range of 
loans. I thought it would be difficult to compare newly formed organisations with 
long established CDFIs. So the thesis has concentrated on the variety of CDFIs 
in the UK.  
 
Later after gathering data I looked at more research methodologies and Grix 
(2004) suggested simplifying organisations down to their essential 
characteristics. It was proposed that a model could explain how organisations or 
humans may behave (Grix, 2004). Again this proved problematic since there 
were too many variable characteristics and CDFIs offered different loans to an 
array of customers. Similarly, their revenue and capital funding for running the 
business and lending to customers respectively came from various sources. 
CDFIs worked locally, regionally, nationally and even internationally. Rather 
than models I decided to focus on organisational reviews or case studies, which 
would investigate the whole organisation (Stringer, 1999). I saw CDFIs as being 
part of a sector, but also supplying local demand and therefore the case study 
methodology had credibility. The organisation review or case study would 
interrogate the mission, the goals, the structure, the operation and the problems 
of an organisation (Stringer, 1999). During the research this method proved 
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more and more fruitful as different characteristics were identified within CDFIs. 
This delineated one CDFI from another, but also showed connections.  
 
By examining case studies of CDFIs my initial research questions and ideas 
were strengthened. At a very basic level research needs a question or a 
hypothesis (Berger and Patchner, 1988) and two of my initial questions were:  
 
• What was social about CDFIs? 
• How could CDFIs bring about financial inclusion?   
 
It was necessary to look at the organisations and the potential markets for CDFI 
finance. Research showed that CDFIs were not intending to replace the banks, 
but were supplying loans to businesses excluded from bank finance.  
 
I began using action research because this methodology focused on asking 
who, what, how, where and when (Stringer, 1999).  These questions linked up 
with the process of carrying out a series of organisational reviews. The research 
questions could be made more complex and use two variables such as age and 
profitability. Berger and Patchner (1988) stated that a hypothesis speculates on 
the relationship between two or more variables. Another two potential questions 
were formulated:  
 
• Could the longevity of a CDFI be interconnected with their financial 
sustainability? 
• Could the size of loans affect the financial sustainability of the CDFI? 
 
One of the case study CDFIs, ICOF had made losses, but continued to lend to 
co-operatives and social enterprises. Another organisation, Street UK was 
intending to make very small loans to micro-businesses and become financially 
sustainable. Sustainability was an issue as the CDFA defined a CDFI as being 
a sustainable lending organisation (CDFA, 2002). However, many of the UK 
CDFIs were in receipt of grant funding. In the early period of research, the 
rhetoric about sustainability from the CDFIs and their Association did not match 
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the individual profit and loss accounts.  In terms of micro-finance, financial 
sustainability has been defined as the breakeven point where costs and income 
are equal with the donor providing the initial capital (Adongo and Stork, 2005). 
Morduch (1999a) identified that repeated grants from donors made the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh sustainable. A recent CDFI publication (GHK, 
2010) defined two types of sustainability: 
 
1. Operational sustainability covering the organisation’s costs; 
2. Financial sustainability included both costs and capital. 
 
During the research, I was interested in both operational and financial 
sustainability, because CDFIs were generating capital through social 
investments (see case studies of ART and ICOF) and receiving grants for both 
capital and running costs. It was difficult to understand how a small CDFI could 
produce enough income to cover its costs.    
 
Questions were developed as the research progressed and knowledge about 
organisations was collected and reflected upon. During the initial research I had 
assembled a few questions, which were further developed as the research 
process progressed. During 2002 and 2003 I carried out fieldwork using action 
research and asked participants about their organisations and how they were to 
achieve their goals. In addition I was beginning to work out a timetable for the 
research process.  
  
I carried out the research while working on other connected projects. During the 
initial period the research full time and then it became part time. However, 
during periods of part time working I concentrated on the thesis and re-
interviewed participants. The thesis was researched and written up part time 
and therefore was developed into a longitudinal study.  
 
In the beginning I thought I would have sufficient data after one round of 
interviews. However, some participants had just started working for their 
organisations so their answers were vague. 
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Figure 1: Timetable of PhD research 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Figure 1 shows this first round of fieldwork and action research from 2002 to 
2004. Over time government policies affecting CDFIs were discussed and 
implemented. However, these policies had little time to be embedded and 
evaluated, which made a short term study problematic. The CDFI sector was 
not static, but was developing with the input of Phoenix Fund money. I realised 
that I could either capture a snapshot of a developing sector or perform a 
longitudinal study and look for trends. After the initial full time research I knew I 
had to extend my timetable to take into account the changing sector and a 
longitudinal study seemed the way forward.   
 
A longitudinal study can analyse social phenomena and allow the measurement 
of changes (Miller and Brewer, 2003). Ruspini (2002) suggested that a 
longitudinal study was the observation of subjects over an unspecified time. I 
could choose to return to participants at any time. The longitudinal methodology 
allowed a more detailed image of the CDFI sector to be assembled. One of the 
reasons for extending the research period was during the initial field work some 
of the loan managers such as John Hall at Street UK and Rod Jones of the 
CLFNE had been in positions for less than one and two years respectively. 
However, chief executives and managers such as Steve Walker at ART and 
Malcolm Hayday of the Charity Bank had at least five years experience of 
Continual checking the available literature (reports, articles, 
policy documents etc.) 
Initial desk 
based 
research 
Fieldwork Fieldwork 
Action Research 
Participant Observation 
Action Research 
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lending to their target borrowers. Figure 1 documents my time carrying out 
additional fieldwork and re-interviewing a number of individuals in 2007. This 
allowed me to understand how their circumstances and issues had changed 
over time. 
 
I was influenced by Ruspini (2002) in planning the research as she identified 
three longitudinal research designs such as: 
 
• Repeated cross-sectional studies to follow the trends using different 
samples; 
• Repeatedly interviewing the same subjects over time; 
• And retrospective longitudinal studies asking interviewees to look 
back at events. 
 
My thesis encompassed all of these designs in an attempt to give a more 
holistic picture of the developing CDFI sector. One of the problems of carrying 
out longitudinal research using a cross-sectional design can be that many 
different subjects can be studied over time giving information on a macro level 
(Ruspini, 2002). At the start I investigated a sample of the membership of the 
Community Development Finance Association (an organisation I will mention in 
more depth in later chapters). However, I found that the membership was too 
varied and fluctuated annually, which made using different samples problematic. 
Eventually, I investigated the membership in the two sample years of 2004 and 
2009 to give a more complete picture.       
 
It has been suggested that in a second wave of research interviewees often 
answer differently than the first time, which may be because ‘they have lost 
some of their inhibitions, or because they have had new, different experiences 
during the time that has elapsed’ (Ruspini, 2002, p.73). Ruspini (2002) 
recognised that interviewees could leave their organisations giving gaps in the 
data. I found both these suggestions by Ruspini (2002) to be true with 
interviewees being more confident the second time around and staff moved to 
different organisations.  
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Overall I had a foundation that focused on exclusion and a number of research 
questions. I was thinking about a longitudinal study over potentially four to five 
years. This time period was extended (see Figure 1), because the sector was 
developing. I needed to identify methodologies to help answer my questions. 
The following section will show that the methods changed over time as the 
thesis was gradually formed. 
 
Documents 
 
This section will describe my choice of documents and the methods that were 
used during the research. In 2002 there were many organisations attending 
CDFI conferences, but a limited amount of literature. This proved both positive 
and negative in that it was a new area of research suitable for a thesis and 
there were no significant ideas guiding the research. I needed to find an 
appropriate literature that would stand up to scrutiny.  
 
During the initial research I found there were a few books about CDFIs, a 
number of reports and very few academic papers (see the literature review). I 
began using the annual reports of the CDFIs, newspaper stories and 
newsletters to gather data. Stringer (1999) was used as a guide to check the 
validity of the materials. It has been recognised that documents can supply a 
great deal of important information (Stringer, 1999). Potential documents for 
research purposes will contain: 
 
‘memos, minutes, records, official reports, press accounts, public 
relations materials, information statements and newsletters’ (Stringer, 
1999, p. 73). 
 
Policy documents could contain information about an organisation and annual 
reports hold details on the structure, aims, operations and resources of the 
organisation (Stringer, 1999). It was recommended that researchers ask about 
relevant documents during interviews (Stringer, 1999). For me this had mixed 
results with interviewees either becoming defensive or offering full accounts. 
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Bell has suggested there were two approaches to using an organisation’s 
documents. In Bell’s (2005, p. 123) ‘source oriented’ approach the availability of 
documents would determine the project and guide the generation of research 
questions.  The feasibility of the project would be influenced by the extent of 
available documents (Bell, 2005). Organisations such as the Triodos Bank and 
ART generously provided their annual reports and were appropriate case 
studies. Street UK provided limited documents, but was willing to be interviewed 
in depth. Bell (2005, p. 123) suggested a second approach called ‘problem-
oriented’ involved using other research methods and then investigating 
documents. This research method used secondary materials before researching 
the appropriate primary sources.  
 
I used this methodology when I used the CDFA’s and NEF’s reports. I examined 
the reports as secondary sources and then approached individual CDFIs for 
primary data.  Documents can be divided into primary and secondary sources 
and these secondary sources have been described as ‘interpretations of events’ 
(Bell, 2005, p. 125) during the research period. The primary sources were from 
the organisation itself such as the minutes. The annual CDFA reports gave an 
overall picture of the sector, such as the number of CDFIs. Content analysis 
was used to investigate the annual reports of a number of organisations. This 
method has been used to analyse bias found in news reporting (Bell, 2005). 
Often the annual reports for the CDFIs were combined with the organisation’s 
accounts, so they could not ignore financial problems. CDFI annual reports 
would contain the positive aspect of jobs created and the number of loans, but 
would also mention any bad debts and potential under performance. With 
organisations such as Shared Interest and ICOF having shareholders it was 
important to have financial transparency, because investors did not want to lose 
their money. Once again ICOF’s reports would mention any bad debts that had 
been accrued during the year.        
 
The individual CDFIs and the CDFA’s sector reports over time allowed what has 
been called ‘temporal analysis’ (Ruspini, 2002, p. 108). I could identify trends 
developing over time. I recorded annual figures such as the number of jobs 
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created, the annual amounts being out on loan and their reserves in the bank to 
identify trends (see the later case studies).   
 
Stringer’s (1999) suggested using company literature and press reports. I found 
that press accounts varied in their usefulness, because some loan managers 
had little experience of the media. Similarly some public relation materials were 
naïve and obviously very much biased towards a positive image of the 
organisation. Overall, I had to be selective with my sources of information. 
 
As the research progressed the literature available increased as the academic 
literature, CDFI, CDFA and NEF reports were produced. Figure 1 illustrates that 
I continually checked for additional literature and policy changes. This desk 
based research was only part of the methodology. I needed the stories and the 
opinions of individuals working in CDFIs, enterprise agencies and business to 
give a fuller picture.  I used action research and participant observation and 
snowball sampling to achieve this goal. 
 
Methodologies 
 
Methodology: Action Research 
 
Since the CDFI sector was changing I needed a methodology that was 
reflective and with advice from my supervisor and more experienced colleagues 
I explored and used action research. Action research processes: 
 
• Are rigorously empirical and reflective (or interpretive) 
• Engage people who have traditionally been called subjects as 
active participants in the research process 
• Results in some practical outcome related to the lives or work of 
the participants’ (Stringer, 1999, p. xviii). 
 
I appreciated that new members of staff within fledgling CDFIs were developing 
their ideas and organisations in tandem as I researched them. The 
organisations themselves were asking questions about ways to bring about 
financial inclusion and how to become sustainable. Reason and Bradbury (2006) 
 31
found that action research was participatory and it brought together reflection, 
theory and practice. I was interested in it because it could be used to find 
practical solutions to issues affecting individuals and communities (Reason and 
Bradbury, 2006; Stringer, 1999). During the research I was looking at financial 
exclusion and how CDFIs brought about inclusion. I investigated their products 
and services and questioned their financial sustainability to find answers to the 
research questions. Stringer (1999) saw community action research as a 
process that looks, thinks and acts. I re-interviewed a number of participants 
after reflecting on my original data and how far the sector had changed. The 
following chapters show that UK CDFIs have developed and diversified over 
time.   
 
Dane (2010) saw action research as a method to solve purely social problems. 
However, I wanted to get a picture of the social, economic and financial issues 
and after some deliberation set up my first round of interviews.  I did not want to 
just interview CDFIs, because the supply and demand for loan finance were 
interlinked. I had issues about the number of interviews and sets of questions 
sent to organisations. In terms of the CDFA membership I carried out Internet 
searches on all organisations working as CDFIs in 2004 and 2009. However, I 
was more selective in my choice of interviews and I wished to interview a range 
of organisations from three distinct types of organisations: 
 
• CDFIs 
• Business support agencies 
• Businesses and social enterprises   
 
The CDFIs would supply the finance and the businesses and social enterprises 
would be the source of demand. Finally I interviewed business support agencies 
and a business bank manager to ascertain their knowledge of CDFIs. These 
organisations could be conduits for demand and link potential borrowers with 
lenders.    
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The initial desk based research led to a small number of interviews. I was 
researching the different CDFI organisations and their potential markets. I 
decided to use snowball sampling and asked participants who else I should 
contact. Snowball sampling or chain referral has been recognised as an 
acceptable method of research (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Van Meter, 1990; 
Dane, 2010). It has been used to research hidden populations such as drug 
users (Van Meter, 1990). However, my hidden population was made up of 
businesses that had borrowed from CDFIs, social enterprises, business support 
agencies and even CDFIs. There was no North East directory of social 
enterprises to find participants and some CDFIs and business support agencies 
had no Internet presence and advertised with posters and leaflets on a localised 
basis. Through snowball sampling certain individuals and organisations were 
repeatedly mentioned by interviewees as potential sources of information. Often 
interviewees would supply the name of a contact within an organisation and 
their telephone number or email address. A small number of participants were 
inappropriate, but many suggestions proved useful. However, this process also 
highlighted the poor communication links between business support agencies 
and the developing CDFI sector.  
 
During this period I was learning about the demand for loan finance from 
businesses and social enterprises and improving my questions. When I carried 
out a second phase of interviews in 2007 – 2008 my questions had altered and 
interviewees had more knowledge and experience of CDFIs. By having two 
periods of action research interviewing participants I think I gathered better data. 
 
This was only part of my research methodology and because of other research 
projects I was meeting business support agencies and social enterprises. I had 
opportunities to observe organisations discussing funding. I started to research 
participatory observation techniques (Stringer, 1999) and formalise my 
approach to gathering data. Originally, the process was ad hoc, but gradually 
became organised and systematic. Through a series of research projects, jobs 
within the social enterprise sector and a board membership I was better able to 
understand the interactions between business support agencies, CDFIs and 
potential borrowers.       
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Methodology: Observation 
 
I have been given various opportunities to observe organisations and hear 
about funding and development issues. Two significant opportunities were: 
 
• Joining a management board of a business support agency; 
•  And working for a social enterprise. 
 
In 2005 I joined the board of FIN Enterprise Support, a small business support 
agency based in Newcastle. This unpaid role allowed me to observe an 
organisation advising start ups and existing businesses. During my four years 
as a board member I attended meetings about business development and met 
Business Link advisors and other business support agencies employees. This 
gave me an insight into the business grants available in disadvantaged areas, 
the accessibility of bank finance and the opportunities for CDFIs. 
 
From 2007 to 2008 I was the network co-ordinator at Social Enterprise Tyneside. 
This role gave me the opportunity to speak to social enterprises about their 
funding issues. Overall, it gave me an insight into debates about loans versus 
grants. The government’s Future Builders scheme (which will be mentioned in 
later chapters) was also discussed by social enterprises wishing to expand. 
Similarly, research projects gave me the opportunity to observe interactions 
between businesses, support agencies and CDFIs.  
 
Observational research can involve recording:  
 
• Places: the community context or the location of activities 
• People: individuals or formal positions  
• Activities: a set of related acts 
• Purposes: what the organisation is trying to accomplish 
• Time: time or frequency of events (Stringer, 1999) 
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The research investigated the location and type of activities and the purpose of 
the organisation. In observational research, planning and piloting are essential 
(Bell, 2005) and initially I asked to attend meetings and events. Gradually 
individuals and organisations knew I had an interest in CDFIs for my personal 
research.  
 
Over time and because of previous research I was being invited to events 
where organisations discussed bank and CDFI loans, council business grants 
and support for social enterprise.  Participant observation has been described 
as a ‘research method in which the researcher becomes part of the events 
being observed’ (Dane, 2010, p. 331). Also Dane (2010) suggested a 
participant as observer would be known as a researcher, but participating in 
activities. Similarly for Bell (2005) participant observation involved the 
researcher taking part in the life of an individual, group or community and 
observing, questioning and understanding the issues involved. I was able to 
both observe and contribute to meetings.  
 
This method can reveal characteristics of groups which would be difficult with 
other techniques (Bell, 2005). It has been stated that interviews show people’s 
perceptions of what happens in an organisation, but observation can reveal 
what actually happens (Bell, 2005). Unstructured observation allows the 
researcher to postpone definitions and develop their ideas (Bowling, 2002). This 
method allowed data to be gathered and then ideas could be elaborated on 
through further fieldwork (Bowling, 2002). Bell (2005) thought that unstructured 
observation could generate hypotheses and I found that new ideas were 
created through reflection. In addition, the observation methodology confirmed 
and disproved my proposals.  
 
However, this form of research has been criticised, because it can be subjective, 
impressionistic and idiosyncratic (Bell, 2005). There can be a scarcity of 
opportunities to observe or the researcher could become very involved (Dane, 
2010). Bell (2005) stated that bias can especially occur when the researcher 
observes their own organisation. I never observed an organisation I was 
employed in such as Social Enterprise Tyneside, but used the position to 
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observe social enterprises seeking grant and loan funding. It has been stated 
this method could aid the researcher to build up trends and understand the 
language of the participants (Bell, 2005). I did not find trends through 
observation, but it helped me to recognise the language of commercial 
businesses and social enterprises. My trends were identified in the CDFA and 
individual CDFI reports. 
 
Positives and Negatives: The Conclusion 
 
One of the positives of carrying out a longitudinal study has been that it has 
shown trends within organisations. Similarly, it has shown that policies have 
been short term and changes in policy have had detrimental affects to the 
sector. The CDFI sector has been in a constant state of change over a ten year 
period. I feel that I have achieved a balance between a fine grain exploration of 
individual CDFIs and a holistic picture of a sector.  
 
One positive feature is that I have allowed ideas to become embedded over 
time. I have re-interviewed some loan managers and business development 
workers after a four year interval and their knowledge and the organisation’s 
systems had improved over time. Another positive element has been that I was 
able to ‘embed’ myself into the social enterprise sector. Organisations have 
allowed me to observe their meetings and use their reports. It took a number of 
years to build up relationships, to be invited to meetings and be asked onto 
management boards. While working with social enterprises I explained my 
interest in CDFIs. This led to people knowing about my thesis and inviting me to 
attend events. It would have been impossible within a short term study to work 
with social enterprises and join the board of a business support agency.   
 
The negatives of performing a longitudinal study are:  
 
• The time commitment;  
• The constant changes such as staff movements; 
• Organisations merging or changing their names.  
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At times contacts would changes and I would have to begin explaining my 
interest in CDFIs again.  
 
One negative element was the introduction of potential policies. The 
Government would consult with stakeholders about potential policies, receive 
answers and then nothing seemed to happen. In the case of the Social 
Investment Bank the potential funds were being linked to CDFIs, but the idea 
seemed to be dropped from the Government’s agenda for two years after a 
major consultation. The stakeholders such as CDFIs did not know whether the 
Social Investment Bank would bring funds into the sector or not. It was difficult 
to ascertain if anything was happening with the policy. The change from Blair to 
Brown and now Cameron has proved problematic as discussions about the 
Third Way have gradually altered and been replaced. This instability has proved 
a challenge to be solved. 
 
In conclusion I feel satisfied with this longitudinal study. If I had stopped my 
research after three years then a very different thesis would have been written. 
This thesis was submitted in early 2010 just before the change in Government. 
This seemed to be a suitable endpoint to finish the research and writing up. I 
have included a postscript about the change in Government and the potential 
for Cameron’s ‘Big Society’.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
This literature review aims to establish a wider context within which the 
development and role of CDFIs can be assessed. Four areas will be examined. 
Firstly, the influence of relevant examples transferred from Europe, the USA 
and the developing world will be identified, as UK CDFIs have been directly and 
indirectly influenced by the cross-national transfer of ideas and policies (SITF, 
2000). Secondly, contemporary debates about CDFIs have their roots in the 
1970s about micro-finance and CDFIs, and are found within the campaigning 
and lobbying literature produced by organisations such as the NEF. Thirdly, 
New Labour’s espousal of the Third Way agenda since 1997 has brought forth a 
plethora of policy documents which have shaped the contemporary agenda. 
These will be detailed, and the relationship to Third Way and Communitarian 
ideas established. Fourthly, the review will examine the more recent evaluative 
literature on CDFIs and also identify the remaining gaps in the literature and in 
research.  
 
The International Context 
 
European Perspectives 
  
The International Association of Investors in the Social Economy (INAISE) has 
published a series of reports exploring not only the social economy or the Third 
Sector, but also micro-finance and micro businesses. In the late 1990s this pan- 
European organisation produced a directory of Financial Instruments of the 
Social Economy in Europe and their impact on job creation (INAISE, 1997). This 
early document looked at the mechanisms used to finance micro-enterprise and 
the social economy. It identified the age and characteristics of the different 
organisations within the developing sector and grouped them into types. It acted 
as a directory, but also recognised some of the problems of lenders, such as 
the costs associated with micro-finance. It mentioned the laws, policies and 
taxes that would impede the take up of self-employment and the growth of loan 
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funds. However, like many of the INAISE reports from this period it does not 
actually use the term CDFI.  
 
Two years later, the First European Forum on Social Investment Report: 
Upscaling social investment to create jobs (INAISE, 1999) was published.  The 
report was important in that it supplied a series of concise descriptions and 
histories of a range of lending organisations. For example Banca Etica from 
Italy, Aston Reinvestment Trust, the French investment clubs called the Cigales, 
North American time banks, the Triodos Bank and the Prince’s Trust all featured 
in the conference and accompanying report. Continuing this approach, in 2000 
INAISE published 50 Case Studies on Upscaling Social Investment (Sattar, et 
al., 2000), which offered an international perspective on policies, including the 
USA’s Community Reinvestment Act (CRA 1997). It also provided a series of 
case studies drawn from the UK, the USA and France. Authors from INAISE 
and NEF co-edited Banking and Social Cohesion (Guene and Mayo, 2001) 
which explored current and past pioneers in social banking and the potential to 
mainstream social responsibility in the banking sector. The final section 
explored regulating or persuading the banks to be inclusive rather than ‘cherry 
picking’ the best customers.  
 
This European literature added to the range of examples of lending 
organisations. The examples were often specific to certain countries and built 
up a picture of alternative sources of business finance that worked within legal 
frameworks. The majority of the membership of INAISE was European, but the 
literature did attempt to provide a wider, global perspective. 
 
North American Influences 
 
In the USA, organisations such as the Brookings, the Woodstock and the 
National Housing Institutes gave CDFIs a platform to show that they had a 
beneficial role in financial inclusion. Some of these articles and reports would 
subsequently prove influential in forming opinion and developing ideas in the 
UK. 
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Several authors established a coherent historical dimension (Bates, 2000; 
Pinsky, 2001; Okagaki and Moy, 2001). Bates (2000) compared Clinton’s 
Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) program with earlier 
interventions, such as the Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment 
Company (MESBIC) programme created in the 1960s. He suggested that 
CDFIs would have to avoid high cost lending to not have the same history as 
the MESBIC programme. In 2001 the Brookings Institute published Taking 
Stock: CDFIs Look Ahead After 25 Years of Community Development Finance 
by Mark Pinsky, the then President of the National Community Capital 
Association. This document reported positively on low loss rates and growing 
loan funds within CDFIs. It provided a solid historical perspective going back to 
the redlining of communities during the credit boom of the 1960s. In the USA 
redlining has been identified as ‘the refusal of lenders to make mortgage loans 
in certain areas regardless of the creditworthiness of the individual loan 
application’ (Berkovec et al., 1994, p.263). For Pinsky (2001) redlining existed 
and he set out how financial exclusion had been caused both by financial 
rationalisation and the state reducing its interventions. However, others have 
suggested that redlining may be connected with other factors such as 
geographical location, racial discrimination or low income (Berkovec et al., 
1994; Tootell, 1996; Ross and Tootell, 2004).  Pinsky used elements from Alan 
Okagaki and Kirsten Moy’s Changing Capital Markets and Their Implications for 
Community Development Finance (2001). Importantly, Okagaki and Moy in their 
history of the sector identified some of the failures of early CDFIs. These 
authors looked at the history of CDFIs and made recommendations for the 
future.  
 
The policy that most differentiates the USA from the UK has been the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) passed in 1977. President Carter’s 
introduction of the CRA, which forced the banks into lending in more 
disadvantaged areas, has been well documented (Macey and Miller, 1993; 
Immergluck, 2004; Dreier, 1991). Susan White Haag (2002) in her ‘Community 
Reinvestment: A Review of Urban Outcomes and Challenges’ looked at the 
CRA and also President Clinton’s measures to further help finance poorer 
districts. In the 1990s, the CRA helped to expand mortgages in disadvantaged 
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areas and create a community development structure within banks. The CRA 
policy has been strongly connected to the Democratic Party and it has tended to 
suffer during Republican presidencies. George W. Bush’s policies of 
withdrawing funds from CDFIs have been documented over his two terms of 
office (Fogarty, 2001; Immergluck, 2004; Barr, 2005; Bergman and Osuri, 2005; 
Credit Union Journal, 2008).  
 
Not every author was in favour of CRA (Barr, 2005). Despite the CRA reversing 
the trend for finance to leave certain geographical areas, some writers still point 
to the continuation of financial exclusion (Dreier, 1991; Immergluck, 2004; Barr, 
2005). Klausner (1995) thought that the CRA was an ill defined form of localism 
or Communitarianism and others saw the CRA as being outdated and badly 
designed (Macey and Miller, 1993; Barr, 2005). Some have also argued that 
there has not been a market failure by the banks and the costs of running the 
CRA outweigh the limited benefits (Barr, 2005). Barr (2005) produced a 140 
page document focused on the CRA and cited that certain legal scholars 
questioned the empirical evidence for setting up the CRA. The CRA made 
banks give unprofitable loans with few benefits. Similarly, literature that 
suggested that competition for credit had driven out discrimination (Barr, 2005). 
However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explained that there would always be 
rationing of credit as demand would be greater than the supply and the banks 
would assess the risk of each loan. 
 
The literature also highlights the issue of home mortgages - another difference 
between UK and USA CDFIs. For example, Avery et al. (1999) looked at how 
CDFI mortgages had developed and examined potential trends. The research 
found that there was not a correlation between the banks consolidating and the 
number of mortgages in poorer areas (Avery et al., 1999). Literature has 
questioned the need for additional sources of funding (Dreier, 1991; 
Immergluck, 2004; Barr, 2005). At the start of the recession the Federal 
Government’s CDFI Fund produced research into CDFI mortgages highlighting 
the successful strategies of CDFIs (Mayer et al., 2008). Research has shown 
diminished levels of home ownership amongst black and Hispanic households 
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and home ownership has had a strong link with levels of income (Molseed, 
2008; Dickstein et al., 2008).  
 
The policies towards CDFIs during the Clinton’s presidency have been well 
covered in the literature. In an early article, Coalition of Lenders and Investors 
Help Create the Community Development Financial Institution Act of 1994, 
Pinsky (1995) commented on the setting up of the CDFI Fund and stated it was 
a significant milestone that gave the CDFIs credibility. The Brookings Institute 
published a report looking at President Clinton’s Community Development 
Corporation Tax Credit Programme of 1993 and recommended its expansion 
and the size of the tax credit should be appropriate for the project (Steinbach, 
1998). While Clinton’s policy called New Markets Tax Credit was discussed as a 
way of attracting money to CDFIs working in poorer areas (Nowak, 2001; 
Forbes, 2005; Sass Rubin and Stankiewicz, 2005).  
 
The Republican’s lack of support of CDFIs can be found in a series of articles 
about cuts to the CDFI Fund in the USA (Fogarty, 2001; Bergman and Osuri, 
2005; Credit Union Journal, 2008). These articles reflect the Republican’s free 
market approach to loan finance. Finding ways to attract funds to areas for 
economic development was not just a North American problem. Forbes (2005) 
contrasted the USA’s tax credit scheme with earlier Empowerment Zones - an 
idea from the UK. Marshall (2004) compared financial institutions in 
disadvantaged areas in both the USA and the UK. In the UK, NEF’s publications 
concentrated on North America, but very few articles and reports reciprocated 
the process. 
 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has published data and 
research information about community finance and CDFIs since the 1990s. Part 
of its role as a public body was to inform both the banks and the CDFI sector. 
The OCC’s Effective Strategies for Community Development Finance (2001) 
was aimed at helping the banks to engage in community development finance. 
Similarly, Pinsky (2002) produced the article Growing Opportunities in 
Bank/CDFI Partnerships in the OCC’s Community Developments periodical 
offered information on better working practices. The OCC’s publications 
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Community Developments: Community Affairs Online News Articles did 
occasionally focus on CDFIs, the CDFI Fund and the Community Reinvestment 
Act (1977) (OCC, 2001; 2002).  In addition the United States General 
Accounting Office and the CDFI Fund (ABT Associates, 2007) monitored the 
progress of the CDFI sector. 
 
CDFIs were seen as having financial credibility, because they managed risk and 
were able to generate income (Nowak, 2001). However, there were problems 
with the transparency of some CDFIs, which made them less attractive to 
investors (Benjamin et al, 2004). As in the UK, some questioned whether CDFIs 
should be sustainable (Benjamin et al., 2004; Brown, 2008). Even in the USA, 
the literature supplied evidence of a strong sector with supportive policies in 
place, but also a need for further development (Nowak, 2001; Sass Rubin, 
2007). However, there were other influences and micro-finance was seen as a 
product that could be transferred from the developing world to the developed. 
 
Micro-finance in the Developing World  
 
Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank developed by the Nobel Prize winner, Professor 
Mohammed Yunus, has been recognised by the UK national press as an 
important initiative from which to learn. (Kay, 2004; Carlin, 2006; Tripathi, 2006; 
Benjamin, 2009). Similarly, the academic articles have focused on the Grameen 
Bank (Hassan and Renteria-Guerrero, 1997; Hussain, et al., 2001; Hassan, 
2002). This literature on the Grameen Bank can be divided into two sections. 
 
The first is positive and celebratory (Khandker et al., 1995; Yunus, 2003; Carlin, 
2006; Counts, 2008; Benjamin, 2009). The bank’s inclusive aims, the number of 
people it serves, and the low default rate have been viewed positively 
(Khandker et al, 1995; Jain, 1996). The data from the 1990s showed that with 
micro-finance, household incomes increased:  The impact of micro-credit on 
poverty: evidence from Bangladesh used statistics to show a reduction in 
poverty (Jahangir Alam Chowdhury et al., 2005). Similarly, Zaman (2004) 
produced a working paper for the World Bank, which gave a positive spin on 
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micro-finance within Bangladesh, but also questioned the empowerment 
debate.  
 
The second form of literature has questioned different aspects of the Grameen 
Bank and micro-finance. Its use of peer group lending has been questioned 
(Jain, 1996; Rai and Sjöström, 2004) as it has focused on female lenders and 
peer pressure (Beasley and Coate, 1995; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rahman, 
1999). The empowerment of women has often featured in discussions about 
micro-finance (Hashemi et al., 1996; Mayoux, 2001). Mayoux (1998) explored 
the benefits to women and suggested further research was necessary to 
confirm the suggested positive outcomes. Khandker (2003) gave a mixed 
review of micro-finance mentioning the disappointing results in lifting people out 
of poverty, but highlighting its importance to the rural poor. Similarly, McKeman 
(2002) questioned impact of micro-finance on self-employment and profits in the 
developing world. 
 
Tripathi (2006) argued that micro-finance should not be seen as a universal tool 
for getting the poor out of poverty. Rogaly (1996) questioned the profitability of 
micro-finance in the article Micro-Finance Evangelism, 'Destitute Women', and 
the Hard Selling of a New Anti-Poverty Formula. In addition, Rogaly (1996) 
questioned the evangelism by some advocates of micro-finance in the 
developing world. In a similar vein to Tripathi, the author concluded that micro-
finance may not be the complete panacea to lift people out of poverty (Rogaly, 
1996).  Amin et al. (2003) questioned whether this form of finance reached the 
poor of Bangladesh.   
 
Micro-finance was not just part of the developing world but is also linked to 
debates in Eastern Europe. Micro-finance in Russia by Bossoutrot (2005) 
discussed four types of micro lending organisations: specialist banks; NGOs; 
membership organisations; and public funds. The founder of Street UK also 
reported on a successful Polish micro-finance lender, Fundusz Mikro 
(Copisarow, 2001).  
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Overall, the literature on micro-finance has added to debates about CDFIs. But, 
the literature on micro-finance has been ambiguous, with a series of positive 
and negative stories. Even in the developing world, its success has been mixed. 
Thus, debates on empowerment and peer pressure on women have been far 
from conclusive.  
 
The Campaigning Literature 
 
This section will examine the literature explaining (and promoting) CDFIs in the 
UK. An important starting point is Bruyn’s seminal work, The Field of Social 
Investment (1987). Using data from North America, Bruyn connected social 
investment to a range of organisations, including community development 
finance institutions, credit unions and corporations. He offered a range of 
definitions, from the descriptive to the theoretical, but perhaps his most 
important contribution was the normative dimension he provided by arguing 
that: 
 
‘Social investment is the allocation of capital to advance the social and 
economic well-being of people’ (Bruyn, 1987, p. 13). 
 
This emphasis was taken up in the 1990s by organisations such as the New 
Economics Foundation whose reports promoted CDFIs to a greater audience 
(NEF, 1998; Collard, Kempson and Whyley, 2001; Collin et al., 2001). The NEF 
and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) made an important contribution to 
the debate about CDFIs in the UK with the report Small is Bankable: 
Community Reinvestment in the UK (Mayo et al., 1998).  This piece of research 
established many of the key themes of subsequent work, such as the relevance 
of CDFI policies in the USA, the potential for sustainability, low levels of bad 
debts and the five different forms of community finance initiative. Community 
finance was placed squarely between public grants (social return) and private 
sector investment (financial return). It concluded by offering scope for the 
development of community finance in the UK.  
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The role of NEF should not be under-estimated as the organisation seemed 
vibrant and full of ideas. NEF was writing about social and economic problems 
and offering solutions such as improving regeneration projects by measuring 
their social impacts (Walker et al., 2000), improving the monetary system 
(Robertson and Huber, 2000) and stabilising the financial markets through 
currency transaction tax (Simms et al., 2001).  The role of micro-finance in the 
developing and the developed world was explored in two NEF documents 
(Mayo et al., 1998 and Rogaly et al., 1999). In another NEF report, The scope 
for tax credits for social investment highlighted a ‘Robin Hood model’ for the 
transfer of funds from haves to have nots and how a small number of investors 
had accepted low financial return investments in favour of social investments 
(McGeehan, Mayo and Sattar, 2000). The report also argued that social 
investments should be made more attractive through tax benefits (McGeehan, 
Mayo and Sattar, 2000).  The phrase ‘social investment’ began to emerge within 
the literature of the 1990s as a method of funding CDFIs. Sattar and Fisher 
(2000) in another NEF publication The scope and opportunity for social 
investment in the UK explored the potential gaps in finance with examples of 
CDFIs from the USA, Europe and the developing world. 
 
From 2000 onwards, the literature being produced increasingly attempted to 
define the distinctive features of CDFIs and separate these lending 
organisations from under performing soft loan funds (Collin et al., 2001b). As 
CDFIs such as the Triodos Bank and Ecology Building Society were gaining 
institutional credibility amongst investors, the report stated there had been some 
underperformance and recognised that experimentation and potential failure 
was essential for growth (Collin et al., 2001b).   
 
Over time, NEF’s publications moved from general accounts of CDFIs to more 
specialist and technical reports, such as A Proposed Performance and 
Accountability Framework for Community Development Finance in the UK 
(Collin et al., 2001a) and A Feasibility Study into a Wholesale Intermediary for 
Community Development Finance (Ainger et al., 2002). Like many of these 
reports, it looked at funding, but also argued for a main fund to be distributed to 
CDFIs as loan funds. At NEF was an American, Pat Conaty, who had also 
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worked for the Aston Reinvestment Trust and potentially his background 
influenced a series of reports including NEF’s next CDFI report, Life Saving: 
Community Development Credit Unions which explored a North American form 
of CDFI (Brown, Conaty and Mayo, 2003). The NEF were discussing the 
development of a UK CDFI sector through regulation (Mullineux and Mayo, 
2001; Mayo and Mullineux, 2001) before the sector gained its association, the 
CDFA.  
 
During the period from 1998 to around 2002 organisations such as NEF and 
JRF used the words ‘initiative’ and ‘institution’ interchangeably (Mayo et al., 
1998; BoE, 2000; Mullineux and Mayo, 2001). In UK there were many short 
term initiatives to create employment and increase economic activity funded by 
organisations such as New Deal for Communities. Gradually, the consensus 
chose ‘institution’ because CDFIs aimed to be sustainable and not temporary 
(CDFA, 2002).  Once the prototype sector gained an association the literature 
changed to ‘institution’. This thesis reflects the development of the sector’s 
terminology and the gradual change to Community Development Finance 
Institution.  
 
By 2006, McGeehan argued that CDFIs were becoming established in the UK 
(McGeehan, 2006).  In NEF’s 2007 report Reconsidering UK Community 
Development Finance, the authors investigated the development of the UK, 
USA and European CDFI sectors. It noted the efficiency of the USA system in 
levering a significant amount of additional money. In 2008 NEF published two 
reports with the first being A model for funding and supporting CDFIs: Lessons 
from the United States (Nissan, 2008). This was followed by Social investment 
for community development: Completing the half-built house (Brown, 2008). 
With public funding for the UK CDFI sector diminishing, both these reports 
attempted to keep CDFIs on the government’s agenda. Two subsequent reports 
continued with the theme of the UK CDFI sector having funding problems, but 
re-emphasised their potential for bringing about financial inclusion. The next two 
reports offered comparisons with Europe and micro-finance (Thiel, 2008) and 
CDFIs in North America (Thiel and Nissan, 2008). 
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A theme in NEF’s literature has been the need to tackle financial exclusion. The 
withdrawal of banking services from disadvantaged areas and the following 
financial exclusion was highlighted by Leyshon and Thrift (1994; 1995; 1996). 
Leyshon and Thrift wrote about the rationalisation of bank branches in the USA 
and the UK (1994; 1995; 1996). The Joseph Rowntree Foundation continued 
this area of research and funded a number of reports (Kempson and Whyley, 
1999; Collard, Kempson and Whyley, 2001; Mitton, 2008). These reports 
concentrated mostly on personal banking, but successfully highlighted the lack 
of financial products for a section of the population within poorer geographical 
areas. The JRF publications were ‘campaigning’ and suggested 
recommendations for financial inclusion.  
 
In terms of more formal financial institutions, The Bank of England (BoE) has 
also contributed to the knowledge about financial inclusion/exclusion.  Annually 
the BoE publishes Finance for Small Firms (BoE, 2002), which has identified 
problems with access to loans. The BoE has also highlighted the issues of small 
business in deprived areas and social enterprise (BoE, 2000, 2003). In 2000, 
the Bank of England reported on ‘Community Finance Initiatives (CFIs)’, 
‘community loan funds’ and ‘micro-credit schemes’ (BoE, 2000, p. v). The report 
was written before these lenders got their national association and the language 
would indicate that the term CDFI had not been fully established. A special 
report into social enterprise noted that non-grant finance had advantages for the 
organisations (BoE, 2003). Correctly, the document described social enterprises 
as organisations with some trading activity. The report gathered evidence 
together about grants and loans for social enterprise, and while mentioning 
CDFIs as a source of loans, was unclear whether there was demand for loan 
finance amongst social enterprises.   
 
UKSIF members, such as ICOF and the Triodos Bank, have concentrated on 
demand from co-operatives and social enterprises. Enterprising Communities: 
Wealth beyond Welfare (2000) produced by the Social Investment Task Force 
(SITF), explained that poorer communities were lacking business investment. 
CDFIs and equity finance were perceived as the answers to the financial 
exclusion found in these locations. This report was influenced by the chair of the 
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SITF, Ronald Cohen. As head of Apax, an equity finance business, he thought 
this form of investment would help stop a cycle of decline. The five 
recommendations presented to the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown included the setting up of an equity finance scheme for disadvantaged 
areas. In 2000 UKSIF seemed to be an important membership organisation for 
CDFIs such as the Aston Reinvestment Trust. As a membership organisation it 
did not produce extensive literature on CDFIs, apart from updates on the SITF 
recommendations. In 2002 the Community Development Finance Association 
(CDFA) was established and some of UKSIF’s membership gradually moved 
over to the new membership organisation.  
 
Monitoring has been an important part of the CDFI literature. The CDFA have 
successfully monitored their sector (CDFA, 2003a; 2004b; 2009a), while other 
articles have critically assessed the performance of CDFIs (Derban, et al., 2005; 
Irwin, 2006; Kneiding and Tracey, 2009). In Measuring Economic and Social 
Impacts of Membership in a Community Development Finance the authors 
found that poorer families benefited from joining a credit union, a form of CDFI 
(Kolodinsky et al., 2006). It was claimed that CDFIs gave people on low 
incomes the first steps into financial independence (Kolodinsky et al., 2006). 
Literature from the USA has also concentrated on the impacts of CDFIs 
(Kolodinsky et al., 2006; Hollister, 2007). NEF’s evaluation of Street UK (NEF, 
2005) and the CDFA’s examination of Aspire, a micro-finance CDFI based in 
Northern Ireland identified both negative and positive characteristics within 
these failing lenders (Forster et al., 2006). Similarly, Lenton and Mosley (2005) 
found social and financial impacts in their research into micro-finance and self 
employment. 
 
New Labour after 1997 
 
This section will examine the developing policy of the Labour governments 
since Tony Blair’s victory in 1997 towards CDFIs. When New Labour came into 
power it established a series of Policy Action Teams (PAT) to develop evidence 
and suggest solutions to a range of problems. PAT 3 looked at Enterprise and 
discovered there was financial exclusion for a range of smaller businesses (PAT 
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3, 1999). Importantly, it recommended that loans rather than grants could be 
given in certain circumstances. A later PAT report also recognised the role of 
credit unions and other mutual organisations in communities (PAT 9, 1999). 
This document focussed on the community, on enhancing social cohesion, and 
on the importance of financing the voluntary sector to promote community 
development and to supply local services. 
  
New Labour identified certain geographical areas in need of additional 
resources. The setting up of the Social Exclusion Unit and documents such as 
A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: National Strategy Action Plan 
(2001) illustrated the government’s approach to local problems. The Strategy 
Plan attempted to be joined up and reported on crime, employment, health, 
education and housing. The issue of employment (latterly defined as 
worklessness) was particularly emphasised, with organisations such as the new 
RDAs and the variety of neighbourhood partnerships (such as NDCs) illustrating 
the importance of the localism agenda. The Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister’s (ODPM) The English Indices of Deprivation 2004 and the HM 
Treasury’s Promoting Financial Inclusion (2004) located geographical areas 
with a range of social and economic disadvantages. Similarly, the Jobs and 
Enterprise in Deprived Areas report focused on the problems of specific areas 
with high levels of unemployment (ODPM, 2003). The report recommended 
better relationships between Business Link, Job Centres and CDFIs.  
 
In 2002, the government highlighted the importance and the potential usage of 
alternatives to the public and private sectors. A Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) report contained a foreword by Tony Blair and linked the 
development of social enterprise with social benefits for communities (DTI, 
2002). An HM Treasury cross cutting review also looked at how the voluntary 
sector could supply public services (HM Treasury, 2002). It also created the 
Future Builders Fund to help finance social organisations wishing to take on 
public contracts (Future Builders, 2004).  
 
The government’s main source of support for CDFIs was through the Phoenix 
Fund (although the Fund was originally mentioned in connection with enterprise 
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and job creation rather than CDFIs). In 2004 the then Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry and Minister for Women, Patricia Hewitt, celebrated the 
work of the 93 beneficiaries of the Development Fund (DTI, 2004). The report 
highlighted the range of business development work being carried out by 
support organisations including CDFIs (DTI, 2004). Even though the Phoenix 
Fund ended in 2008 the evaluation was carried out before the third round 
(Ramsden Freiss, 2005). The evaluation thought the fund had been successful, 
but recommended that further provision would be better organised at a regional 
level.      
 
New Labour’s approach was to look towards new ways of delivering services 
and to look for local agencies to solve problems. The following section will 
examine some of the literature linking these debates to Third Way and 
Communitarian ideas.  
 
The Third Way and Communitarian Ideas 
 
This section will examine thematically some of the ideas, issues and debates 
underpinning New Labour’s approach to CDFIs. At the same time as the NEF, 
the JRF, UKSIF and INAISE were researching and reporting on CDFIs, other 
authors were promoting new approaches to how the state and the market are 
conceptualised and the role of the individual within a wider set of community 
values and responsibilities.  
 
The Communitarian literature was originally developed by Etzioni (1994; 1997; 
2000). In his work, he both explored the minutia of community responsibilities 
and also gave larger scale overviews of community problems. Etzioni’s focus on 
the crucial importance of community networks (the family, school, church and 
voluntary associations) and the ‘twinning’ of rights and responsibilities has been 
directly linked with the New Labour agenda after 1997 (Driver and Martell, 1997; 
Butler and Drakeford, 2001; Hopper, 2003). Garfinkle (1997) based at the 
George Washington University Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies 
explored Communitarian economics. Although Communitarian literature is often 
rooted in North American experiences (Buchanan, 1989; Neal and Paris, 1990; 
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Sites, 1998), Tam (1998) has supplied a UK view exploring the changing 
ideological battleground of the late 1990s. For him, the Communitarian literature 
offered a move away from liberalism and the selfishness of the individual: 
community interaction was all important.  
 
Giddens’ Third Way also had connections with Communitarian literature, but 
also had its own focus. He looked at politics after socialism and the possibility of 
a ‘social investment state’ as a Third Way to ‘transcend both old style social 
democracy and neoliberalism’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 26). New Labour were thus 
offering a Third Way between the state and the market (Driver and Martell, 
1999). A growing literature points to Third Way ideas being used to support the 
development of welfare reform policies (Powell, 1999; Glendinning et al., 2002). 
Economic policy has been evaluated in terms of Third Way policies (Hay, 2004). 
An additional manifestation of this Third Way has been the devolution of power. 
A series of authors have looked at New Labour and their localised regeneration 
policies (Ellison and Ellison, 2006). Others have investigated how inclusive and 
community-led these actions have been (Foley and Martin, 2000; Evans, 2008). 
Since CDFIs often work at a local level - and focus on the needs of their 
communities (Bryson and Buttle, 2005) – this focus on localism will be important 
to discussions later in this thesis. The use of partnerships (including the 
participation of the Third Sector) has also been explored in literature 
(Glendinning et al., 2002). New Labour was creating new partnerships between 
the public sector and social entrepreneurs and using partnerships local 
schemes such as Health Action Zones (Glendinning et al., 2002). Both Etzioni 
and Giddens advocate a key role for voluntary and community organisations. 
Haugh and Kitson (2007) investigated New Labour’s policies towards the Third 
Sector, and found that the growth in social enterprises and support for the 
sector were core concerns. Similarly, Craig and Taylor (2002) explored the 
issues of local government and the voluntary sector.   
 
James Midgley (2001) has added to the debate by linking loan finance to a 
Third Way. In Midgley’s article, Microenterprise, global poverty and social 
development (2008), he recognised that micro-finance had helped business in 
the developing world, but stated that market liberalisation alone would not end 
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poverty. Lewis and Surender (2004) offered a range of discussions on the 
labour market, welfare reform, the social investment state and whether there 
was only one form of Third Way? Similarly, Prabhakar (2004) explored a 
particular policy - public interest companies - to find if there was a Third Way. 
He found a Third Way, but suggested it is not a stable concept. Other literature 
has found that the Third Way dialogue was not just within the USA and the UK, 
but across Europe and countries across the world (Blair and Schröder, 2000; 
Giddens, 2001: Bonoli and Powell, 2002).  
 
Overall, academics have explored and discussed New Labour’s rhetoric and 
ideology and found resonances in their policies. The literature has shown a 
government trying to find alternatives to the state and the market. These ideas 
will be returned to in future discussions on CDFIs within this thesis. 
 
Summary 
 
The two separate strands of literature, one drawing on international experiences 
to promote CDFIs, and another looking at the relevance of the Third Way and 
Communitarian ideas to the New Labour project were being produced in parallel 
with each other.  
 
Just as New Labour was looking for an alternative between the state and the 
market, organisations like NEF and UKSIF were offering a potential solution. 
The growing sophistication in the literature also reflected its increasing political 
significance. The campaigning literature from UKSIF and NEF was originally 
aimed at explaining what CDFIs were and looked at the potential of these 
lending organisations. However, their later research looked at how government 
policy would benefit (or hinder) the sector and aimed to capture the unmet 
needs of CDFIs. However, while New Labour has produced a range of policy 
documents mentioning CDFIs in certain sections or chapters, there has not 
been a large scale governmental document that fully investigated this sector - 
only piecemeal research in other evaluations and reports. This thesis aims to 
produce a more holistic picture of the UK CDFI sector.  
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The following chapters will go on to explain the history and development of 
CDFIs in the UK over the last decade and show the variations and changes in 
New Labour’s support. While certain policies, for example the devolution of 
power down to local areas, have had benefits, there are also a number of 
negative implications. The limitations of the overall approach are also 
considered, and located within a critique of New Labour’s reliance on Third Way 
assumptions.        
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Chapter Three: The Influences on UK CDFIs 
 
During the1990s in the UK there was an increased interest in financial inclusion, 
with CDFIs being established and supported by grants, gifts and social 
investments. This chapter will look at the potential external influences affecting 
the growth of UK based CDFIs. Both the first and third worlds have had their 
success stories (such as the Shore Bank and Grameen Bank respectively). In 
the 1990s research in community development highlighted these organisations 
and stated: 
 
‘One ambitious and successful example of a locally-controlled 
financial institution is the South Shore Bank in Chicago. The Bank 
has been a continuing experiment in how to capture local savings 
and convert them to local residential and commercial development. A 
related effort in Bangladesh, called the Gameen Bank, is a 
successful experiment in very small capitalization for small business 
(McKnight and Kretzmann, 1996, p. 7). 
 
However, the Shore and Grameen Banks are part of the story and a variety of 
different models and policies towards financial inclusion and funding all may 
have played a role influencing home grown CDFIs. 
 
This chapter will begin with potential definitions of CFDIs and questions whether 
they are sub-prime lenders or not, because this form of lending has 
concentrated on poorer districts with high levels of ethnic minorities 
(Immergluck and Smith, 2005; Mayer and Pence, 2008). It will then explore the 
policies around social investment and support for CDFIs in the USA.  It is 
important to begin by looking at CDFIs in the USA because certain North 
American policies have been particularly influential in the UK (SITF, 2000). 
Potentially, the USA has offered a blueprint for the development of the UK CDFI 
sector, both in models and supporting policies. The latter part of this chapter will 
go on to examine wider influences and will explore links between the developing 
and the developed world.  
  
Defining CDFIs : sub-prime lenders or not?  
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A basic definition of a CDFI would be an independent organisation that lends to 
those denied mainstream finance. Both the UK’s Community Development 
Finance Association and the US Treasury have mentioned the idea of ‘under-
served communities’. In the USA the National Community Capital Association 
defined CDFIs as: 
 
‘financial institutions that invest in individuals, small businesses, 
quality affordable housing, and vital community services that benefit 
economically disadvantaged people and communities’ (NCCA, 
undated, p. 3). 
 
In this context, CDFIs have been defined by the communities where they work 
and who with, whether it is a geographical location, particular groups, such as 
disadvantaged people, co-operative businesses or young people with little 
experience of a start-up business. An example of this from the USA is the 
Northern California Community Loan Fund (NCCLF). This CDFI’s website gave 
its mission statement as: 
 
‘financing and expertise to strengthen low-income neighborhoods and 
enable disadvantaged people to build a better future.’ (NCCLF, 2009). 
 
Similarly, the Hope Community Credit Union (Hope CCU) based in Jackson, 
Mississippi wished: 
 
‘To strengthen communities, build assets and improve lives in 
economically distressed areas of the Mid South by providing access to 
high quality financial products and related services.’ (Hope CCU, 
2009).  
 
Both these CDFIs have concentrated on low – income and distressed areas and 
are very typical of many CDFIs. Poorer areas can lack regulated banking 
services and have been blighted by unregulated lenders (Barron et al., 1994). 
There are signs that predatory lending is not a recent problem with several 
states in the USA attempting to curb this practice in the 1990s (Ernst et al., 
2002). These predatory lenders would offer high interest loans in poorer districts 
(Ernst et al., 2002). Without competition for clients, these lenders can draw 
money out of a community (Brooker and Whyley, 2005). It should also be noted 
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that CDFIs are not like sub-prime lenders. They bring capital to an area and can 
be developed within a community (Sass Rubin, 2007). There needs to be an 
element of caution around the term and the idea of financial exclusion. Leyshon 
and Thrift (1995) suggested that: 
 
‘Financial exclusion refers to those processes that prevent poor and 
disadvantaged social groups from gaining access to the financial 
system’ (p. 312). 
 
Leyshon and Thrift (1995) found that poorer communities in USA and the UK 
were being excluded from the financial system. However, Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) knew that within the financial system there was credit rationing and 
demand for finance would be greater than the supply.  
 
‘We reserve the term credit rationing for circumstances in which either 
(a) among loan applicants who appear to be identical some receive a 
loan and others do not, and the rejected applicants would not receive a 
loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; or (b) there are 
identifiable groups of individuals in the population who, within a given 
supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even 
though with a larger supply of credit, they would’ (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981, pp. 394 – 395).  
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggested that there will always be some people 
unable to access finance because of the general availability of funds and 
importantly the perceived risk of ‘identifiable groups of individuals in the 
population’ (p. 395). The identifiable features of the individuals could be their 
geographical location, race or poverty (Berkovec et al., 1994; Tootell, 1996; 
Ross and Tootell, 2004).  CDFIs attempt to bring financial inclusion to those 
excluded individuals. Similarly, the sub-prime lenders focus on the same 
potential borrowers. 
 
Soon after the millennium it was identified that in the USA, the sub-prime 
market for home mortgages was increasing in the poorest communities with 
potential problems (Calem et al., 2004). Unlike the USA, in the UK and other 
European countries CDFIs do not deal in home mortgages. There are two main 
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differences between CDFIs and regulated or unregulated high interest lenders 
working in the sub-prime market.  
 
Firstly, unlike the banks or sub-prime lenders, CDFI have distinct social 
objectives. In the USA the Coalition of CDFIs has stated on its website that 
CDFIs focus on:  
 
‘The “double bottom line:” economic gains and the contributions 
they make to the local community. CDFIs rebuild businesses, 
housing, voluntary organizations, and services central to 
revitalizing our nation's poor and working class neighborhoods. 
The positive effect that CDFIs have on their communities should 
not be underestimated’ (Coalition of CDFIs, undated). 
 
CDFIs can attempt to stabilise local communities, rather than making profits 
from the lack of alternative sources of finance. Individual CDFI websites have 
been important sources of information and the Community First Fund (CFF) 
based in Pennsylvania assured investors that through the Small Cities Strategy 
it was: 
 
 ‘revitalizing downtown business districts and neighborhoods, 
bringing wealth back into our communities’ (CFF, 2007).  
 
Similarly, the Louisville Community Development Bank (LCDB) offered to: 
 
‘Stimulate economic growth within the West End, and Smoketown, 
Shelby Park and Phoenix Hill neighborhoods of Louisville, Kentucky, 
by providing an array of financial and development resources’ 
 (LCDB , 2007).  
 
The LCDB was a registered CDFI and aimed to make a profit, but also carry out 
the social goal of promoting financial inclusion in its chosen location. CDFIs do 
work in the same geographical areas as predatory sub-prime lenders but seek 
borrowers that the major banks would avoid. Moreover, CDFIs have become 
firmly embedded in communities (unlike sub-prime lenders) and often call 
themselves after the district where they work. Some examples would be the 
Brooklyn Cooperative Federal Credit Union, the Montana Community 
Development Corporation and the Fresno Community Development Financial 
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Institution Fund. Possibly the most well known US example would be Shore 
Bank was created in the South Shore district of Chicago (Esty, 2006). They can 
attract capital for loans and keep funds circulating around an area. 
 
The second difference between a sub-prime lender and a CDFI is that a CDFI 
will look at the client’s ability to repay a loan. Sub-prime lenders have not been 
interested in documenting whether the borrower has had the ability to repay 
their mortgage (Gramlich, 2007). Within the sub-prime market there is the fringe 
banking sector made up of currency exchanges, cheque-cashing outlets, 
pawnshops, and rent-to-own stores (Benjamin et al., 2004). In the USA cheque-
cashing outlets can charge 10 percent for a two week loan on a pay cheque, 
which would be the equivalent of an annual interest rate of around 1,000 
percent (Benjamin et al., 2004). These organisations are conveniently located 
and give quick transactions, but offer high interest rates, have additional 
charges and draw customers into a cycle of regular borrowing. 
 
In 2008, the Federal Trade Commission found that predatory sub-prime lending 
had four characteristics, Equity Stripping, Packing, Flipping and Linkage of 
Loans (Stock et al., 2001, p. ii). The report stated that equity stripping was 
based on the value of the asset, rather than the borrower’s ability to service the 
loan (Stock et al., 2001, p. ii). These loans have had an increased potential for 
failure, foreclosure and repossession (Stock et al., 2001). Research from the 
1990s found sub-prime lending incurred greater levels of foreclosures 
(Immergluck and Smith, 2005). In a time of rising house prices, if the borrower 
failed to keep up the repayments the lender would gain an asset with an 
increased value. Another way of making money from the lender has been 
packing, when an additional premium credit insurance would be added to the 
cost of the loan (Stock et al., 2001, p. ii). In flipping, the lender has persuaded 
the borrower to remortgage the property a number of times as the value of the 
house increases. Often flipping will benefit the lender, rather than be in the 
borrower’s interest (Stock et al, 2001, p. ii). It has been identified that certain 
sub-prime lenders such as Associates First Capital have attempted to 
‘effectively strip homeowners of their equity’ with ‘stiff penalties for prepaying 
loans, and fee-loaded mortgage refinancing’ (Benjamin et al., 2004, p. 183). 
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Finally, linkage loans for home improvements and other things can be added to 
the loan (Stock et al., 2001, p. ii). The lender or salesperson would gain 
commission on a loan that would not have added equity to the property. Sub-
prime lenders have also used teaser rates to draw borrowers in, while penalties 
stop them from getting out of the mortgage (Gramlich, 2007).  
 
In the UK, credit unions keep money within an area with savers and borrowers 
circulating funds within a district or workplace, but have concentrated on 
personal finance. Whereas, the USA’s community development credit unions 
(CDCU) lend for a range of purposes including the purchase of property. It was 
suggested by CDCUs that home ownership loans was one way of getting 
people on low incomes out of poverty (Brown, Conaty and Mayo, 2003). 
Potentially, the CDCU would have to have a greater knowledge of the borrower 
than a generic mortgage application. The borrower would have built up a history 
of saving, borrowing, repaying and employment. Research has confirmed that 
trust and loyalty were necessary between the lender and the borrower (Fuller, 
1998). The combination of local savers and borrowers and potentially some 
governmental funding (in the USA CDCUs can receive CDFI grant funds) can 
produce stability within a community as people move from being tenants to 
owners. In the UK, organisations such as the NEF and the North East Centre 
for Excellence have recognised the economic benefits of keeping money 
circulating within an area through research into local multipliers (Prove and 
Improve, undated; ONE, 2007). CDFIs attempt to draw funds such as 
governmental grants or social investment into an area and recycle this money 
through loans and repayments. Even though a CDFI may create a profit, it will 
have social objectives to serve a chosen community.  
 
In the UK, even though organisations like NEF have tried to explain the 
distinctiveness of CDFIs, some of the research has tended to combine local 
loan funds with CDFIs (Irwin, 2006). CDFIs are not soft loan funds - the latter 
has a limited time period, while the social and economic benefits cease with the 
end of revenue or capital funding. Soft loan funds are loan funds often 
established by the public sector with a finite time period (Collin et al., 2001b). 
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Soft loans can be subsidised with a low interest rate or can be high risk loan 
funds. There may not be a major need to recoup all of the funds or recycle the 
fund as people pay back the loans. These funds are different from CDFIs in that 
they do not seek to be sustainable (Collin et al., 2001b). Soft loans can 
stimulate an area for a short period of time allowing some entrepreneurship to 
flourish, but this economic input will diminish over time. As part of the research 
for this thesis, one CDFI manager suggested that in the past their funds acted 
more like soft loan funds, because if a business failed, they would not follow up 
the debt. Even though many CDFIs have received capital and revenue grant 
funding they still saw themselves as being long term and aiming to be 
financially sustainable. If an organisation has permanence, then the borrower 
knows that a loan from a CDFI will have to be repaid. CDFI loan managers 
unlike sub-prime lenders and soft loan funds look at the ability of the borrower 
to repay the loan, rather than just merely making the loan.  
 
A Typology  of CDFIs   
 
In the USA, a range of CDFI structures have been formed bringing social 
investment to their chosen areas of work (Bruyn, 1987). Each type will be suited 
to a particular problem. The US Treasury has supported the role of CDFIs to 
bring additional social objectives to disadvantaged areas and has funded a 
range of CDFI models. Overall, the choice of CDFI has depended on the 
perceived problem of a given district. A CDFI industry body, the CDFI Coalition, 
has stated there are six basic types of CDFIs:  
 
• community development banks  
• community development loan funds  
• community development credit unions  
• micro-enterprise funds  
• community development corporation-based lenders and investors 
• community development venture funds  
(Source: Coalition of CDFIs, 2005). 
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The products offered by these lenders range from small scale personal loans to 
large scale equity investments. Table 1 illustrates the differences between these 
types of organisation and their similar purposes and markets. Non-profit 
community organisations could approach both Community Development Banks 
and Community Development Loan Funds.  Similarly, businesses could borrow 
from a Community Development Bank, Loan Fund or Corporation and Micro-
Enterprise Fund or a Community Development Venture Fund.  
 
Table 1: The Characteristics of CDFI types in the USA 
 Purpose Borrowers 
Community 
Development 
Banks  
 
To provide capital to rebuild 
lower-income communities 
through targeted lending and 
investment. 
Non-profit community 
organisations, individual 
entrepreneurs, small 
businesses, housing 
developers 
Community 
Development 
Loan Funds  
 
To receive capital from social 
investors and lend to non-
profit housing and business 
developers in lower-income 
communities 
Non-profit community 
organisations, social 
service provider facilities 
and small businesses 
Community 
Development 
Credit Unions  
 
To provide affordable 
credit/financial services to 
lower-income people, take 
deposits and make loans only 
to members 
Members of the credit 
union (usually individuals) 
for personal loans and 
mortgages 
Micro-
Enterprise 
Funds  
 
To aid business development 
through loans and assistance 
to low-income people 
involved in small businesses  
Low-income individuals 
and entrepreneurs 
Community 
Development 
Corporation 
To revitalise neighbourhoods 
by producing affordable 
housing, creating jobs, and 
providing social services 
Entrepreneurs, 
homeowners, business 
owners, consortia of 
community residents 
Community 
Development 
Venture Funds  
 
To provide equity for medium-
sized businesses to create 
jobs and wealth that benefit 
low-income people and 
communities 
Invests in small to 
medium-sized businesses 
in distressed communities 
that hold the promise of 
rapid growth 
Source: Paraphrased from the Coalition of CDFIs website in 2010.  
 
Each organisation has its own purpose such as a Community Development 
Bank (CDB) aims:  
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‘to deliver credit, payment, and savings opportunities to communities 
not well served by banks, and to provide financing throughout a 
designated area for businesses too small to attract the interest of the 
investment banking and normal commercial banking communities’ 
(Minsky et al., 1992, p. 3).  
 
Potentially, one of the best known examples of a North American CDFI would 
be Shore Bank. Originally it focused on the specific issues of a Black African 
American community (Taub, 1994).   
 
For Shore Bank: 
 
‘Their target was a community of approximately 75,000 residents 
most of them black, that had undergone rapid racial and economic 
change in the mid-1960s. As so often happens, housing vacated by 
the middle class, first white and then black, became occupied by the 
poor, with disinvestment and deterioration following’ (Taub, 1994, p. 
3).  
 
The development of Shore Bank was a reaction against financial, economic and 
social change. The majority of both Community Development Banks (CDB) and 
Credit Unions (CDCU) were located in low income areas (Benjamin et al., 2004). 
These financial organisations allow customers loans for cars, health costs or 
education fees and start to give the borrower a credit record (Benjamin et al., 
2004). In the 1990s CDBs and CDCUs were the only sources of mortgages for 
low income families (Benjamin et al., 2004).   
 
Micro-enterprise funds (MEF) and community development venture funds 
(CDVF) provide business finance in low income areas (Benjamin et al., 2004).  
CDVF make a capital investment in a business in exchange for partial 
ownership, which would give young businesses access to capital. This is patient 
capital and unlike a loan will not have to be repaid immediately (Benjamin et al., 
2004).  MEFs offer small business loans often under $5,000 (Benjamin et al., 
2004).   
 
The role of Community Development Corporations (CDC) can be harder to 
define, because they can be involved in a range of activities such as building 
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houses in poor communities, stimulating economic activity and also offering 
training (Glickman and Servon, 1998). Robinson (1996) found them a defence 
against the gentrification of an area from outside redevelopment. Schill (1996) 
suggested that the creation of housing was part of the work of CDCs. Broadly, 
these organisations attempt to stop the economic decline of an area and 
stabilise the community. Increasing home ownership amongst local inhabitants 
with low incomes could be an important element of the work of a CDC. Schill 
(1996) found that enterprise development and equity finance were also aspects 
of their work. This combination of roles makes CDC difficult to comprehensively 
describe. However, they are an attempt to bring economic inclusion to an area.  
 
Each structure would attempt to address the financial problems of a given area. 
The Coalition’s website stated that ‘all are market-driven, locally-controlled, 
private-sector organizations’ (Coalition of CDFIs, 2005). These lenders seem to 
be demand led, strongly linked to a particular location and separate from the 
public sector.  
 
The locality of a CDFI, and their chosen target markets, does seem to help 
define lending organisations such as CDFIs. In the UK, CDFIs can be defined in 
different ways. One way would be to research their legal structures such as an 
Industrial and Provident Society, a charity, a bank, company limited by 
guarantee or a combination of structures. In the 1990s, organisations were 
experimenting and attempting to identify suitable legal structures (Mullineux and 
Mayo, 2001). Since many CDFIs were still in development there was no 
appropriate single model.  
 
In the UK, some lenders have registered themselves as CDFIs to offer tax relief 
and others have joined the Community Development Finance Association 
(CDFA). In the UK CDFIs have been defined as:  
 
‘sustainable, independent organisations which provide financial 
services with two aims: to generate social and financial returns. 
They supply capital and business support to individuals and 
organisations whose purpose is to create wealth in disadvantaged 
communities or under served markets.’ (UKSIF, 2002, p. 3). 
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The CDFA used this definition on their website from 2002 onwards. Again, 
financial exclusion has helped to create this definition. Other ways to explore 
the character of CDFIs would be to look at the products, such as the size of the 
loan, or the chosen market, such as social enterprise (see Table 2).   
 
Table 2: Characteristics of CDFIs 
 Size of loan An Example CDFI Area 
Micro-finance £500 to 
£5,000 
Street UK (currently 
Street North East) 
Local 
Small business loan Up to 
£10,000 
Aston Reinvestment 
Trust 
Local 
Loans to Third Sector 
organisations (social 
enterprises and charities) 
Up to 
£250,000 
Charity Bank National 
Equity investment  Up to £10 
million 
Bridges Community 
Ventures 
National 
Source: The websites of ART, Bridges Community Ventures, Charity Bank and 
Street UK. 
 
The figures in table 2 need to be taken with an element of caution, because 
since the inception of each organisation their products have changed. For 
example, Street UK started out offering micro-finance and by 2004 offered loans 
up to £30,000 to previous customers.  
 
CDFIs have attempted to bring about financial inclusion for their chosen market 
(Table 3). The regional Shell Fund administered by Project North East offered 
loans to young people without a past history of business. 
Table 3: Area of financial exclusion  
Market Example CDFI 
Young people  Shell Fund run by Project North East 
People over fifty  Prime 
Women Women’s Employment Enterprise 
Training Unit (WEETU) 
Ethnic minorities Black Business in Birmingham (3b) 
Poor credit history (working in the grey 
economy / county court judgements) 
Street UK 
Personal finance (relatively small 
amounts) 
Salford Moneyline 
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Source: The websites of 3b, Prime, PNE, Salford Moneyline, Street UK and 
WEETU. 
 
WEETU has concentrated on helping women without business experience and 
Street UK, sole traders with poor credit ratings. 3b supplied loans and support 
to African Caribbean business owners based in Birmingham and the Black 
Country (CDFA, 2004a). Salford University’s Community Finance Solutions 
(CFS) began research in the late 1990s and found banks were unwilling to lend 
to people from deprived groups (Tysome, 2004). CFS’s Dr Karl Dayson found: 
 
‘most of the client group in question did not wish to borrow a lot of 
money, but they were so poor that any slight change in their 
circumstances would have tipped their budget over the edge’ and ‘We 
saw that we could act as a broker between local and commercial 
partners to create trusts that could loan money for a range of 
purposes, including small enterprises such as setting up a window-
cleaning business’ (Tysome, 2004, p. 6).  
 
Dayson was speaking after the development of the Salford Moneyline and other 
Moneyline organisations (later mentioned in the mapping chapter). 
  
All of these lenders offer a niche product outside the mainstream banking 
sector. The examples drawn from the USA and UK (in tables 1, 2, 3) would give 
the impression that CDFIs are small scale organisations. However, the Triodos 
Bank works in the UK and across Europe. In Bangladesh the Grameen Bank 
has ten of millions of borrowers (Grameen, 2008).  
 
To recap, CDFIs are not mainstream lending institutions or sub-prime lenders, 
but they can have significant numbers of borrowers, such as in the case of the 
Grameen Bank. They have a range of structures and can be banks. CDFIs in 
the USA, UK and across the world adjust to suit their chosen markets. The 
following section will now explore the influence of the USA upon developments 
in the UK.    
 
CDFIs in the USA 
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The United States of America has offered the UK examples of CDFIs and 
potential legislation to help these lenders. Even though the USA has Federal 
and State laws (unlike the UK) it has been influential on the development of 
CDFIs in the UK. Research has also shown that policies such as business 
improvement districts can successfully transfer from the USA to England and 
that there is a long history of policy transfer in the area of urban policies more 
generally (Cooke, 2008). A series of reports such as Wealth Beyond Welfare 
(UKSIF, 2000), Small is Bankable: Community Reinvestment in the UK (Mayo 
et al, 1998) and The State of Community Development Finance (Collin et al, 
2001) all found beneficial policies in the USA. Later examples of looking across 
the Atlantic were found in A model for funding and supporting CDFIs: Lessons 
from the United States (Nissan, 2008) and Reflections and Observations on the 
US CDFI Sector – A Report on a Study Trip to the US (Vik, 2009).  
 
Geographically, closer countries in Europe have not been as influential as the 
USA.  This could merely be caused by the language differences stopping ideas 
and examples disseminating across the English Channel. Equally, it could also 
be because of legislative and socio-economic differences between the UK and 
France, Italy or Germany. The range of rules governing CDFIs across Europe 
were problematic and created issues of eligibility (Collin et al, 2001). The pan 
European organisation, INAISE with its publications in both English and French 
may have helped in some way spread ideas about alternative lending 
organisations. However, the USA can be seen as the testing ground for CDFIs 
and supportive policies.  
 
One potential starting point for the inception of the modern CDFI sector can be 
found in the policies of Lyndon Johnson’s administration and it’s ‘War on 
Poverty Campaign’ (Coalition of CDFIs, 2005) during the 1960s. In the 
introduction to The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 stated that it was: 
 
 ‘the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in 
the midst of plenty in this nation by opening, to everyone, the 
opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity’ 
(Federal Government, 1964, p. 1).  
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The rhetoric of the 1964 Act has an inflection similar to New Labour’s 
‘Opportunity for All’ of the late 1990s and early 2000s. During the 1960s, the 
USA was a mixture of economic wealth and poverty with the poorest areas 
containing the poorly educated and low skilled. The Government aimed at 
giving people the opportunity to get themselves out of their poverty. It was 
recognised that entrepreneurship was one way of succeeding. The early CDFIs 
were established to fill gaps that ‘materialized when mainstream financial 
institutions failed to supply capital to minority and lower-income individuals and 
communities’ (Moy and Okagaki, 2001, p.4). Furthermore, the Economic 
Opportunity Act covered the provision of education and training and community 
action programs. The Economic Opportunity Act programmes offered:  
 
‘services, assistance, and other activities of sufficient scope and 
size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty or a 
cause or causes of poverty through developing employment 
opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and 
productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, 
learn and work’ (Federal Government Economic, 1964, Section 
202.2)  
 
The programmes seem to have tried various means to get people out of poverty 
including CDFIs. Moy and Okagaki (2001) have stated that only a small number 
of early Community Development Corporations were supported by funds from 
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the form of the Special Impact 
Program. The OEO had in partnership with local Community Action Agencies 
supported the establishment of hundreds of credit unions. The National 
Federation of Community Development Credit Unions (NFCDCU) website 
explained that the government’s support for credit unions in the USA was 
sporadic. In the 1960s many of these credit unions were given insufficient 
resources or technical support and had poor business plans (NFCDCU, 2004). 
By 1970, many of these organisations had failed, because of lack of funding. In 
the same year, credit unions successfully gained access to the deposit 
insurance, which helped a number of credit unions survive (NFCDCU, 2004). In 
the 1960s and early 1970s credit unions did not have national voice and in 1974 
they formed the National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions. 
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During the 1970s, the fledgling sector was gradually finding funding to expand. 
Federal Funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 
Economic Development Administration and the Department of Agriculture all 
financed business development loan funds (Coalition of CDFIs, 2005). In 
addition to State finance, some early CDFIs received capital from ‘socially-
minded individuals, churches and local institutions’ (Moy and Okagaki, 2001, 
p.4). Moreover, from 1965, the private sector was allowed to make investments 
in community development (OCC, 2001a). This law, named Part 24, allowed 
banks to make loans that were for social benefits rather than purely for profit. 
So funding could come into the CDFIs from the State, philanthropic sources and 
now the private sector. This may have been small-scale investment from the 
private sector, especially the banks, because there was little incentive to 
persuade them to support the poorer parts of communities.  
 
In 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) intended to 
encourage banks to ‘help meet the credit needs of the communities in which 
they operate, including low and moderate income neighborhoods, consistent 
with safe and sound banking operations’ (CRA, undated). At the same time 
under the ‘supportive administration of President Jimmy Carter’ the Federation 
of Community Development Credit Unions received funding for its first paid 
director (NFCDCU, 2004, p. 5). By 1979, the US credit unions had received a 
boost from the Community Development Revolving Loan Program for Credit 
Unions worth $6 million (NFCDCU, 2004).  
 
With the change in administration from the Democratic President Carter to the 
Republican, Ronald Reagan, federal funding was drastically reduced (Cashin, 
2000). The Community Development Credit Union sector was halved and had 
to find funding from new sources such as charitable foundations and social 
investors.  
 
The literature available would suggest that the CDFI sector found it difficult 
during the 1980s and had to find non-governmental sources of funding 
(NFCDCU, 2004; Pinsky, 2001). Community Development Credit Unions found 
that the Community Development Revolving Loan Program was virtually 
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suspended and the membership of their Federation had halved (NFCDCU, 
2004). Similarly, Federal support for affordable housing, including CDFIs, 
dropped by 70 percent during the presidency of Ronald Reagan (Moy and 
Okagaki, 2001). It would seem that throughout the Reagan administration the 
Federal Government ignored CDFIs - leaving the financial market to solve the 
problem of insufficient investment in deprived communities. It has been 
suggested that one of the roles of CRA 1977 was to stop redlining by the banks 
and this benefited CDFIs during the 1980s (Moy and Okagaki, 2001). However, 
leaving CDFIs to market forces meant a segment of the financial market was 
ignored.   
 
The banking sector was going through its own transformation and was having 
less involvement with poorer communities. In the 1980s, the State handed 
responsibility for lending in deprived communities to the banks, while the banks 
were withdrawing from the same communities. During the 1980s and 1990s 
there was large scale bank rationalisation with approximately 8,000 bank 
mergers occurring (Moy and Okagaki, 2001). Mark Pinsky of the National 
Community Capital Association commented upon this time stated that the: 
‘Disintermediation of local financial markets through the 1980s and much of the 
1990s opened market niches for CDFIs’ (Pinsky, 2001, p. 6).  
 
Overall, the banks were withdrawing from the poorer districts and were 
potentially excluding people on low-incomes and ethnic groups from loan 
finance, leaving a gap in the market to be taken up by under resourced CDFIs. 
During this time the CRA 1977 was becoming more of guide than an actual duty. 
The CRA 1977 influenced some of the banks that were withdrawing from poorer 
areas to support CDFIs through both gifts and loan funds. Even though CRA 
was in place, it produced an insufficient supply of funds to satisfy the demand 
for loans. Eventually, an unfunded initiative supported by President George 
Bush was taken up and remodelled by Bill Clinton in 1993 to produce the CDFI 
Fund (Pinsky, 2001). One of the industry’s national bodies, the CDFI Coalition, 
participated in the modelling of the legislation. The CDFI Fund Statute ensured: 
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 ‘that it would help build the CDFI industry and encourage banks and 
other conventional lenders to step up their work in under-served 
communities’ (CDFI Fund, 1994).  
 
President Clinton’s administration looked at the issues around bank funding and 
how banks had ignored the poorer areas and altered and improved the CRA 
making the banks more aware of their redlining policies. This measure was 
aimed at getting more money into the excluded areas. Similarly, the creation of 
the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act (1994) was 
another way of increasing the funds available to CDFIs and disadvantaged 
communities (and was an influential model for the Phoenix Fund in the UK).  
While the CRA used bank finance, this Act also brought in Federal funding to: 
 
 ‘promote economic revitalization and community development by 
investing in and assisting CDFIs through equity investments, capital 
grants, loans and technical assistance support’ (CDFI Fund, 1994).  
 
This act gave government recognition that both capital and revenue funding 
was needed to support CDFIs to play a role in the financial world in the nation’s 
economy. The CDFI Fund provided:  
 
‘relatively small infusions of capital to institutions that serve distressed 
communities and low-income individuals’ and the Fund’s activities 
levered in ‘private-sector investments from banks, foundations, and 
other funding sources’ (CDFI Fund, 1994).  
 
The CDFI Fund had four aims with the first being to increase financing to 
businesses and individuals desiring to start businesses with low wealth located 
in under served communities. The second focused on financing the supply of 
housing units for under served communities and populations. This was to 
increase home ownership rates amongst minority groups. Thirdly, it aimed to 
increase access to affordable financial services to those without bank accounts 
and increase financial literacy for low-income persons. Finally, it wished to 
increase the capacity of CDFIs to lend and provide financial services to 
disadvantaged communities.  
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Overall, the aims of the CDFI Fund were very much focussed upon inclusion 
and the creation of a financial environment within disadvantaged districts where 
enterprise and home ownership could increase with appropriate finance. It was 
important also in the same areas to supply financial services where potentially 
they had been lost, and educate people about finance. Unlike the UK, CDFIs in 
the USA lend for low-income housing to give people a stake in their 
communities.  
 
This Act produced growth, doubling the number of lenders and tripling the 
managed assets of the CDFI industry by 2001 (Pinsky, 2001). A revision in the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations in 1995 recognised an 
investment in a CDFI as a qualified CRA activity. This meant that the banks, 
rather than working with higher risk borrowers from poor districts, could transfer 
their responsibility and lend to a CDFI. It would be for the CDFI to work with the 
riskier client, but the bank would gain the CRA recognition. If the CDFI had a 
guarantee fund then the bank would have an almost risk free investment and 
would still fulfil its CRA obligations. With the combination of the altered CRA 
and the banking act, the CDFI sector grew by around 38 percent per annum 
over a ten-year period (Pinsky, 2002). 
  
However, forcing the banks into lending to poorer communities was problematic. 
There has been a division between CRA and the roles of the banking system on 
one side and CDFIs on the other (Haag, 2000). Banks or the market has been 
seen as the best way to solve the problem of supplying finance in low-income 
areas and similarly CDFIs have claimed the same position (Haag, 2000). 
However, banks working with CDFIs would be beneficial to all parties.  
 
The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending Study (1999) 
sampled five hundred banking institutions and found that the majority of loans 
under the CRA scheme were profitable (Federal Reserve, 2000). During 1999, 
in the small business sector around half of loans were CRA applicable, some 
$58.9 billion from $117 billion overall lending and the CRA related small 
business loans had a very similar profitability to the overall sector (Federal 
Reserve, 2000). This could indicate that the criteria for CRA small business 
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loans were too broad. Table 4 below illustrates that loans for small business 
and community development were profitable, but CRA special lending programs 
were less clear-cut. 
 
It would seem that an investment in community development such as lending to 
a CDFI would be profitable. The CRA special lending programs worth $11.2 
billion were mostly profitable, but from the data it would indicate this was the 
less profitable end of the market. 
 
Table 4: The Profitability of CRA lending.  
Profitability 
(percent of 
institutions) 
Profit-
able 
Margin-
ally 
profitable 
Break  
Even 
Marginally 
unprofitable 
Unprofit-
able 
CRA Related 
Small Business 
Lending 
85% 11% 2% 1% 1% 
Community 
Development 
Lending 
54% 39% 4% 2% 1% 
CRA Special 
Lending 
Programs 
29% 32% 14% 15% 10% 
 Source: Federal Reserve (2000): The Performance and Profitability of CRA 
Related Lending, pp. xxi - xxiv 
 
Almost all surveyed cited the CRA special loans were a response to:  
 
‘the credit needs of their local community, promoting community growth 
and stability, and improving the public image of the institution’  
(Federal Reserve, 2000, p. xiii).  
 
It was thought that these programs would have produced ‘either a satisfactory 
or outstanding CRA rating’ (Federal Reserve, 2000, p. xiii).  Around 75 percent 
of the banks used third parties, possibly CDFIs, and offered reduced interest 
rates and provided pre-loan education. It would seem that the special lending 
programs were the place where the banks would have reduced their profits with 
possibly higher risk loans to CDFIs, but gaining the most CRA credits. However, 
if the investment was match funding to support a governmental grant, then the 
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bank’s funds would only be diminished after the other funding had been lost, 
which would minimise the bank’s risk. In the late 1990s and early 2000s it could 
be argued that the government, banks and CDFIs had some success working 
together.  
 
Potentially, without the revised CRA, there would be no special lending 
programs and there would be no pressure for the banks to put $11.2 billion into 
this form of lending. The Act had its supporters. Kenneth H. Thomas in his work 
for the Levy Institute reported that CRA was: 
 
 ‘proof that capitalism can have a corporate conscience without 
degrading into socialism or gambling on the other extreme of 
completely unregulated markets’ (Thomas, 2002, p.3).  
 
In addition, he thought CRA was ‘arguably a perfect example of the correct 
balance between government and market regulation in a capitalist economy’ 
(Thomas, 2002, p. 1). Overall, the CRA policy has attracted money to poorer 
areas, but it has also had an influence upon the CDFI sector.  
 
A CRA investment could be used in conjunction with the next policy to effect 
investment. The Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act 1994 further increased the funds available to CDFIs. In November 2000, the 
CDFI Fund was extended to include a Small and Emerging CDFI Fund aimed at 
Community Development Credit Unions (CDCUs) and newer CDFIs. In the 
early part of the new century CDCUs and potentially other CDFIs had problems 
with rising unemployment, decreasing interest rates and a reduction in 
charitable budgets (NFCDCU, 2004). At the same time the Community Renewal 
Tax Relief Act (2000) was passed, giving a tax credit to investors aiding 
borrowing in disadvantaged communities. The tax credit aimed to raise $15 
billion and offered 39 percent tax relief on the investment over seven-years. 
From the CDFI Fund data it would suggest that this target would be met.  
 
The establishment of the CDFI Fund in 1994 marked the stage at which the US 
CDFI industry finally took off, as it now had the prolonged financial support that 
it needed. By the end of the 1990s, the USA had a growing CDFI sector, which 
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was seen as a potential role model for a UK CDFI sector. From the National 
Community Capital Association, Mark Pinsky has attended a number of UK 
CDFI conferences such as Birmingham (2001), Melton Mowbray (2005) and 
Newcastle (2009). In 2002 he wrote that CDFIs had three goals with respect to 
self-sufficiency with some aiming to become totally self-sufficient, others 
wishing to cover core costs and others wanting to be 50 percent self-sufficient 
(Pinsky, 2002). Pinsky’s admission that some CDFI wished to cover only 50 
percent of costs was problematic, because in Britain, North American CDFIs 
have been viewed as being sustainable and successful.  
 
George W. Bush’s presidency started well when he appointed Mark Pinsky to 
the CDFI Fund Advisory Board. However, the funds given to CDFIs were 
reduced from almost $50 million (2001) to $46.6 million (2004) and further 
reduced to $26 million (2007) (CDFI Fund, 2006). This obviously led to a 
reduction in the sector as revenue funds decreased. In 2008, George W. Bush 
proposed around $50 million for funding CDFIs. However, President Obama 
suggested boosting this up to $400 million in 2010 (Kirchhoff, 2009). A 
commentator noted that this was small change compared with financing the 
banks, but each dollar invested in CDFIs levered in between $14 to $20 
additional funds (Kirchhoff, 2009).  
  
The CRA has not influenced the financial crisis and persuaded banks into the 
sub-prime market. The Federal Reserve Board researched whether the CRA 
played a substantial role in the sub-prime loan crisis using the 2006 Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act data and other sources and concluded that the CRA 
did not contribute to or cause this crisis (Dallas Federal, 2009). It has been 
observed that CRA has strengthened the US economy, producing small-
business loans totalling $2.5 trillion from 1998 through 2007 and according to 
the Small Business Administration producing a significant percentage of new 
jobs (Dallas Federal, 2009). Even in 2009, it was suggested that the UK could 
benefit from a measure like CRA to help access to credit and the new President 
Obama was a supporter of the Act (Rahman, 2009).  
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Despite the recession and the credit crunch, research has found that CDFIs 
were being approached by increased numbers of businesses. These had 
approached their banks and had been rejected (Vik, 2009). In 2009 CNN 
announced that CDFIs received loan applications worth over $400 million and in 
the fiscal year 2010, the CDFI Fund would be approximately $250 million. In 
addition Goldman Sachs was distributing $300 million (over five years) to CDFIs 
in grants and loans (CNN, 2009). 
    
Overall, a number of organisations such as the New Economics Foundation, 
Community Development Finance Association and the Social Investment Task 
Force have all wished to see similar policies established in the UK. The USA 
has been an influence upon the modelling of policies in the UK. However, 
micro-finance has played a much smaller role and the following section will 
explore something of its background. In the UK a large majority of CDFIs made 
micro-finance available and the CDFA found that more established medium 
sized businesses were ‘less likely’ to be excluded from bank finance (CDFA, 
2009a, p.8).   
 
Micro-finance: From the Developing to the Developed World. 
 
As mentioned above, the majority of the CDFA membership offered small 
business loans unlikely to be attractive to the high street banks. There are links 
between alternative banking or lending systems in Bangladesh or Chile and 
CDFI loans in the UK or the USA. All of these lenders are working with 
individuals excluded from bank finance. This short section will discuss micro-
finance travelling from Asia into Eastern Europe and finally into economically 
developed countries. 
 
Micro-finance and micro-credit can be confused and used in a general way 
(United Nations, 2006). However, the European Micro-Finance Network, the 
Micro-Finance Centre and the UK’s CDFA produced the following definitions: 
 
‘Micro-finance refers to the provision of financial services - micro-
loans, savings, insurance or transfer services - to low income 
households. Micro-credit refers to provision of micro-loans for micro-
 76
enterprise development. As such, micro-credit is one of several 
financial services referred to when the term microfinance is used’ 
(Lens and Menendez, 2007, p. 2).  
 
Banks have had policies of expanding into new markets and spreading across 
national boundaries. One international bank (HSBC) has even called itself the 
‘World’s local bank.’ However, an area where the banking sector has failed is in 
the supply of very small loans for business. Micro-finance is the supply of very 
small amounts to the unbankable individuals and groups. Some of the defining 
characteristics of micro-finance are: 
 
• ‘Small loans, typically for working capital, 
• Informal appraisal of borrowers and investments, 
• Collateral substitutes, such as group guarantees or compulsory 
savings, 
• Access to repeat and larger loans, based on repayment 
performance, 
• Streamlined loan disbursement and monitoring, 
• Secure saving products.’ 
(Ledgerwood, 1999, p. 1) 
 
The level of loan needed would be dependent upon the country. Bangladesh is 
the home of the Grameen Bank and it would offer loans under £50. In the UK, a 
micro-finance loan would be around £1,000 to £5,000. However, because the 
amounts are comparatively small in the developing and also the developed 
countries, the banks have been unwilling to lend small amounts to businesses, 
especially those without sufficient records or a good credit history. The World 
Bank (2007) has stated that more than 500 million people world-wide need 
access to financial services, which would suggest a large percentage of the 
world’s population is not catered for by the banking sector.  
 
Micro-finance through CDFIs attempt to fill this gap created by the bank’s 
unwillingness to supply small business loans. The United Nations recognised 
this problem and the General Assembly adopted 2005 as the International Year 
of Micro-credit to address the constraints that exclude people from full 
participation in the financial sector (United Nations, 2006). Kofi Annan, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations stated that: 
 77
 
 ‘Inclusive financial sectors can go can a long way toward breaking 
the vicious circle of poverty…With more opportunities to build on 
their ideas, energies and visions, they will lead the way in working 
their way out of poverty with dignity’ (United Nations, 2006, p. v).  
 
Even though the United Nations and the World Bank have relatively recently 
recognised the problems of financial exclusion amongst the world’s poor, 
organisations such as Accion and the Grameen Bank have attempted to 
address this problem for decades.      
 
Across the globe there are diverse examples of micro-finance, but these 
different forms all have the common purpose of providing ‘financial services 
directed at those most in need and proving, time and again’ (Ramirez, 2001, p. 
48). These interventions are part of the development process aimed at moving 
people out of poverty (Ledgerwood, 1999). The supply of small amounts of 
money increases economic activity and gives people the opportunity to improve 
their lives. It has been suggested that micro-finance is a market based way of 
increasing self-employment and alleviating poverty in the developing world 
(Morduch, 1999). There have been numerous forms such as: 
 
 ‘the Grameen Bank’s group lending in Bangladesh, the solidarity 
group method of Accion International first tried in the Dominican 
Republic and then expanded to many other countries, village banking 
and saving schemes or ‘caisses villageoises’ in Africa, the individual 
lending methodology of Bank Rayat in Indonesia and of FIE in Bolivia’ 
(Ramirez, 2001, p. 48).  
 
Micro-finance has become a major tool for development and has been seen as 
a solution to the challenge of poverty in the developing world (Fisher, Sriram 
and Harper, 2002). It can be understood as a form of self-help with the poor 
themselves borrowing and through entrepreneurship improving their own 
situation. It is not a replacement for capital projects, but an element to move the 
poor out of poverty. Over many years its importance has been recognised by 
the United Nations and other donor organisations. Micro-finance organisations 
often aim to be sustainable (Sinha and Sinha, 2002), but because of their 
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outreach work and their inability to charge sufficient interest to cover costs 
financial sustainability has proved problematic. 
 
Micro-finance has spread to the UK in the form of Street UK and Aspire. 
However it did not directly transfer from the developing world to the UK and 
there was an intermediate stage in Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the dividing up of the Soviet Union new forms of micro-finance were 
developed within Eastern Europe. The Micro-Finance Centre based in Warsaw, 
Poland found: 
 
‘In Europe the development of the sector started in the 90’s and has 
not progressed at the same pace in individual countries. A rapid and 
strong development in the countries of Eastern Europe (including 
some of the new EU Member States) has contrasted with slower, 
patchier growth in Western Europe (Micro-Finance Centre, 2007, p. 
4). 
  
There are a number of examples of micro-finance being established in Eastern 
Europe, but there is one direct link from Poland to the UK. In 1994 Rosalind 
Copisarow, an ex-banker for JP Morgan in Poland began the Fundusz Mikro 
with $24 million from the Polish American Enterprise Fund. Over four years this 
organisation had built up a large enough customer base to be self-sufficient 
distributing 25,000 loans worth $25 million with a 98 percent repayment rate 
(Copisarow, 2001). In 2000, Copisarow established Street UK in Newcastle, 
Birmingham and planned to work in Glasgow. It was the success of such 
models in Eastern Europe that allowed these ideas to be imported into the UK.  
 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall micro-finance in Eastern Europe may have had 
some success establishing micro-finance organisations and getting loans out. 
However, the picture has not always been successful, with organisations being 
unable to cover their costs across Europe (Evers, 2007). Similarly, the Micro-
finance in Central and Eastern Europe newsletters have highlighted the 
problems of micro-finance since 1999 (Micro-Finance Centre, 2007a). However, 
the Micro-finance Centre was a network of 90 micro-finance organisations in the 
new independent states. Both WEETU based in Norwich, and the North East 
branch of Street UK tried lending circles / groups. This loan mechanism has 
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been transferred from the villages of Bangladesh to Eastern Europe to UK cities 
with mixed results (see later chapters). 
 
The European Connection 
 
This section will use information from INAISE to illustrate other forms of CDFIs 
in Europe. The literature suggests that it would be difficult to transfer certain 
models from mainland Europe to the UK and that Europe has played a minor 
role in influencing UK CDFIs when compared to the USA. 
 
One European influence would be the Triodos Bank setting up in the UK and 
Ireland in 1995. This expansion into the UK market meant that it transferred 
many years experience from Europe to become an important CDFI in the UK. 
Triodos Bank had 15 years experience of being a bank and developing 
environmental and social investments (Triodos Bank, 2002). It incorporated: 
 
‘social and ethical – as well as financial – perspectives into its 
business practices. This three-way approach is the source of the 
name Triodos’ (Triodos Bank, 2002, p. 5) 
 
The Triodos Bank was a member of both INAISE and UKSIF; organisations 
involved in promoting CDFIs. In the UK, it later joined the Community 
Development Finance Association and became a registered CDFI distributing 
the tax relief (this UK policy will be mentioned in further chapters). Potentially, 
having many years experience in Europe has allowed the Triodos Bank to be a 
leading national CDFI. It and the Charity Bank have been the UK’s only CDFI 
banks.  
 
Some of the UK based CDFIs were members of the INAISE. Potentially, it was 
important for them to join a membership organisation that could help their 
sector. Organisations such as the Aston Reinvestment Trust joined, because 
they did not have their own UK based association and agreed with INAISE’s 
principles. INAISE’s members had two main characteristics: 
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• ‘They tend to serve social economy organisations and small or micro 
enterprises which have social or environmental objectives.’ 
• ‘They finance (de facto) sections of the population, projects, sectors or 
regions which have been abandoned by traditional banks or financial 
institutions’ (INAISE, 1998, p. 2).  
 
The late 1990s were a time when INAISE was defining social investment and 
building up a significant number of European members. At the First European 
Forum on Social Investment in 1999, social investment was an: 
 
 ‘investment which aims to recreate social bonds, by reintegrating 
excluded groups into the economic circuit, re-establishing these 
bonds by creating jobs and businesses’ (INAISE, 1999, p. 7). 
 
This definition further stated that the:  
 
‘issue is to move out of welfare and to aim at making projects 
profitable. So as a general rule it is not a question of integration for 
the sake of integration, but to engender the development of real 
economic activity’ (INAISE, 1999, p. 7).  
 
The INAISE membership of social lenders wanted to see entrepreneurship, and 
argued that the issue was: 
 
 ‘to move away from the philosophy of welfare to one promoting an 
economic approach which is not at odds with the market economy, so 
that the individuals, groups or localities to be “reconnected”, to be 
“reintegrated”, see themselves as being offered the means to become 
real actors in the process, and not merely "client’s"' (INAISE, 1999, p. 
8).  
 
The themes of reintegration by employment and opportunity, and moving 
people from welfare into work, were policies associated with New Labour and 
Third Way thinkers (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998; 2000). There was a connection 
between the UK lenders and other European lending organisations, but no 
definite transfer of policies. These debates held at conferences throughout 
Europe and posted on INAISE’s website may have clarified and explained the 
role of social lenders or CDFIs. However it is difficult to identify direct influences 
from Europe on the UK CDFI sector. Europe had many member states, many 
individual examples and too many laws specific to individual countries.  
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One illustration of this would be the participation of local authorities in the 
development of a social bank, Banca Etica in Italy and its connections with 
social co-operatives (Defourny and Borzaga, 2001). It would be difficult to 
transfer Banca Etica’s structure and funders across to the UK, because it does 
not have the same municipal co-operative culture or history. Similarly, in France 
the Association for the Right to Economic Initiative (ADIE) would be difficult to 
transfer to the UK. Begun in 1988, AIDE has acted very much like a CDFI 
lending to the individuals in receipt of welfare and potentially without prior 
business experience. The development of ADIE was not straightforward and it 
took the organisation ten years to introduce micro-finance to France (Nowak, 
2001). ADIE has had to adapt each year to the changes in welfare affecting 
enterprise and financial and training support. The continual governmental 
changes were made worse ‘by the phenomenon of regional and departmental 
decentralisation’ (Nowak, 2001, p. 246). This made policies inconsistent across 
the country and problematic for an organisation attempting to be national. In 
2000, this lending organisation was looking to expand and also reduce its costs 
(INAISE, 2000). The costs and decentralised structure of government made 
AIDE a difficult example to transfer across to the UK. The developer of AIDE 
has suggested that in France there was no suitable legal framework for 
establishing micro-finance organisations (Nowak, 2001).  
 
Overall, European developments have had little influence in the UK, despite  
INAISE reporting on different forms of lending organisations from across Europe, 
such as the Fund for Local Employment Initiatives based in Hamburg, the JAK 
Bank offering interest-free lending in Sweden and the Cigale movement in 
France (INAISE, 2000). However, micro-finance is one area where Europe has 
had some influence on the UK in the form of Street UK and Aspire. While 
INAISE played a role in supplying a membership organisation to spread ideas, 
once the UK received its own association many of INAISE’s UK membership 
disappeared. It is possible that if more European examples had been shown in 
research reports, the character of the UK’s CDFIs could have been altered.   
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Summary 
 
Assessing the UK literature about CDFIs it is clear that the USA has helped 
form ideas and models. From a UK perspective, policy transfer from the USA 
has bequeathed two important policies aiding CDFIs, CRA (1997) and the CDFI 
Fund. Although the UK’s Phoenix Fund supporting CDFIs lasted less than a 
decade, in the USA the CDFI Fund has celebrated its 15th anniversary this year. 
Additionally, ideas on financial inclusion and micro-finance have spread from 
Bangladesh, to Eastern Europe and then to the UK. The next chapter will 
capture what can be described as the British ‘new wave’ of CDFIs.  
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Chapter Four: CDFIs – The British ‘New Wave’ 
 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter examining the influences from the 
USA and Europe and it has two purposes. Firstly, to explore the issues and 
circumstances that led to the developing interest in CDFIs in the UK in the 
1990s, and also to exam in detail the work of the Social Investment Task Force.  
While alternative lending organisations had existed since the 1970s, by the end 
of the 1990s there were clear links developing between lending organisations 
and the work of campaigning research organisations and this combination was 
helping to create a prototype sector.  
 
The Formation of a Prototype CDFI Sector  
 
CDFIs have been developed in the UK over the last 30 years.  On a national 
level, there was the Prince’s Trust Business Start-Up Programme, established 
in the 1983, and on a regional level Project North East (PNE) based in 
Newcastle set up its Shell Fund for young people in 1980. During this period 
many of the loan funds were described as soft loans not requiring the same 
security or ability to repay as a bank loan.  
 
In the late 1980s ICOF had received local authority funding to create 
employment in the Midlands. It was used to stimulate financially fragile 
businesses and was more about the short-term employment gains, rather than 
creating a sustainable resource (ICOF, 1999). The UK picture for SME business 
loans during the 1980s was problematic, so the government’s Small Business 
Loan Guarantee Scheme was established to help to reduce finance exclusion 
for businesses. However, in the 1980s there were still gaps or areas of 
exclusion, such as loans for ethnic businesses owners (Hughes, 1997). The 
recession of the early 1990s also meant that there less funding available and 
surveys identified more gaps in loan funding (Hughes, 1997).  
 
The recession and high interest rates of the 1990s were influential in reducing 
the supply and demand for business loans. However, the banking sector was 
changing, with the introduction of technology and rationalisation (Leyshon and 
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Thrift, 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997). In both the USA and the UK the high street 
banks were withdrawing from poorer areas (Leyshon and Thrift, 1996).  It was 
recognised that financial services were being rationalised through mergers and 
branch closures (Mayo et al., 1998).  
 
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation was actively funding research into financial 
exclusion during this period (Mayo et al., 1998). Research showed that banking 
services were not universal and part of the population was excluded from basic 
banking (Kempson and Whyley, 1999). Nevertheless, the Bank of England and 
the major clearing banks thought that there was ‘no generalised shortage of 
finance’ (Mayo et al., 1998, p. 9) and in this sense, the banking community were 
ignoring sections of the population. During the late 1990s it was discovered that 
1.5 million people lacked basic financial services such as a current account and 
another 4.4 million were on the margins of financial exclusion (Kempson and 
Whyley, 1999). With a population of around 50 million people, around 10 
percent of the total population of the UK had experienced some form of financial 
exclusion. Similarly, it was found that small business lending from the high 
street banks had diminished from £46.7 billion to £34.1 billion from 1991 to 
1996 (Mayo et al., 1998). This was a time of high interest rates that potentially 
helped to reduce economic activity and contributed to the lack of interaction 
between certain communities and the banking sector as the banks were 
rationalised (Jones and Maclennan, 1987; FSA, 2000; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994; 
1995; 1997).  
 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, there seemed to be an increased interest in 
sustainable loan funds and finding alternative forms of lending. The Charity Aid 
Foundation had loaned to the charity sector for many years, but expanded into 
social enterprise sector. In 1997 it formed Investors in Society to finance the 
social enterprise sector rather than the charitable sector. Later, this organisation 
became the Charity Bank. The Shared Interest Society (1990) was established 
to lend to fair trade importers and producers in the developing world. There 
were also a series of local funds established, such as the Aston Reinvestment 
Trust (ART) (1997), Women’s Employment, Enterprise and Training Unit 
 85
(WEETU) (1998), Aspire (1999), Salford Moneyline (2000) and Portsmouth 
Area Regeneration Trust (PART) (2000).  
 
Figure 2: Timeline for a sample of CDFIs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the dates when the lenders started lending. In 2010 all of these 
organisations still existed, but their names and aims may have changed over 
time. These lending organisations were not established in haste, taking a 
number of years to work out their company structures and raising funds. The 
development of ART was reported in the Independent newspaper in the mid 
1990s (Gosling, 1994) even though it did not start lending until 1997. The 
Shared Interest Society took around two years to be developed and has been 
included in figure 2, because similar to ART and ICOF it was a member of the 
UK Social Investment Forum and funded by social investments. Interviews with 
members of staff and their chairman indicated that the organisation wanted to 
be recognised as a CDFI, so it could gain tax benefits for investors. Shared 
Interest like the other lending organisations wished to attract additional 
investments through tax relief. However, unlike other lenders it loaned money to 
the developing world, which eventually meant it was not recognised as a CDFI 
by government. WEETU, a business support and lending organisation for 
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women in Norwich, was established in the 1980s, but only began peer-group 
lending in 1998. They were establishing themselves as potential solutions to 
financial exclusion in particular areas. Organisations such as ART were being 
seen as important examples, even within government (House of Commons, 
1998; 2000).  
 
Campaigning Organisations 
 
Some of these organisations such as ART, ICOF, Local Investment Fund and 
Triodos Bank were members of UKSIF. At the time, UKSIF membership ranged 
from banks, such as the Co-operative and Barclays, to ethical investment 
advisors and ethical investments for the developing world to CDFIs (UKSIF, 
1998; 2000; 2005). It was not a cohesive body, because the membership did 
not have a single purpose. Many of the CDFIs had received some of their 
funding from social investors and hence their membership of UKSIF. In the late 
1990s the membership also included Demos and the NEF.  
 
In addition, many of these same organisations were members of INAISE. In the 
late 1990s the membership was concentrated within Europe with a few North 
American and Asian members. INAISE will be mentioned later, but at present it 
is important to note that networks were being established within the UK and 
across Europe. Having these two membership organisations may have given 
these lenders a place to exchange information and campaign for greater 
recognition.       
 
Building up evidence on the problems caused by financial exclusion was an 
important factor in gaining recognition for community development finance. In 
the 1990s research was being carried into financial exclusion and problems with 
finance (Kempson and Whyley, 1998; BoE, 2000; Leyshon and Thrift, 1996), 
but very few solutions were being found. In 1998, research published by the 
NEF and JRF explored the problem of exclusion and identified five solutions to 
financial exclusion. These were: 
  
 87
• Credit unions: financial co-operative organisations offering personal 
saving and borrowing, owned and controlled by the membership. Each 
credit union membership has a common bond, such as location or a 
workplace. 
• Community loan funds: serve community regeneration initiatives by 
making capital available. Their loans can be used to lever in additional 
finance. 
• Micro-finance funds: make very small loans to micro-businesses such as 
sole traders. 
• Mutual guarantee societies: are formal associations of SMEs pooling 
their savings to offer collective guarantees.  
• Social banks: are for-profit financial service providers dedicated, typically 
in their constitution, to social or environmental objectives (Mayo et al., 
1998). 
 
These organisations offered both personal and business finance. It should be 
noted that the term Community Development Finance Institution was not being 
used at this time. NEF used the phrase ‘community finance initiative’, which 
illustrates that ideas and terminology were still being developed (Mayo et al., 
1998, p. 3).   
The NEF/JRF report also set out an agenda for community finance and 
produced a vision for the following ten years: 
 
• Credit unions would be serving at least 10 percent of UK households. 
• A national micro-finance scheme serving 100,000 enterprises. 
• Community loan funds in every major city. 
• An extended social economy / charitable enterprise sector. 
• One hundred mutual guarantee societies across the UK. 
• Community finance as a significant force for sustainable local 
regeneration (Mayo et al., 1998).  
 
To carry out this agenda the report suggested a number of policies. The first 
policy response was to improve access to technical assistance, such as 
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business training. The second policy recommendation was to enable community 
finance initiatives through a capital fund to support micro-finance. The third 
policy recommendation explored improving the risk and return for the investor. If 
the risk was decreased then loan funds would be more attractive to investors. It 
was suggested that loan guarantees and tax relief could act as incentives. 
Finally, the last policy involved social responsibility and the banks disclosing the 
level of loans in poor communities. In the 1990s the banks had physically 
moved out of the poorer areas of towns and cities, so it was unknown how 
many loans were being given in these places.   This policy of disclosure focused 
heavily upon the USA’s Community Reinvestment Act. This research and 
additional studies external to government over time were influential within 
government.  
 
 In 1997 the Labour Party had been out of power since 1979 and had little or no 
experience of being in government. When New Labour came to power 
unemployment was the third most important electoral issue behind education 
and health (Labour Party, 1997). In addition, the New Labour Government had 
promised to stick to the spending plans of the previous administration. In the 
early years, Gordon Brown was prudent and he avoided raising public spending. 
In the late 1990s, the Government had limited funds available and was looking 
at Public-Private Partnerships as a form of finance for public capital projects 
(Ruane, 2002).  
 
The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and others were discussing the potential of a 
Third Way in politics at a national and international level (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 
1998; 2000; 2001). The government were exploring ideas that were a middle-
way between the state and the market (Driver and Martell, 2000). This 
emphasised that policies could take into account the positive attributes of both 
state intervention and the free market. 
 
Tony Blair in promoting ‘Opportunity for All’ policy stated that: 
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‘Gross inequalities continue to be handed down from generation to 
generation, and the progressive Left must robustly tackle the 
obstacles  to true equality of opportunity’ (Blair,  1998, p.3).    
 
He was not specifically writing about financial exclusion, but any form of 
exclusion that would stifle opportunity. In 1997 New Labour established the 
Social Exclusion Unit to investigate inequalities across employment, health and 
education. The new government decided to take stock and evaluate the UK and 
established Policy Action Teams (PAT) to look at different problems within the 
UK. In 1999, PAT 3 researched enterprise and social exclusion and found there 
were issues around access to finance. When looking at finance in deprived 
communities it recommended that the:  
 
‘Government should encourage an innovative and competitive 
banking market to serve poor areas – but in the end market 
mechanisms will not be enough. So the Government should also 
encourage new initiatives to provide finance for enterprise where 
justified by the high potential returns to society’ (PAT 3, 1999, p. 
3).  
 
The majority of the report concentrated on the banking sector and the members 
of PAT 3 wanted the banks to take a major role in filling a gap in finance. The 
report offered two routes to supplying finance. The first suggestion was to 
persuade the banks to become involved, even though the market had already 
failed. The second accepted that CDFIs were an alternative solution that 
needed to be built upon. It suggested that even soft loans were preferable to 
grants, because loans were seen as a more efficient use of limited public 
resources. Continuing the theme of reducing the public purse it proposed that 
the public and voluntary sectors were: 
 
 ‘too stuck in a culture of grants’ and if an organisation created ‘positive 
financial returns’ then there should be ‘a presumption in favour of 
loans’ (PAT 3, 1999, p. 4 ).  
 
According to the report, organisations such as social enterprises, charities or 
voluntary groups with an income ought to have been taking up loan finance 
rather than grants. The report indicated that the Third Sector could, if there were 
positive financial returns, actually move away from state maintenance.   
 90
 
PAT 3 was also linked with the Treasury, and the Team had Patricia Hewitt 
followed by Stephen Timms (both Financial Secretaries for the Treasury) as 
their ‘Champion Minister’. In 1999 the Treasury established the Phoenix 
Development Fund, which ran from 2000 to support mostly business 
development organisations. In a foreword to a later evaluation, Patricia Hewitt 
directly linked PAT 3 to the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) Phoenix 
Fund (DTI, 2004). A few CDFIs such as WEETU and Project North East did 
receive funds for their developmental work. The New Labour government were 
thus finding ways to invest in disadvantaged communities at a local level 
(Wallace, 2001; Affleck and Mellor, 2006). This emphasis on localism will be 
discussed in greater depth in later chapters. 
 
The value of the Phoenix Fund was that it was able to galvanise the UK CDFIs 
into a more coherent sector. Firstly, the Phoenix Fund was worth £100 million 
and split into streams (SITF, 2002). Over 250 organisations bid for funding in 
the first round of the Phoenix Development Fund in 2000 and over 350 in the 
second round  in 2001 (DTI, 2004). The Development Fund was aimed at 
business support and £29 million was disbursed (DTI, 2004). However, the 
Challenge Fund that followed was aimed at CDFIs and in the first round in 2001 
£5 million was awarded to 16 organisations. In the following year, the second 
round gave £14 million to 32 organisations (SITF, 2002). Eventually, around 
£41 million was distributed to CDFIs. These sums supplied by the Small 
Business Service (SBS) to business support organisations and CDFIs helped to 
change language. CDFIs became Institutions rather than Initiatives, because 
the SBS and others were using the term.  The Challenge Fund financed 41 
organisations and 48 projects (SITF, 2002). However, other later figures show 
that 59 national and regional CDFIs received Challenge funding. The 
combination of gaining a UK based association and having funds allowed the 
sector to solidify.   
 
The Social Investment Task Force 
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As well as the influential PAT reports, the work of the Social Investment Task 
Force (SITF) was also important in stimulating governmental interest in 
community development finance. As this document has been an important 
influence upon policy makers and CDFIs, it will be helpful to consider the 
message in some detail.   
 
Wealth Beyond Welfare (2000) 
 
The Wealth Beyond Welfare: Enterprising Communities Report was addressed 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and written by the SITF. The Task Force 
was made up of people from the business community, which included: 
 
• Ronald Cohen of Apax Partners and Co, an equity finance business; 
• David Carrington the Chief Executive of the PPP Healthcare Medical 
Trust; 
• Philip Hume, the Chair of Computacenter; 
• Tom Singh, an entrepreneur and the Managing Director of New Look, a 
clothes retailer; 
• Geraldine Peacock, the Chief Executive of Guide Dogs for the Blind;  
• Another task force member with a background in CDFIs, Joan Shapiro 
formerly the Vice President of South Shore Bank based in Chicago;  
• It also included Ian Hargreaves, an academic and journalist.  
 
There was mix of people from both the business and the charitable sectors and 
a North American social bank that would bring a range of expertise. However, 
there was no one directly associated with social enterprise or tackling exclusion. 
Joan Shapiro from South Shore Bank would have been influential and explains 
why the report tended to duplicate the policies followed in the USA. 
  
Since the Task Force was made up of Chief Executives they were quite distant 
from the problems of SMEs within disadvantaged communities within the UK. 
However, having important figures from industry gave the report credibility.  
Similarly, the endorsement of Gordon Brown gave the document some 
 92
importance. It found poor communities were in a spiral of decline and even 
though an estimated £3 billion per year was invested in public regeneration 
within the UK’s poorest areas nothing had changed to improve the wealth of the 
residents. The physical environment had changed and what was needed was a: 
 
 ‘new approach to addressing the needs of under-invested 
communities would help to rebuild their economic base’ (SITF, 2000, 
p. 10).  
 
It was thought this could reverse the spiral of decline leading to rising property 
prices, increasing enterprise and creating more purchasing power, which would 
in turn produce more opportunities for entrepreneurship. This development 
would need greater co-ordination and importantly: 
 
 ‘a major cultural shift from the public, charitable, voluntary and 
community sectors towards a more entrepreneurial approach’  (SITF, 
2000, p. 10).  
 
The SITF also confirmed the importance of rebuilding the: 
  
‘economic base of under-invested communities’ it needed recognition 
of their financial needs and viewing as ‘an economic opportunity’ 
(SITF,  2000, p. 15).   
 
Like the PAT 3 report, the document highlighted tackling social exclusion 
through bringing employment to disadvantaged areas through enterprise. It also 
noted that research undertaken in Scotland had argued that the contracting out 
of public services gave the charitable sector opportunities to raise income 
through service delivery. This was seen as illustrating the potential for charities 
to change and be more businesslike. However, the transfer of public services to 
the charitable sector could also be understood as a cost cutting exercise, rather 
than an example of truly entrepreneurial spirit. 
 
Financial exclusion was seen as an issue and CDFIs were viewed as a way of 
funding these enterprises in disadvantaged areas. The SITF thought that what 
was needed for ‘neighbourhood renewal’ was to restore ‘local market forces’ 
and this required ‘a market-driven system that harnesses entrepreneurial drive’ 
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(SITF, 2000, p. 15). Those Task Force members from entrepreneurial 
backgrounds may have influenced this message. However, from another 
perspective, market forces were part of the problem in creating disadvantaged 
communities with businesses including banks finding insufficient profits in these 
areas and rationalising their branches. In the PAT 3 report it was identified that 
business support with loans was necessary, but the SITF was very much aimed 
at investments and loans.  
 
Overall, the Task Force’s report focused on supplying finance for enterprise and 
made five policy recommendations;  
 
1. Community Investment Tax Relief 
2. Community Development Venture Fund  
3. Bank Disclosure  
4. Greater latitude for investment in Community Development Initiatives. 
5. Support for CDFIs through a national trade association. 
 
These recommendations were to bring support and finance into the CDFI sector 
and targeted at communities excluded from finance. Each of these will now be 
considered in turn  
 
Community Investment Tax Relief  
 
At the second CDFI conference in 2001, Paul Boateng MP announced that 
there would be tax relief for investments in CDFIs. The SITF suggested that 
demand for finance outstripped supply and therefore an incentive was needed 
to attract further capital funds. At the conference there was a call for further 
revenue and capital funding and the tax relief would create larger loan funds. 
CDFIs were thought of as looking: 
 
 ‘for higher social returns than traditional private investment and 
higher financial returns than traditional public expenditure and grants’ 
(SITF, 2000, p. 15).  
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In terms of returns, CDFI were thought of as a potential Third Way between 
financial and social returns. The Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) 
would move the CDFIs towards a commercial return by reducing their amount of 
tax and diminishing the public spending. This policy was to adjust the balance 
for the social and financial returns and make the sector more attractive. By 
investing in accredited CDFIs the investor could apply for 5 percent per annum 
tax relief over the five-year period of the investment. In a period of low inflation 
and falling interest rates (2002 – 2003) the tax relief of 5 percent of the 
investment was a positive return. Early in 2003 the first batch of seven CDFIs 
were accredited, and by 2004 this had increased to twenty-three. This was 
unlike the Phoenix Fund, which was supplying grants for capital and revenue 
costs. The tax relief measure was purely aimed at attracting private capital and 
only capital into a number of CDFIs. Nevertheless, it was proposed that revenue 
support would be given for CDFIs with CITR accreditation providing wholesale 
finance nationally (SBS, 2003). CITR has remained an important element of the 
Government’s policy for attracting funds to CDFIs and in December 2006 it 
begun a review to assess further developments of this tax relief. It attracted 
around £38 million by 2006 (Hackett, 2006).  
 
Community Development Venture Fund  
 
Ronald Cohen of the Apax partners (a venture capital business) and the chair of 
the SITF, would have been influential in deciding upon this second 
recommendation. The Bridges Community Development Ventures (Bridges) 
Fund was established in 2002. Venture capital was chosen as a tool for 
enterprise within poor districts, because it had the ability to enable businesses 
to grow rapidly. It could utilise the skills of venture capitalists and bring new 
skills to disadvantaged businesses. In the UK, venture capital was an important 
measure helping business expansion and the SITF reported that venture capital 
backed companies increased their number of employees by 24 percent 
between 1994 to 1998 (SITF, 2000).  
 
The Bridges Fund was made up of £20 million private equity funding and 
another £20 million from the Government and focused on disadvantaged areas. 
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The fund would make an equity investment into a SME and after a number of 
years the business would buy the stake back or it would be sold on to another 
financier, potentially making a profit. The Government’s funds would be the first 
to absorb any losses made from poor investments, so it had safeguards for 
commercial investors. The Bridges Fund aimed at finding SMEs in 
disadvantaged areas wanting equity finance from £100,000 to £2 million. By 
making equity finance available to SMEs in disadvantaged areas the fund could 
be seen as an incentive for entrepreneurs to start up in these areas. Additionally, 
it was also designed to support indigenous SMEs trying to grow.  
 
The investment had built in safeguards making sure that the majority of 
employees came from the deprived community. Ronald Cohen with knowledge 
in his field stated in a press release ‘a grass roots approach – we do not expect 
it to be easy or quick, but over time we do expect it to be very successful’ 
(Bridges, 2002). As of 2009, Bridges had around £150 million in two funds 
(Bridges, 2009).  
 
Bank Disclosure  
 
The third recommendation, bank disclosure, was aimed at persuading banks to 
report on the amount of business they performed within disadvantaged areas. It 
was thought that the banks needed: 
 
‘to play an essential role in under-invested communities, not only in 
providing finance for bankable business, but also in ensuring that 
viable businesses operating below market levels of financial 
acceptability can grow and become bankable’ (SITF, 2000, p. 20).  
 
Figures from the USA had shown that involvement by the banks was essential 
in turning around under-invested communities. The Task Force pointed out that 
there was the perception that banks were withdrawing from poor communities 
through branch closures and this gave the impression that certain areas were 
becoming limited in terms of enterprise. This recommendation of bank 
disclosure came after a number of high profile reductions of inner city and 
country branch closures during the1990s. Both the PAT 3 report and the SITF 
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thought that the banks were part of the solution to finance within excluded 
communities, but without suitable information it was impossible assess the 
problem.  
 
This suggested policy was partially influenced by the system in the USA with 
the fair lending laws including the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The Act 
worked in three areas with the first being disclosure allowing lenders to identify 
gaps. Once gaps in the market were found they then could be addressed. The 
second area was ratings that would be adverse or favourable to a bank’s 
reputation and the third was sanctions imposed upon the worst performers. 
Disclosure has remained purely voluntary with Barclays, the Co-operative Bank 
and the Unity Trust Bank having made some disclosures. The SITF linked 
disclosure by banks with the tax relief. This would give an incentive to banks to 
invest in poor communities and would have been a more holistic approach, but 
it would need legislation to force the banks to give the information.  
 
Greater latitude for investment in Community Development Initiatives. 
 
The fourth measure had a direct input into the finance available for social 
enterprise, the charitable and voluntary sectors and even possibly for SMEs. 
Under the heading of ‘Greater latitude and encouragement for charitable trusts 
and foundations to invest in community development initiatives’ (SITF, 2000, p. 
6) the SITF recommended that:  
 
‘charitable foundations and major charities should undertake 
programme-related investment via an appropriate CDFI rather 
than by making such invests directly’ (SITF, 2000, p. 22).  
 
This policy allowed charities to make programme related investments (loans) to 
CDFIs to fulfil their charitable remit. This was possibly one of the most 
controversial recommendations, because it reduced the amount of grants 
available and increased finance through the CDFI sector. Since there was some 
confusion over the charitable status of CDFIs involved in regeneration, the SITF 
wished for clarification. It suggested that a key consideration was the balance 
between the public and the private benefits flowing from the regeneration 
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initiative. For the initiative to be charitable, any private benefits generated would 
be outweighed by the wider public benefit (SITF, 2000). If the loan was to a 
social enterprise or the trading arm of a charity then the balance would move 
towards the creation of a ‘wider public benefit’ (SITF, 2000, p. 22). In May 2001, 
the Charity Commission published guidance on Programme Related 
Investments allowing charitable trusts to pursue their charitable aims by lending 
money. This has meant charitable trusts can lend some of their money out, 
rather than giving it all in grants.  
 
The Task Force used the example of the USA with 22 percent of loan capital 
coming from the charitable foundations.  Both the Northern Rock Foundation 
(NRF) and Esmée Fairbairn Foundation (EFF) have in the past set aside funds 
for distribution through the Charity Bank (EFF, 2006; 2007). The charitable 
foundation could either use their money directly to lend to an enterprise - and 
have the CDFI monitor the loan for a fee - or invest in the CDFI and direct the 
enterprise to their investment. This policy has diminished the availability of grant 
finance to some extent, and potentially persuades grant recipients into 
accepting a combination of loan and grant finance.  
 
A suggested advantage to this policy was to make the enterprise or trading arm 
of a charity more financially aware (NRF, 2004). Once the loan was repaid then 
it could be recycled and borrowed again giving increased social benefits for the 
same money. As a representative of the NRF stated at a conference it ‘would 
give more bangs per buck’, therefore improving the efficacy of the limited 
annual funds available (NRF, 2004). The NRF went on to supply some North 
East England based CDFIs with loan funds. 
 
Support for CDFIs (A trade association for UK CDFIs) 
 
The fifth and final recommendation was to establish an association for the CDFI 
sector. Similar to many of the other policies it was influenced by examples from 
the USA : 
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 ‘the USA, after 25 years of development, each part of the community 
development finance sector now has at least one dedicated trade 
association' (SITF, 2000, p.23).  
 
In the USA, the different types of community finance institutions had developed 
a sense of coherence (as a movement or an industry) during the 1980s and 
1990s by forming coalitions and associations. The SITF formulated that a 
potential UK trade association would be a source of networking for CDFIs, 
strengthening the sector and supplying representation in Government and 
amongst the regional development agencies. In addition, an association would 
aid CDFIs by providing appropriate training, the promotion of best practice, 
supplying model business plans and news on the sector.  
 
The trade association for the CDFI sector, the Community Development 
Finance Association (CDFA) was launched at the Treasury by Paul Boateng, 
the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and Sir Ronald Cohen in April 2002 
(UKSIF, 2002). Paul Boateng pledged support, stating that the Government 
thought the CDFI sector could ‘make a valuable contribution to our efforts to 
make opportunities for enterprise open to all’ (UKSIF, 2002, p. 2). Sir Ronald 
Cohen urged CDFIs and the banks to join the CDFA and support the 
association. It was supported by Barclays, the DTI, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
NatWest, the Bank of Scotland and membership fees from the CDFIs.  
The newly formed CDFA had six aims and objectives: 
 
1. ‘Provide an excellent service to members 
2. Promote growth in the size and diversity of the sector 
3. Improve performance levels of CDFIs 
4. Enhance reputation for CDFIs 
5. Influence the policies of key stakeholders 
6. To be a sustainable organisation’ (CDFA, 2003, p. 3). 
 
These aims were an attempt to establish a sustainable and professional sector. 
In 2001 there were as many as 250 loan and equity funds across the UK 
established to provide last resort lending for SMEs (Collin et al., 2001b).  These 
soft loan funds had a very high closure rate and had high loss rates (Collin et al., 
2001b). A membership association with guidance, support and examples of 
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best practice could help make these loan funds more professional and convert 
temporary soft loan funds into established credible lenders.  
 
The SITF’s recommendations have had some success in developing financial 
support and policies to address the needs of CDFIs. It could be argued that the 
establishment of lenders during the 1990s, the highlighting of financial exclusion, 
and the rationalisation of banking services, all led to the eventual support from 
government.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By the late 1990s, CDFIs had gained government recognition and moved from 
being grass roots organisations funded by small amounts of local money to 
gaining large scale Phoenix Challenge grants.  The reason for the increase in 
interest in CDFIs reflects changes in national and international finance. The 
banks had merged and withdrawn from areas in both the UK and the USA. 
CDFIs were being established to counteract this change. In the UK 
organisations such as ART can be seen as a grass-roots or community answer 
to an area’s problems. In the late 1990s the evidence would suggest that CDFIs 
were gradually being established to cover gaps in the financial market, often 
without direct government input.   
 
Research reports from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, the New Economics 
Foundation and, to a lesser extent, INAISE helped to identify financial problems 
and offer solutions. PAT 3 led to the setting up of the Phoenix Fund, which 
brought money to business support organisations and importantly CDFIs. With 
additional funding established, CDFIs were able to build on their experience and 
grow.  
 
From 1997 onwards, the government used examples such as ART and North 
American CDFIs to build up their knowledge and bring support to the sector. 
The UK government accepted that the market was not working and decided to 
do something about it.  With the change from a Conservative to New Labour 
government more interventionist policies took place. These lending 
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organisations could be interpreted as having Third Way attributes being 
between the private and public sectors. With the introduction of tax relief, CDFIs 
were more attractive investments for the private sector, but without the 
government’s intervention the number of CDFIs would not have grown. The free 
market did not supply opportunity for all, but the CDFIs attempted to supply 
finance to viable businesses.  
 
The following chapter will look at three national case studies and how 
government’s policies such as the Phoenix Fund and Community Investment 
Tax Relief have influenced their development.    
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Chapter Five: CDFI Case Studies – The National Level   
 
This chapter will be the first of two case study sections, and will look at the 
development of national bodies such as the Charity Bank, ICOF and the Triodos 
Bank. While two of these national lenders have histories going back to the 
1970s, the Charity Bank is part of the ‘new wave’ of CDFIs in the 1990s. 
Beginning with a discussion of the case study methodology employed, the 
chapter will go on to examine each organisation’s development, failures and 
successes as they have developed over time. In addition, it will look at the 
diversity of the sector with individual organisations attempting to solve particular 
breakdowns in the loan finance market.      
 
Case Studies Selected 
 
A variety of information sources were utilised. The initial research was desk 
based and examined the literature being published by NEF (Collin et al., 2000; 
2001b; Fisher, 2000). This helped to build up a picture of a developing sector 
with many national, regional and local actors. Case studies were then used as a 
way of gathering information and comparing data (Bell, 2005; Somekh and 
Lewin, 2005). The national CDFIs case studies were chosen partly because 
these lenders were keen to broadcast about their organisations and developing 
products and partly because of the range of information available, including 
websites filled with both qualitative and quantitative information and annual 
reports offering a descriptive narrative of their lending and a balance sheet.  
 
An interview schedule was produced which was made up of closed and open 
questions (see appendix 2) (Gillham, 2000). Initially, a first draft was tested on a 
local CDFI. I used a number of academic colleagues and two individuals from 
business support agencies to check the survey. These questions were then 
emailed to senior members of staff and replies were received.  During the 
research some CDFIs were reluctant to give financial data or their results while 
others posted out large annual reports and displayed their results on websites. 
Some were very generous in their time and information. The CDFA conferences 
were vital sources of information as a number of organisations looked to 
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promote their products and services.  Before the conferences I planned to 
speak to certain individuals and organisations and arranged some meetings.  
 
The conferences also allowed some formal face to face interviews to take place 
with employees from the CDFIs. Action research methods were used and I 
would reflect on the interview results and alter questions as I built up knowledge 
about CDFIs and the sector’s terminology. In addition, observational research 
was used at the conferences. The seminars and workshops were good sources 
of data and stories about lending. The real life examples of CDFI lending given 
by practitioners were helpful in fully describing the sector and the issues 
(Connelly and Clandinin, 2000). Interviews can give perceptions of an 
organisation, but observation can reveal what really happens (Bell, 2005). 
Unstructured observation allows the researcher to postpone definitions and 
develop their ideas (Bowling, 2002). This method allowed data to be gathered 
and ideas to be developed through the fieldwork (Bowling, 2002).  
 
It was found at the conferences the loan managers would give frank answers to 
attendees from similar organisations. In interviews they could be more careful 
and reserved in their comments. Observational research was a useful 
methodology, because the CDFI sector was still young and ideas were being 
developed. At the conferences there were a range of delegates from 
experienced managers and new employees from recently formed organisations. 
Observational research gave me the opportunity to choose appropriate 
interviewees.  
 
At the conferences I collected the reports and the promotional literature. 
Stringer (1999) suggested using memos, minutes, records, official reports, 
press accounts, public relations materials, information statements and 
newsletters. Ephemeral materials such as websites, leaflets and publicity 
materials were gathered to support the case studies. Often press releases on 
the CDFI websites would have a lifespan and then be removed. This material 
was printed and filed with other information. Stories from newspapers and 
evidence to parliamentary select committees have been sourced to develop a 
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picture of a changing group of organisations.  The different types of information 
have been amalgamated into the following three national CDFI case studies.  
  
Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) to the Investors in Society to the Charity 
Bank.    
 
The Charity Bank has its roots in the Charities Aid Foundation, an organisation 
more involved with distributing funds and administering office facilities for 
charities. The Charity Bank can be seen as an attempt to mainstream CDFI 
finance. As a bank it could be more recognisable to the general public than a 
CDFI. It still acts like a CDFI, but uses the bank structure to be an alternative 
lender for organisations excluded from bank finance. By 2009 the Charity Bank 
had been in existence seven years and this section will explore the successes 
and failures during this period.  
 
This section is based on a series of questions I emailed to Malcolm Hayday in 
2002, press releases, promotional materials, company websites and the annual 
reports of the Charity Bank. Initially, the Charities Aid Foundation website was 
an important source of information, but this was superseded by the Charity 
Bank’s own website.   
 
From Charities Aid Foundation to the Charity Bank  
    
Opened in 2002, the Charity Bank has its origins with the Charities Aid 
Foundation (CAF), which has its roots in the 1920s. CAF was started in 1924 as 
a department of the National Council of Social Service. Its purpose was to aid 
efficient giving to charity, which still remains one of CAF’s tasks. The 
organisation was renamed in 1959 and finally became CAF in 1974. In 1986, 
the organisation became a licensed deposit taker, so began to start acting like a 
bank. In the late 1990s, CAF’s success in the sector can be illustrated by the 
fact it controlled over £1 billion for donors and charities per annum. In the 
financial year 1998/9 it distributed £130 million on to charities (CAF, 1999). It 
acted as an agent investing money for charities and distributing charitable gifts. 
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However, this was only one aspect of CAF’s work. It also wanted to help 
charities by acting like a bank and giving loans.  
 
CAF was a complex financial organisation with products and services aimed at 
both charities and businesses. In terms of social lending CAF tentatively began 
with a brokerage service in 1993. This led to the establishing of Investors in 
Society (IiS) in 1995 with £500,000 of CAF’s money. During the initial research 
around 2001, CAF administered the distribution of grants for other 
organisations, including Barclays Bank. It offered consultation, fundraising and 
financial services for the charity sector and NGOs. In 2000, CafCash Limited 
was developed, offering ‘a range of traditional bank account facilities to UK 
charities’ and two types of account ‘specially designed to meet the needs of 
charities of all sizes’ (CafCash, 2001, p.1). CafCash acted as a bank investing 
in other banks, building societies, local authorities and short term UK gilts to 
produce interest for its customers. The 2001 accounts declared a ‘commission 
charge is deducted from the total rate of interest earned and the remainder is 
declared as the rate payable to customers’ (CafCash, 2001, p. 3). Any profits 
were covenanted to the charity CAF, which amounted to £1.5 million in 2001. In 
addition, there was another CAF Fund offering ethical investment funds. It also 
offered administrative services such as pay roll giving. CAF had a multi agency 
approach towards the charitable sector fulfilling many services within the sector. 
With all of these products and services it would easy to lose sight of the CDFI 
element, Investors in Society. 
 
The sole purpose of Investors in Society (IiS) was to give registered charities 
access to loan finance across the UK. In the director of loans, Malcolm 
Hayday’s own words, the fund was: 
 
‘not about replacing charitable impulses and philanthropy. It is about 
making money work many times over while responding to donors’ 
changing financial circumstances. At the same time, it provided 
charities with loans and guarantees on affordable terms, thereby 
filling some of the gaps that mainstream banking leaves open’ 
(Hayday, 1997, p.2).  
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He recognised that there was a gap in the market and also acknowledged that 
philanthropic donations were not infinite. 
 
The fund was offering a different way of helping charities and the website stated 
‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, give him a fishing rod and you 
feed for life’ (Just Insights, 2002, p. 2). This approach was seen as being 
sustainable and offering financial discipline, accountability and a long-term 
solution to some of the problems within the charitable sector. It was a departure 
from philanthropic gestures towards charities and a produced a different 
relationship with donors. To illustrate the potential change in relationship 
between donor and charity the Bank of Scotland gave IiS a £500,000 interest 
free loan and the press release contested that it ‘allow charities to secure much-
needed funding through loans they would be unable to obtain under commercial 
terms’ (Caf, 2000). The Bank of Scotland was making a social investment by 
foregoing the interest. IiS was borrowing money, lending it to charities, having it 
repaid with interest and then returning it to the investor. It was the temporary 
use of an investor’s money rather than a gift. Around this time CAF was thinking 
about a mechanism using temporary investments called ‘Returnable Donations 
and Gifts’ (Hayday, undated). This trade marked mechanism would allow 
interest to be paid on short to medium term investments for social aims.  
 
From the initial £500,000 supplied by CAF, IiS gained over £3 million from 
individuals, companies, charitable trusts and other agencies. In the late 1990s 
the fund was comprised of 55 percent in donations and capital from CAF and 
the remaining 45 percent in loans. By 2000, the fund had increased to £6 million 
and in four years 140 loans had been made (IiS, 2000). During this time the 
fund only had one failure and since the borrower had security, no money was 
lost. In 2000, the organisation announced thirty-one borrowers had repaid their 
loans allowing the money to be recycled.  
 
What IiS offered was loans from £5,000 to £150,000 at an interest rate of 
around 6 percent with up to a 1 percent arrangement fee dependent on the 
amount of work necessary. The competitive interest rate of 6 percent was in 
 106
place from 1996 to 2002. Malcolm Hayday described IiS’s and the Charity 
Bank’s role in an email:  
 
‘We do not exist to displace bank lending but to provide credit where it 
is not available or only on terms which are not affordable’ (Hayday, 
2002).   
 
With an interest rate of around 6 percent in the late 1990s, IiS were fulfilling 
their aim of making finance affordable. If a loan application was too large for the 
IiS Fund then the organisation would help to put a proposal together to 
approach a bank and get a deal. IiS could gain an income through brokering a 
loan.     
 
In their 2000 review, it was recommended that IiS continue its development 
towards gaining authorised bank status (IiS, 2000). IiS was attracting money 
into its fund and aimed to get Financial Services Authority (FSA) approval to 
become a bank and move its fund into the bank (Social Enterprise, 2001). In 
2002, the Charity Bank was established to potentially change charity funding 
and hoped to attract £6 million of investments for the public in its first year 
(James, 2002). The Charity Bank as a charity could not be owned by another 
charity, so it became independent of CAF. The Charity Bank can be seen as a 
hybrid having the FSA regulation of a bank and charitable status. 
 
A Bank Aimed at Supporting Charities 
 
The Charity Bank was officially opened by the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown 
in October 2002. At the Charity Bank’s high profile launch at No.11 Downing 
Street the Chancellor, Gordon Brown suggested that:  
 
‘You do not rebuild communities from the top down. You can only 
rebuild from the bottom up – one family, one street, one 
neighbourhood at a time’ (Just Insights, 2002, p. 1).  
 
It marked a change in finance and a move from grants to loan finance. The CAF 
chairman, Sir Brian Jenkins stated:  
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 ‘It challenges charities and social enterprise to look beyond grants 
and it challenges each one of us to think about how our money can 
work harder for the common good’ (Just Insights, 2002, p. 1).  
 
Both Gordon Brown and the Governor of the Bank of England, Eddie George 
became investors, which gave the Charity Bank credibility. The organisation’s 
publicity leaflet stated it aimed ‘to build a bridge between charities that are 
looking for finance and investors who are willing to provide the capital’ (Charity 
Bank, 2002). Its Chief Executive, Malcolm Hayday thought the bank had to work 
towards making loan finance acceptable within the charity sector and saw the 
benefits as ‘Unlike a donation, people can get their money back when they need 
to if they invest it. And while it’s in the bank, they know it is benefiting 
communities’ (James, 2002).  
 
The bank had two roles: 
 
1. Attracting investors both corporate and individuals. 
2. Attracting borrowers both charities and social enterprises. 
 
In 2002/2003 the bank investors could have received an interest rate of 2 
percent, which at a time of relatively low interest rates would have been 
competitive. Investors could decline or reduce this interest payment to increase 
the social benefit of their investment. In 2003 the bank received an important 
boost becoming one of the first organisations to gain CDFI accreditation and be 
able to attract funds using Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR). The CITR 
scheme offered investors tax relief of 5 percent per annum for five years. In the 
organisation’s marketing it noted that this was worth ‘8.33% gross per year to 
higher rate taxpayers, 6.41% per year to standard rate taxpayers and 7.14% per 
year to main rate corporation tax payers’ (Charity Bank, 2003). In 2002 and 
2003 the Bank of England base rate was around 4 percent, this would be an 
attractive five year investment proposal. This fund proved to be attractive and 
produced an investment of £25 million (Finch, 2006). This was the largest CITR 
investment amongst all of the CDFIs. At the same time, potential borrowers had 
the opportunity to borrow sums from £3,000 to £250,000 at an interest rate of 
between 5 – 7 percent with an arrangement fee of around 1 percent.  
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Overall, the bank in its first year was endorsed by Gordon Brown and Eddie 
George, the Governor of the Bank of England, and was being mentioned in the 
national press (James, 2002). With endorsements from leading financial people 
it could have been thought that the Charity Bank’s successful progress would 
have been assured.  In 2007, the Charity Bank expanded with a Northern office 
based in Leeds with a £2.5m loan fund given by the RDA, Yorkshire Forward. It 
also received a capital investment of £500,000 by the Community Foundation 
Northern Ireland. By 2008/9 the bank had around 25 staff based in two offices 
and representatives spread across the country.  
  
The Performance of the Charity Bank 
 
The Charity Bank took on the loan portfolio of IiS and its fund, so it already had 
an income and a reputation for lending to charities and social enterprises. It 
would have expected that during the first year there would be one-off costs to 
establish the organisation. The results from 2002, the transition period, showed 
expenditure of over £1 million, which outstripped its income of £375,000. 
However, this loss of £755,000 would have been linked to the increased 
administration costs and the transformation into a bank. 
 
 Table 5: Performance of the Charity Bank 
 Loans and 
advances to 
banks 
Loans and 
advances to 
customers 
Annual 
Operating Loss 
or net deficit 
2002 £2.1m £4.4m £755,000 
2003 £8.2m £6.1m £733,557 
2004 £8.8m £7.8m £817,000 
2005 £24.8m £10.1m £597,000 
2006 £20.0m £16.4m £560,000 
2007 £20.1m £18.9m £676,000 
2008 £26.4m £18.9m £1,143,000 
Source: Taken from the Charity Bank Annual Review 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008; 2009).  
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Table 5 shows the sums of money the Charity Bank had in banks and borrowed 
by customers. The last column of the right shows the annual operating loss with 
2006 being smallest loss over the seven year period. In the first few years the 
organisation would experience some financial problems and one off costs. 
However, the Charity Bank as a national organisation seems to have had a 
number of problems on a larger scale. In its first full year of trading (2003) it lost 
another £733,557 and in 2004 its losses peaked at £817,000. By 2006, its 
cumulative losses came to over £3.4m. The Chief Executive, Malcolm Hayday 
described 2004 as a ‘challenging year’ (Charity Bank, 2004, p. 4). In the 2005 
statutory accounts and report, he suggested that they would impact on the 
bottom line and move into surplus until 2008. In 2008 the bank had exceptional 
losses, because of increased regulatory costs and payments to the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme. Overall, an analysis of the operating accounts 
indicates the Charity Bank will continue producing an annual deficit in future 
years. 
 
In the process of exploring how well this CDFI was performing, it was useful to 
look at how much money was being borrowed by customers and how much was 
in other banks. The Charity Bank started off well, with £4.4m being borrowed 
and £2.1m in other banks (table 5). The Charity Bank was one of the first CDFIs 
to offer the CITF to investors. Table 5 shows that there was a sudden increase 
in sums in the banks from £8.8m in 2004 to £24.8m in 2005. This was a result 
of the CITF attracting new customers. In 2003, the Charity Bank had £8.2m in 
the bank and £6.1m out to customers. By 2005 this disparity had grown to 
nearly £25m in the banks and only £10m being borrowed by customers. In a 
publicity article, the Charity Bank wished charitable organisations to benefit from 
£20m raised by depositors (Charity Bank, 2006).  It is important for banks to 
have reserves, but Charity Bank had a large proportion of its funds in the bank.  
 
The annual reports have been a key source of data with the balance sheet and 
the profit and loss accounts. In 2006 the annual report gave the loans portfolio, 
which showed that money has been borrowed and returned.   
 
 
 110
Table 6: The Portfolio of loans  
The Loans Portfolio as of 31/3/06  
Loans approved to date £45m 
Number of loans approved to date 489 
Total value of loans drawn £22.1m 
Loans fully repaid to date  £8.8m 
Number of loans repaid in full 166 
Average loan size of drawn loans £97,400 
Total value of projects supported £127m 
Source: Charity Bank Annual Review 2006 
 
Table 6 illustrates the large difference between loans being approved (£45m) 
and taken up or drawn down (£22.1m). Over half of the potential borrowers 
have not taken up their offer of loan finance. In a rough calculation using the 
average loan amount, borrowers have taken up 226 loans, but the bank has 
approved 489 loans. The Charity Bank may have done a great deal of 
preparatory work to assess the loan and the organisation, but a loan has not 
been taken up. This figure is not for enquiries, but organisations that have filled 
in the forms, had visits and had its forecasts and business plans checked to be 
finally been accepted. This can be expensive and time consuming for the 
lender. In 2007, the bank had agreed loans worth nearly £15.4m, but the take 
up will have been less. In the year 2008, the bank lent £11.7m and made a 
deficit of over £1m. From interviews with a number of CDFI loan managers 
some of the potential reasons for not taking up a loan were: 
 
• Reluctance from the management board; 
•  Issues of security; 
• A change in circumstances, especially changes in contracts or funding; 
• Producing a good business plan allowed the charity or social enterprise 
to approach another lender with a better interest rate. 
 
However, no-one mentioned an organisation not taking up a loan, because they 
had received a grant.  
  
The Charity Bank’s accounts make uncomfortable reading, because it has lost 
approximately £5 million over a seven year period. It is hoped that the bank can 
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reverse this pattern. Since the bank was built on the experience of Investors in 
Society started in 1997, it has had ten years to produce a working model. The 
bank aimed to attract deposits and attract borrowers and it has successfully 
increased its deposits and loans each year. However, these depositors may 
have been attracted by the idea of helping charities, and a large percentage of 
funds have remained in banks and earning interest, rather than working in 
communities. It has not been successful in attracting sufficient borrowers, so 
potentially there could be too much supply of other loan and grant finance. From 
the loan portfolio there has been significant interest, but this has not been 
translated into organisations signing the loan agreements. It is difficult to 
understand why the gap has been so large. The preparatory work involved will 
have proved expensive and contributed to the bank’s losses. Interviews with 
loan managers from CDFIs have highlighted a number of potential reasons for 
not taking up loans such as reluctance by the board. Overall, demand for loans 
from charities was less than expected.  
 
In early 2010, it seems difficult to see the Charity Bank becoming self sustaining 
without major changes. There does not seem to be enough of a market for its 
products and services.  
 
Co-operative and Community Finance, formerly known as Industrial 
Common Ownership Finance (ICOF). 
 
At a CDFA workshop in 2002, Andrew Hibbert, the development manager, 
announced that ICOF was ‘the only self-sustaining provider in the UK’ and in its 
past it had a loss rate of 18 percent. This raised the question of how did this 
organisation survive? This section focuses on the UK’s longest existing CDFI, 
the Co-operative and Community Finance, formerly and better known as ICOF. 
This organisation has had a long history of lending to the co-operative sector. 
The introductory chapter mentioned ICOF as an early example. ICOF has 
recently changed to the Co-operative and Community Finance. However, this 
thesis will continue to use the acronym ICOF, because of the name’s longevity 
and all of the interviewees recognised the organisation by ICOF. The following 
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section will recap some of the history of the organisation, look at changes within 
the last ten years and look at its performance.  
 
In the initial research I found that ICOF was both a member of INAISE and 
UKSIF. The organisation’s website explained the history of the organisation and 
its aim and objectives. I expected to find academic literature about this 
organisation, because of its links with the co-operative movement and longevity 
and this presumption was not the true. ICOF’s own annual reports proved 
informative. ICOF’s history, purpose and structure make it unique and individual, 
so the basic survey was supported with additional questions.  
 
This section is based upon interviews with staff members, workshops held by 
ICOF in the early to mid 2000s, publications and the website. ICOF also 
produced a 25 year history of the organisation which recorded its successes 
and failures.  
 
A Brief History of Lending to the Co-operative Sector. 
 
Started in 1973, ICOF was established to finance cooperatives with funding 
from another co-operative, Scott Bader. Later in 1976, the Industrial Common 
Ownership Act provided ICOF with £250,000 to lend. This was successfully 
recycled from 1976 to 1994, producing over 120 loans amounting to £725,000 
(ICOF, 1999). Eventually, there were too many losses for the fund to continue. 
In the 1980s, ICOF began to manage co-operative funds for local authorities 
such as West Glamorgan, Luton, Northampton, London and York. In the 1980s 
the creation of co-operatives was seen as a cost effective way of increasing 
employment (ICOF, 1999). ICOF noted that high risk loans were made causing 
the cumulative losses to reach 30 percent in 1986. The organisation was 
helping failing businesses to become co-operatives and quickly these 
businesses also failed. Around 1991 ICOF wrote-off the significant sum of over 
£100,000. During the early 1990s the write-offs peaked about a year after the 
loan balances had peaked and declined as it made more prudent loans. 
Potentially, in the late 1980s ICOF was lending to organisations that were 
surviving only a year or two before closing and debts being written off. In an 
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ICOF workshop it was explained that from 1987 to 1991 the losses were 18 
percent (Hibbert, 2002). So some of the businesses they funded were not fully 
viable, but they had political pressure to create and sustain employment.   
 
These losses were from local authority funds and separate to other funds. In 
1987 ICOF plc was formed with the purpose of attracting finance by a public 
share issue to create a national fund. Over £500,000 was raised in shares 
redeemable after ten years. When the shares became redeemable in 1997 
many investors transferred them to the new issue. In 1994, ICOF created 
Community Capital an investment society with membership shares. This raised 
£450,000 to be borrowed by community and social enterprises. ICOF’s 
supporters were making investments in Community Capital and the publicity 
materials advertised it as a ‘Social Investment.’ The 1990s was a decade of 
stabilisation with ICOF reducing its write-offs and making lower risk loans. The 
company has gradually improved its sustainability by working with the potential 
borrowers and around the millennium the organisation had a loss rate of only 4 
percent of its lending portfolio (Hibbert, 2002). 
 
What does ICOF do and how does it do it? 
 
ICOF unlike other smaller CDFIs, has many roles. It firstly acts similar to the 
Charity Bank or other CDFIs attracting money into its funds and distributing 
loans. It continues its lending role and manages funds for other organisations 
such as local authorities. However, unlike other CDFIs it has offered ‘back 
office’ services since 1996. It has many years experience in lending and had 
invested in the technology for loan management. In the early 2000s its clients 
included the Aston Reinvestment Trust, the London Rebuilding Society, Radical 
Routes, a loan fund for housing initiatives and Opportunity Micro Credit 
International (ICOF, 2003). ICOF has managed to achieve mixed sources of 
funding.   
 
ICOF lending policy has been very clear cut and disseminated through the 
website: 
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 ‘ICOF will only invest in the social economy, co-operative and 
employee owned businesses which are economically viable. Each 
enterprise must be able to demonstrate the ability to pay interest and 
repay the capital on any agreed loan finance’ (ICOF, 2007).  
 
In 2002 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published Social Enterprise: 
A Strategy for Success, which stated that a social enterprises may only be 
covering 75 percent of their costs and being supported by grants. For ICOF a 
potential borrower had to make a profit, but not a private profit and this profit or 
surplus would service the debt.  
 
ICOF’s market has been established over many years. It had basic loans 
products for co-operatives and social enterprises. In 2009, the loans started 
from £5,000 to £50,000 at an interest rate based on individual circumstances. 
However, other managed funds could increase the loan to £125,000 and 
£250,000 in London. In addition, there would be a loan appraisal and 
arrangement fee of between 1 to 2 percent. This fee ranged from £250 up to a 
maximum of £1,000. Finally, borrowers had to become members and invest 
£250 into the organisation. Over a number of years these percentages 
remained constant.  
 
ICOF has been over time entrusted with a number of funds available on a 
geographical basis (Newsector, 2001). Potentially, a loan could be mix of funds 
with ICOF being paid to manage one fund and in receipt of an arrangement fee 
as a percentage borrowed from another fund. This would spread the risk around 
their different funds made up of investor’s money and local authority funds.    
 
While the lending has been straight forward, its investment policy has been 
more complex. ICOF has previously advertised its Community Capital Fund as 
a social investment with ‘a priority on people rather than profit’ (ICOF, 2000, p. 
1). Investors would buy shares in the organisation and receive dividends. In a 
BBC interview Andrew Hibbert explained: 
 
If you're looking for an investment that is not for a financial rate of 
return but a social rate of return, then that is what you get … We do 
manage to pay interest or dividends at around the rate of inflation so 
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your investment doesn't go down in value, but nor does it go up. So if 
you're looking for a rate of return or a pension for your old age that's 
not what we offer. We do offer, hopefully, a better social environment 
in the UK (BBC, 2001).  
 
 In 2006 the minimum investment was £250 and the maximum £20,000. Interest 
was paid on the investment, but it was at risk. Investors can withdraw funds with 
six months notice. Since 1987 ICOF also had a ten year share issue with 
investors giving their money to ICOF to lend and recycle. The last share issue 
was in 2007.  Since ICOF was asking investors to buy shares within the 
organisation it would be important to safeguard these funds as much as 
possible. Investors, especially social or ethical investors often expect to receive 
a rate lower than the market, but do not expect to lose their money. ICOF has 
gradually produced a structure appropriate for taking investments and making 
loans. Rather than attempting to become a bank, ICOF is a series of 
businesses, which can seem complex. Throughout the 2000s there were two 
main organisations: 
 
• Industrial Common Ownership Finance Ltd, which traded as Co-
operative and Community Finance. It had two subsidiaries, the ICO Fund 
Plc, which held investors money to be borrowed by co-operatives and 
ICOF Guarantee Company helping to preserve the fund. In the annual 
accounts this part of the organisation is called the Group.  
• ICOF Community Capital, which was a separate organisation that 
contained the East Midlands and East of England Community Capital.  
 
Investors, both individual and corporate make an investment to support co-
operatives or social enterprises. The company structure has been aimed at 
preserving these social investments, while producing a small dividend and 
social return. The Guarantee Company has been made up of investors 
contributing their interest or dividends to allow the organisation to make a few 
more high risk loans. The Group accounts can illustrate the fragility of the 
organisation with 2002 producing a retained profit of £12,202. Four years later, 
in 2006 there was a loss of £13,252, which reduced the retained profit to be 
carried forward to only £21,404. Any losses would reduce their Guarantee Fund. 
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The Community Capital element of the organisation does not the have a 
guarantee and has to regularly make provisions for bad debts. In the 2006 
accounts the organisation wrote off two loans worth £47,159 from the previous 
year and sustained a loss of £16,152. These failures did reduce the opportunity 
to pay a dividend on their social investment.  
 
ICOF was one of the first lenders to become a registered CDFI and has offered 
the CITR offering a 5 percent reduction in tax on the amount invested for five 
years. The majority of ICOF’s shareholders have been supporters of the co-
operative structure. However, the tax relief has made the investment financially 
more attractive. Again, ICOF has to be very careful with investor’s money, 
because it must be returned, so it cannot make significant losses. The tax relief 
attracted £1 million to the organisation (Finch, 2006).  
 
ICOF’s Performance 
 
The Charity Bank has managed to attract large sums into its funds using the 
CITR, but could not get sufficient borrowers. It is possible that ICOF may have 
done better because of its longevity and experience. In 2006, the Chair of Co-
operative and Community Finance stated he was unaware of any other CDFI 
lending 75 percent of their CITR funds by the third year (ICOF, 2006). 
Potentially, it had performed better than the Charity Bank. However, by 
comparing figures from before and after the tax relief scheme a less favourable 
picture is shown. In 2002, the ICOF Group had debtors worth £1.1m and cash 
in the bank worth £0.98m and it was a similar amount to previous years. In 2006, 
the debtors amounted to £1.2m and funds in the bank £3.9m. The amount being 
borrowed had hardly changed, but the amount of cash had dramatically 
increased. It would seem that the CITR has attracted funds to produce for the 
organisation.     
 
ICOF has had good grounds to claim to be sustainable. In 2001, the ICOF 
Group were covering 81.6 percent of operating and administration costs from 
loan and bank interest (ICOF Group, 2001). In 2002, it was announced that 
ICOF was covering 90 percent of these costs (Hibbert, 2002). This efficiency 
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has been achieved by keeping costs to a minimum. This can be illustrated the 
fact that the ICOF Group only employed three workers, but had a £1.1 million 
loan balance (ICOF Group, 2001). However, the profit and loss accounts from 
the early 2000s illustrate that some of their income came from consultancy. In 
2006 the accounts for the Group showed a small loss of £13,252, but ICOF Plc 
made a profit of £17,900.  In 2007 and 2008 the group made approximately 
£61,000 and £68,000 profit respectively. From the 2008 annual review, the 
organisation had £269,542 in loans to be repaid within the year and another 
£921,278 over a year. It also had £2.8m in cash at the bank and in hand. In 
2008, ICOF had £1.1m out on loan and had increased the members of staff to 
five. Like the Charity Bank, ICOF has successfully attracted funds in, but still 
had considerable funds available. ICOF’s financial accounts illustrate the 
organisation has survived by making small profits and retaining profits for less 
successful years. Its sustainability has potentially come from its ability to attract 
mixed streams of income.  
 
Because of its longevity, ICOF is an important example of a CDFI. However, for 
a national lender it does seem to be a niche market lender. The small amounts 
being borrowed may indicate that there is a limit to the number of borrowers or 
too much competition. ICOF has seemed to have settled on being a small-
scale, yet national organisation. In the early 2000s it was only employing three 
people and later this was increased to six. By 2008 this was down to five. It 
could be that expansion beyond a certain point would make the organisation 
less efficient.  
 
At the CDFA conference in 2003, a member of staff stated that ICOF had 
always been sustainable, because it had survived by managing governmental, 
local and national funds and making loans from its own funds. However, at 
certain periods of time it had a loss rate of 20 percent to 30 percent, which 
would be clearly unsustainable if it was investor’s money. However, the 
governmental funds were aimed at establishing businesses, rather than 
producing successful loans. In the 1980s it had been noticed that taking failing 
businesses and turning them into co-operatives did not help the employees, 
because the enterprise could still fail (Mellor et al., 1988). Potentially, during this 
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period the lender was setting up high risk loans just to satisfy a wish to create 
enterprises. A later chapter will explore the balance between creating 
opportunity and risk. Even in the mid 2000s a small number of ICOF’s loan 
failed. However, diversification into managing other funds has kept the 
organisation going.  
 
The Triodos Bank 
 
This example of a CDFI is a trans-national bank working across Europe. 
However, the term CDFI would be meaningless on the European mainland, 
because it is a North American term. The Triodos Bank can be seen as a 
potential role model for the Charity Bank paying interest on its accounts and 
managing to make a small profit for its shareholders. Currently, the Charity 
Bank is a not-for-profit bank, but does pay interest on its accounts. Originally in 
2002/3, I researched the Triodos Bank and was sent the annual report. I sent 
emails and questioned certain aspects of the business and again the bank was 
helpful in supplying available information. I regularly checked their website 
throughout the research period and updated figures in 2009. This section will 
look at the bank’s history, the views of the bank’s managing director to give an 
idea of the philosophy behind the organisation, some of its different accounts 
and the effect of CITR. It will also look at how the organisation has adjusted 
itself for the UK market in the mid to late 2000s. 
 
A Brief History of this European bank 
 
Triodos Bank has been associated with the Third Sector and ecology in Europe 
since its establishment in 1980. The original organisation based in the 
Netherlands, has its roots in a study around the conscious handling of money in 
1968. This led to the development of foundation in 1971 and a guarantee fund 
for social projects in 1973. The Triodos Bank was opened in the Netherlands in 
1980, then a Belgian office in 1993 and finally the UK and Ireland office in 1995. 
A merger with UK Provident plc aided the establishment of the UK branch 
(Warwick and Tickell, 2000). In the late 1990s and early 2000s Triodos across 
Europe established a series of ethical and environmental accounts including a 
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wind fund. In 2003 the bank expanded to Spain, in 2005 into Germany and in 
2006 created a Luxembourg fund.  
 
Like ICOF and the Charity Bank, Triodos became a registered CDFI in the UK. 
This allowed the bank to offer the Community Investment Tax Relief to their UK 
investors. In 2003, the Community Investor Account used the CITR to give 8.33 
percent to higher tax payers and 6.41 percent gross to those paying the basic 
rate of tax. In addition, the investors received the variable interest rate of around 
2.1 percent. The new account closed after two weeks when it reached its full 
subscription of £3 million. This fund proved to be attractive, was over-
subscribed and produced £3.8 million (Finch, 2006). Charles Middleton, the 
managing director stated in a press release that: 
 
 ‘In a climate of low interest rates and growing interest in ethical 
investment, the account simply made sense to hundreds of 
people…The challenge now is to lend the same money to the 
organisations and enterprises that need it most’ (Triodos, 2003).  
 
This gave a gross interest rate equivalent to 10 percent and 8 percent and was 
a very attractive five year financial investment. Current investors were unable to 
transfer existing funds into the account, so the scheme attracted only new social 
investment money. The bank has established itself within the ethical financial 
market by its history of financing green projects. Another area of investment 
success was the sponsoring of the Cafédirect share issue to raise £5 million. 
Begun in February 2004, after two months £3.5 million had been raised from 
mostly private investors (Triodos, 2004). This increased to over £4 million after 
another month and the limit of £5 million was reached soon after. This was 
remarkable for an ethical investment with a potentially low financial return.  
 
What Products are Available? 
 
The CDFI element of the Triodos Bank’s is only a part of larger organisation. 
The organisation has over years tried to link investors to borrowers to cover its 
costs and make a profit. From the research it was found that Triodos Bank had 
many different accounts as though it was attempting to appeal to the broadest 
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possible range of social investors. These account options eliminated the gap 
between depositor and borrower offering investors to target their funds and 
receive a lower rate of return (Warwick and Tickell, 2000). This policy of being 
trans-national and offering many products illustrates the bank’s competitiveness 
to extend into new markets. In the early 2000s during the original research the 
bank concentrated its lending in four areas: 
 
• The first being social businesses for example co-operatives, organic food 
retailing, employment creation and fair trade. This covered a large range 
of potential borrowers.  
• The second sector was environmental initiatives such as organic 
agriculture, conservation and renewable energy.  
• Charities working with special needs, complementary therapies, the arts 
and education were the third area.  
• Finally, community projects such as social housing, community services, 
local investment and voluntary groups were their last market (Triodos, 
2002).  
 
From this list it would seem that every potential commercial or social enterprise 
or charity would be covered by this broad remit. Potentially, employment 
creation could be an extensive area of lending.    
 
By having the experience of working in Europe and possessing sufficient funds, 
the bank was able to offer products and loan amounts different from other UK 
based CDFIs. Its loans began at £20,000, but went up to £5 million illustrating 
the range and scope of projects the bank would fund. Interest was based on the 
merits of each project, but in the UK would be approximately 2 – 3 percent over 
the base rate (Triodos, 2002a). Triodos Bank like the Charity Bank and ICOF, 
also charged a 1 percent arrangement fee. The bank expected 100 percent 
security. In the early 2000s, unlike other banks, Triodos would accept group 
guarantees making a number of people liable for the loan repayments. This 
could be seen as the influence of the Grameen Bank. However, it also shows 
that the bank has been open to innovative ideas.  By the late 2000s, the bank 
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stopped suggesting interest rates on the website and advised the potential 
borrower to consult with one of their loan managers. Potentially, this was 
because of the low UK interest rate, property prices and the strength of each 
individual loan application.  
 
Over the research period, the bank’s accounts and funds have been trialled and 
altered appropriately. An example of Triodos Bank’s approach to supporting 
organisations with social objectives can be found in their work with investors 
and charities. The ‘Charity Saver’ product allowed ‘depositors to target a 
proportion of their interest to a charity of their choice’ (Triodos, 2003a, p. 25). 
The Social Target Account was innovative in that supporters could help their 
organisations by moving their savings to Triodos. The interest on supporter’s 
accounts could be partially or totally used to help pay off their charity’s loan. 
The supporter would not risk their savings, but by choosing zero interest would 
offset some of the repayments of their chosen charity. Alternatively, charity 
supporters could become guarantors for their chosen charity if it did not have 
sufficient security. This guarantee was limited to a maximum of £2,000 per 
person. This was another new way of linking the investors with the charity 
borrower. Similarly, a charity could borrow without security if donors formed a 
Triodos Bank Borrowing Community turning their regular donations into loan 
repayments to benefit their chosen charity (Triodos, 2001). Money for a minibus 
was used as an example for these repayment donations, because the bus 
service could guarantee an income from donations and charges.  
 
As further proof of Triodos exploring the market in 2004, it had eighteen 
personal accounts. These included the Amnesty Saver Account, which donated 
0.25 percent of the average yearly balance to Amnesty International, the Charity 
Saver, Fairtrade Saver, Organic Saver, Just Housing accounts and the Quaker 
Social Housing Account providing finance social housing schemes (Triodos, 
2004a). Earlier in 2002, there was the North South Plan, which was a savings 
account that helped to provide the funds for the Development Investment Unit. 
This was used to invest in micro-credit organisations in the developing world 
(Triodos, 2002a). However, this account seemed to have been taken off the 
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market by 2004 indicating a lack of demand and Triodos testing different 
financial products linked to social causes.  
 
In 2007, its products are less diverse with around six accounts including a mini 
ISA. On offer was a renewable energy bond allowing investors to invest in 
green forms of energy and receive an interest rate of 4.5 percent. Similarly, 
savers could decide to have their funds used for organic farming, social 
enterprise, charities or the developing world. As a CDFI it has a mixed portfolio 
of investments, loans and products on a national and international level. The 
bank has lent to British social enterprises and also to the developing world and 
Russia with micro-finance. One of the characteristics of a CDFI is to bring about 
financial inclusion and Triodos seems to have actively found markets in Europe 
and beyond.      
 
The ideas behind the Triodos Bank 
 
In 2000, Peter Blom, the Chair-person of the Triodos board gave an insight into 
the philosophy of the bank. He stated that: 
 
 ‘Orthodox economic thinking holds that growth is good – but the 
quality of such growth and long term costs are not taken into 
account. The problems we are now experiencing with food and 
agriculture are a result of this way of thinking and may be the 
pressure point which brings about change’ (Triodos,  2000, p. 3).  
 
Blom was speaking at a time post Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, better 
known Mad Cow Disease, debates over genetically engineered crops across 
Europe and high stock market prices. He commented that: 
 
‘Twenty years ago, customers were prepared to donate their 
interest to charity and research. Now our customers expect to get 
market-level returns and the warm feeling that we use their savings 
to finance positive projects’ (Triodos, 2000, p. 3).  
 
He recognised that even social investment was becoming more commercial 
while keeping a social goal. Triodos took a Third Way path between 
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philanthropy and the very commercial market. This perspective was illustrated 
by Peter Blom’s statement,  
 
‘I don’t believe in pure altruism, but short-sighted egotism doesn’t 
work either. It is in the interaction between altruism and self-interest 
that business and society can both benefit’ (Triodos, 2000, p. 3).  
 
People’s choices for investment were based upon being a businessperson and 
a citizen. Blom was suggesting social and financial investment judgements 
working together.  
 
In the mid 2000s the bank questioned the ‘light green varnish’ of the other 
banks offering ethical and green products (Triodos, 2005, p.1). The bank even 
questioned the role of money and how it needed to measure its social outputs. 
In 2005, celebrating twenty-five years of the bank, Blom saw that the bank’s 
expansion had not weakened the social mission. He suggested that in the future 
‘we will play more of a gateway role; an exchange where money and initiatives 
for a sustainable society can be brought together’ (Triodos, 2005a, p. 3). This 
gateway idea can be seen in the bank offering such a wide range of products 
and issuing ethical shares.  
 
The bank had introduced green products in the 1990s before the mainstream 
banks had explored this market. In the late 2000s, with the banking crisis the 
bank was able to show its difference. Peter Blom announced in the 2009 annual 
report that: 
 
 ‘Deal with a financial system that has so singularly failed to provide 
for the majority of people it serves and we could build the basis for a 
lasting solution to our most pressing environmental and social 
problems … and despite well-publicised problems in the financial 
system, sustainable banks like Triodos Bank continue to be 
successful. Attracting over euro 100 million in a capital raising issue 
to support further growth, just as many high-street banks were using 
tax payer’s money to fill holes in their capital base simply to survive, 
was proof of that’ (Triodos, 2010, p. 9).  
 
Again, this CDFI was able to show its innovation, sustainability and its superior 
social benefits. 
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The Performance of the Triodos Bank  
 
Triodos Bank has had success in three areas, investment, sustainability and 
recognition. The organisation has run some very successful share issues and 
opened some popular accounts. In 2004 and 2010 Triodos Bank was given the 
Queen’s Award for Enterprise in the sustainable development category 
(Triodos, 2004b, 2010a). Charles Middleton, the managing director of Triodos 
Bank in the UK commented that:  
 
‘Mainstream business and many consumers appear to have woken 
up to the power of ethical money… in a crowded market place it is 
increasingly important that organisations genuinely committed to 
positive change are able to make themselves heard (Triodos, 2005a, 
p. 37).  
 
He found environmental and social issues were becoming more mainstream 
and thought the award recognised the support of its many savers and social 
enterprise borrowers. In 2005, it won best cash ISA in the Consumer Finance 
Awards run by the Guardian newspaper group. It has gained recognition for its 
ethical policy and its openness giving customers lists of borrowers (Guardian, 
2004). Unlike the larger banks, Triodos Bank had not made excessive profits 
and avoided criticism from their customers, because their aim was to produce 
only moderate profits for their investors so allowing them to work for social 
benefits (INAISE, 2001). 
 
Table 7: The Key Figures for the Triodos Bank (International figures) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of 
accounts 
79,883 87,989 102,318 130,644 169,517 
Funds 
entrusted 
£632m £735m £911m 1,186m 1,978m 
Loans £386m £456m £574m £747m £1,210m 
Number of 
loans 
3,255 3,682 3,977 6,181 9,381 
Net profit £2.6m £3.6m £4.1m £6.6m £9.7m 
 Source: Taken from the Triodos Bank Annual Accounts 
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The figures in Table 7 are for the whole bank and not just the UK and Ireland 
branch. However, the figures show the bank has successfully covered its costs 
and each year been profitable. 
 
Figure 2: Growth of savings and loans. 
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Source: Taken from the Triodos Bank Annual Accounts 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the regular increases in savings and loans. This CDFI has 
around 60 percent of savings out on loan. With further analysis it was found that 
their Netherlands operation was the most successful at producing loans.  
 
The UK branch has gradually increased its number of loans to be comparable 
with the other European branches. The Netherlands branch would have 
subsidised its UK counterpart for the first few years. In 2007/8, the UK bank had 
approximately £207 million out on loan (Triodos, 2008). It also had a share 
issue for Triodos Renewables and raised £10 million from 4,000 private 
investors (Triodos, 2008). Unlike the Charity Bank, it was managing to cover its 
costs and create surpluses.  This was due to earning interest on their loans and 
receiving management fees for their work with share issues. The annual reports 
indicate that supporting environmental projects and promoting ethical banking 
had paid dividends. In 2008, the UK operation experienced a successful year, 
even though its growth was hampered by the decline in the Pound and rise of 
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the Euro. However, this fluctuation in currencies also increased profits for the 
UK business.  
 
The Triodos Bank has been innovative and groundbreaking and came to the UK 
with fifteen years of experience as a bank. Rather than starting from scratch it 
took over an existing organisation and imported its range of products. Its loan 
portfolio has been diverse, including organic farming, renewable energy, health 
care, social enterprise and the arts. However, financial exclusion is the link 
between the separate parts of their loan portfolio. The mainstream banks would 
be unlikely to support environmental projects that would take many years to pay 
off a loan. This CDFI has thought long term with the conversion to organic 
farming taking a number of years and green energy equally taking many years 
to recoup the investment. Triodos have not been short term investors in 
environmental schemes. Only a small percentage of its work is involved in 
lending to social businesses and creating employment. Possibly concentrating 
too narrowly on enterprise can be detrimental to the sustainability of a CDFI.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Are these national or international CDFIs on the way to ensure sustainability? 
ICOF has remained small within a niche market of co-operatives and social 
enterprise and has succeeded in being sustainable. Its supporters believe in co-
operative principles and it has social principles behind it. The Triodos Bank in 
the UK has had larger aspirations and has produced loans in the millions. It, like 
ICOF, has social ideas behind it. In 2009/10 the Triodos Bank stated it aimed ‘to 
achieve its mission as a sustainable bank in three ways’ (Triodos, 2010, p. 5). 
The Bank aimed to be a sustainable service provider, a product innovator and 
an opinion maker (Triodos, 2010). It knew it had environmental and social 
credentials and offered them the right products. The Charity Bank has not yet 
achieved sustainability possibly because it is has not found its market yet. It 
may continue to make losses and eventually disappear as its financial 
supporters diminish.  
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What connects these organisations is their work in financial inclusion and the 
investment by the public and organisations in their funds. All of these CDFIs 
have amounts of investor’s money out on loan and in the bank. A balancing act 
is needed between investments and loans. The Community Investment Tax 
Relief initiative seems to have brought in investment that has largely remained 
within the CDFI rather than being borrowed. With hindsight, this form of support 
may not have been ideally suitable for younger or smaller CDFIs. 
 
The demand for loans has been as issue for many CDFIs and research has 
shown that corporations attempt to firstly find internal funds and then external 
funds (Myers and Majluf, 2004). It has been argued that there is a ‘strict 
ordering or a hierarchy of sources of finance’ (Benito, 2003, p. 7). This could be 
true of UK businesses, especially trading charities and social enterprises. 
Charities may seek other options, such as fund raising or applying for a grant 
before seeking a loan.   
 
Sustainability is very much linked to diversification, such as managing a fund 
belonging to a local authority, having a large range of products, running back 
office services or managing share issues. Larger loans for capital projects bring 
in more money. At CDFI conferences many loan managers have commented 
that it takes just as much work to give a £5,000 loan as it does a £250,000 loan. 
Triodos Bank with its environment loans has capitalised on long term, larger 
loans for renewable energy.  
 
Overall, things look financially problematic for the Charity Bank, because it still 
has not found its route to sustainability. ICOF has had large fluctuations, but 
now seems settled as a small-scale niche lender. The Triodos Bank has 
continually acted as an innovator and tried new products with social, 
environmental and cultural benefits. It has a market, but will continue to offer 
new things. All of these CDFIs are still in development. The following chapter 
will show that the regional and local CDFIs have been innovative and have had 
major problems too.  
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Chapter Six: CDFI Case Studies: Local and Regional  
 
This chapter looks in detail at individual examples of three CDFIs working at the 
sub-national level. The majority of these case studies will come from what I 
previously called the ‘New Wave’- those organisations that began in the late 
1990s or the early 2000s. This was an area of interest for my research as these 
organisations have had to assess and gradually work out their roles through a 
mixture of success and failure. While both ICOF and the Triodos Bank have 
survived over twenty five years of trading, Street UK, the Aston Reinvestment 
Trust and the Community Loan Fund North East are more youthful in 
comparison. The two CDFIs based in the North East of England were selected 
because they offered two different models. The third CDFI, ART, was chosen 
because of its profile – it has appeared extensively in the national press 
(Gosling, 1994; Mgadzah, 1995; Gosling, 2001; Parker, 2001; McCurry, 2002).  
 
Data collection involved accessing secondary sources, and collecting primary 
data through a number of interviews. In the case of ART based in Birmingham, 
Steve Walker, the manager, visited Newcastle and this was used to gather 
information. Similarly, the annual CDFI conferences were used in keep up to 
date with changes within organisations. Both the Community Loan Fund North 
East (CLFNE) and Street UK were interviewed at least twice over a five year 
period.  
 
ART had very a good website that was updated with their annual reports and 
news stories of their work around Birmingham. The CLFNE website was quite 
static with limited information and therefore a greater need to interview the loan 
manager again. During the research period Street UK changed staff and 
became Street North East. Once again it was important to re-interview the 
organisation.  
 
Other CDFIs, business support agencies, social enterprise development 
workers and a Barclays’ Bank business manager were interviewed to attempt to 
gain a more holistic picture. The CDFIs hoped to gain referrals from the banks 
and business support agencies, so these additional interviews were important.      
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Street UK: Bringing Micro-finance to the UK. 
 
In previous chapters it has been noted that micro-finance has been successful 
in developing countries and the Grameen Bank is often cited as an important 
example. Street UK took its inspiration from the Grameen Bank and its model 
and experience from Fundusz Mikro. The Polish micro-finance organisation, 
Fundusz Mikro was set up in 1994 with $24 million from the Polish American 
Enterprise Fund. Rosalind Copisarow, an ex-banker for JP Morgan was the 
Chief Executive of this lending organisation. Over four years the organisation 
had built up a large enough customer base to be self-sufficient, distributing 
25,000 loans worth $25 million with a 98 percent repayment rate (Copisarow, 
2001). The success of Fundusz Mikro led Rosalind Copisarow to begin 
establishing a similar organisation in the UK. Rosalind and Martin Hockley, 
formerly of ICOF aimed to establish a micro-finance organisation in the 
economically developed UK. 
 
Street UK was established to provide loans to small businesses unable to 
access finance from high street banks. The starting date for the organisation 
has proved slightly problematical with the NEF report claiming August 1999 and 
its own website suggesting its launch was in September 2000 (Street UK, 2000). 
Originally, Street’s aim was to establish 40 branches serving 20,000 active 
clients and a £40 million loan portfolio over a seven-year period (NEF, 2005). It 
was offering loans between £500 and £10,000 and introduced its first business 
loan product in April 2001.  
 
In the first year of Street UK its website stated that it aimed to ‘fill the gap left by 
mainstream banks, credit unions, credit card companies, money lenders and 
charities’ (Street UK, 2000). The zeal and philosophy of the organisation can be 
illustrated in an interview with Rosalind Copisarow, the chief executive of Street 
UK. She stated: 
 
‘When we first talk to them there is often a dead look in their eyes 
because they’re so tired, they’re trying so hard to just tread water, 
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and they don’t see the point in going on because there is no-one 
there to help them. But once they realise you’re for real this light 
comes into their eyes – in that moment you re-ignite hope and it’s 
wonderful’  (Loney, 2003, p. 15).   
 
There was fervent desire to solve a series of social problems. Street’s founders 
claimed: 
 
• ‘There was a growing gap between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’.  
• There was growth in the number of people becoming self 
employed. 
• The restructuring of financial services had led ‘less availability of 
trust-based, appropriately structured, small business loans’ (NEF, 
2005, p. 10).  
 
Street UK thought they had identified a need for small loans for start ups (in 
business for six months), the grey market (people trading while receiving 
benefits) and the existing self employed and micro businesses. In an interview 
with a Street UK loan manager based in Newcastle it was suggested that there 
were still people being denied credit, because of county court judgements 
dating back to the Poll Tax of the early 1990s. Others were denied credit, 
because they did not have sufficient experience or had poor records. Rosalind 
Copisarow cited the importance of her organisation and micro-finance on the 
World in Need website: 
 
 ‘The rewards (of micro-credit) are immense: for individuals, micro-
credit can improve their psychological, social and financial well-being: 
for communities, it can strengthen their ties of mutual support and 
reach out to the needy; and for the country as a whole, micro-credit 
can create tens of thousands of unsubsidised jobs in only a few 
years’ (World in Need, 2002). 
 
It was perceived that the opportunity to access the correct form of loan finance 
would bring about great social and economic benefits. Street UK was to use its 
knowledge of Polish micro-finance to give people this opportunity and develop 
into a national organisation. 
 
Street’s Proposed Methodology 
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Street UK had intended to use a Grameen Bank type model with groups of 
lenders mutually supporting each other. An early version of the website stated: 
 
• ‘Borrowers join together to form groups of between 4 and 7 members. 
Borrower groups are self-forming and self-regulating;’ 
• ‘No collateral is required but each member of the group mutually 
guarantees the obligations of the other group members. Access to 
further loans is dependent on all group members fully repaying their 
loans.’ 
• ‘Loans are structured to meet the needs of each borrower in terms of 
size, purpose and terms’ (Street UK, 2000). 
 
It was planned that group borrowers would receive a discounted interest rate 
and individuals would supply three personal external guarantees. From these 
statements it would suggest that Street UK was going for a peer group model 
where liability would be transferred to others ensuring full repayment. This peer 
pressure and joint liability model was a copy of the Grameen Bank (Yunus, 
2003). Street UK aimed to transfer peer pressure, group loans from rural 
Bangladesh to the urban United Kingdom. In an early promotional leaflet, Street 
UK attempted to get across the message of group loans and their publicity 
leaflet stated: 
 
• ‘Use your contacts not your assets to guarantee your loan.’ 
• ‘Involve family, fellow traders, even fellow borrowers.’ 
• ‘Successful repayment will open the door to further immediate loans’ 
(Street UK, Newcastle, 2001). 
 
This may have been potentially a new and therefore difficult concept for many 
business people. The first North East loan manager Sarah Mackey had some 
difficulty with the proposed methodology. However, she found that amongst 
ethnic minorities there was an acceptance and knowledge of group loans. 
Since this method did not entirely work, most loans were not to groups, but 
individual loans backed by guarantors. When interviewed Sarah Mackey stated: 
 
‘We ask for guarantors, three guarantors or a group… the taxi drivers 
is a case in point, they all borrowed £1,500 for their premises 
(Mackey, 2002) 
 
A group of Asian taxi drivers took a group loan and guaranteed for each other.   
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 The Street UK branches altered their methodology of lenders and guarantors 
after an initial period. In Street UK’s own evaluation it suggested after a 
number of years trading that: 
 
‘Loans need to be made individually, group loans having been found 
not to work on a large scale, mostly due to the lack of peer group 
support and peer pressure levels prevalent in developing countries’  
(Copisarow, 2004, p. 6). 
 
The transfer of group loans to the UK failed, because of cultural differences. It 
was found that an individual guarantor provided better security than a group 
(Copisarow, 2004). Similarly, NEF’s evaluation of 2004 suggested that it 
proved difficult for potential borrowers to form groups with a mixed range of risk 
profiles suitable for Street’s lending criteria. John Hall, the second loan 
manager based at the Newcastle branch found parents would be guarantors 
for their sons and daughters and trust was limited to immediate family 
members. The group loan methodology was confusing to many potential 
borrowers and was an element that slowed the progress of the organisation. 
 
Street’s Performance 1999 – 2004 
 
Street UK’s performance was evaluated by itself in 2004 and at the request of 
the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation (EFF) by the NEF in the same year. Street 
UK’s history can be divided into two phases, pre and post 2004. After 2004 the 
London office was closed and the organisation changed, with the North East 
office becoming a separate entity. Street UK seems to have gradually attracted 
funding from the banks (Bank of Scotland, Northern Rock, Co-Op Bank, 
Alliance and Leicester and Barclays) for onward lending (Street UK, 2000). The 
role of the Northern Rock Bank has been difficult to clarify, because the website 
and Street UK’s staff used ‘Northern Rock’ interchangeably to mean both the 
Bank and the Foundation. The second source of significant revenue funding 
was from many charitable foundations such as the EFF, the NRF and the 
Gulbenkian Foundation. Some of its funding was aimed at certain areas such as 
operating expenses from the Newcastle Employment Bond, Scottish Enterprise 
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and Leaside Regeneration. Overall, by 2004 it had attracted over £4 million in 
funding (Street UK, 2004).   
 
The NEF report stated that the first phase of Street UK was the research period 
and the second phase was its pilot stage up to the end of 2001. In its second it: 
 
 ‘explored locations and opened branches in Glasgow and Bradford, 
developed their lending policies, procedures and documentation and 
marketed themselves to potential clients. Street’s first loan was made 
in March 2001’ (NEF, 2005, p. 22).  
 
In an early press release the organisation announced the first branches would 
be in Edinburgh/Glasgow, Newcastle/Sunderland, East London and 
Manchester/Preston (Street UK, 2000a). Street UK opened branches in 
Birmingham, Newcastle and London (BBC, 2002). However, Sarah Mackey, the 
loan manager in Newcastle mentioned the Glasgow office on a number of 
occasions and the NEF (2004) evaluation stated that an office in Glasgow was 
set up. The Glasgow branch may have been a pilot project over a very limited 
period.  
 
During this time there was speculation that Street UK would merge with unLTD, 
a new charity to support social entrepreneurship. unLTD was in receipt of the 
Millennium Awards Legacy Fund worth £100 million endowment offered by the 
Millennium Commission. Rosalind Copisarow became the CEO of unLTD in 
March 2001. unLTD was aimed at supporting charitable causes through grant 
funding and was not looking to create sustainable businesses. However, the 
two organisations never merged and Rosalind resigned from unLtd in 
December of the same year (NEF, 2005).  
 
In 2002 it entered its third phase, a period of stock-taking post the unLTD 
experience and the development of a new business plan (NEF, 2005).  Since 
Street UK had not succeeded in reaching its projected targets the EFF 
suspended their funding. There was insufficient business in Glasgow and 
Bradford, so these branches closed during the year. From 2002 Street UK 
modified its products and services. This was a period of diversification 
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developing Street Lab to perform research and campaigning and Street Serve 
offering back office services. 
 
Between the start of April 2001 to the end of September 2002 it had 116 
enquiries. In this eighteen-month period Street UK Newcastle had: 
 
• Made forty-eight loans worth £82,650 
• The average (mean) enquirer wanted £2,053, but the actual loan was 
£1,722. 
• The majority of its enquiries and subsequent borrowers came from press 
and media advertising. 
• A majority of loans were to improve the income of the enterprise and 
maintain /upgrade machinery. 
•  Three quarters of borrowers were male and one quarter female.  
• Only seven from forty-eight loans came from the grey economy. 
• Six borrowers or twelve percent approximately were British Asians. 
Source: A fax from Martin Hockley based at the Birmingham branch: 4th 
October 2002. 
 
It was stated by a member of staff that these loans had produced or maintained 
approximately seventy one jobs. The difference between the enquiry and the 
actual loan (of around £300) could be seen as a sign of the staff working with 
the borrower, identifying exactly the finance needed, and how much the 
borrower could afford to repay. From these early figures it would seem that 
Street UK was attractive to ethnic minorities with around 12 percent of loans 
going to British Asians. Similarly, their product may have tapped into the female 
market with 25 percent of their borrowers being female. The organisation was 
not achieving a large loan book, but was making some progress.  
 
In 2004, NEF carried out an evaluation for the EFF, one of Street UK’s main 
funders. The reason for the evaluation was the limited success of the 
organisation. In Street UK’s own evaluation it found that the number of micro-
entrepreneurs wishing loan finance and ‘sufficiently creditworthy to receive a 
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loan’ was less than expected (Copisarow, 2004, p. 6). Examining the data from 
the Newcastle office again; 116 enquiries translated into 48 loans, which is just 
over 40 percent. Demand was coming from business people with low levels of 
financial literacy and cash flow management skills and with debts already. 
Potential borrowers needed a range of additional business support   
 
The NEF evaluation stated that there was a high level of customer satisfaction 
and the organisation had produced well developed systems for credit 
assessment and delinquency management. Potentially, through its problems, 
successes and failures it had been able to learn and develop lending systems.  
The cost of lending seems to be quite high at £2.80 to lend a pound or £4,300 
per loan. However, the NEF considered it to be comparable to other CDFIs 
(NEF, 2005).  This £2.80 included the costs of Street’s wholesale operations 
(StreetServe) and its policy work (StreetLab). In Birmingham, it was only costing 
Street UK a total of £1.60 to lend £1. Street UK had not fully costed the amount 
of development needed to get enterprises up to the point of being able to take a 
loan. NEF suggested that diversification of products and services would be 
important to Street UK’s future. The organisation changed its mind about its 
sustainability and stated: 
 
‘Overall, although Street UK no longer believes that micro-finance 
organisations in the UK can achieve scale and sustainability with a 
single loan product only, it does still believe that sustainable 
organisations can be created by a combination of: 
• Adding to their revenue stream through new product development 
for micro-entrepreneurs… 
• Finding synergies with other organisations… 
• Reducing costs through greater use of volunteers, secondees and 
non-executive directors, as well as technology in place of staff’ 
(Copisarow, 2004, p. 8).  
 
The Chief Executive (2000 – 2004) Rosalind Copisarow was prophetic about 
some of the developments at the Newcastle office. 
   
Developments after 2004  
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The EFF Evaluation, and the separation of Street UK and Street North East, 
marked a major change. Street UK had not taken off and produced the 
expected benefits. Hence, it was facing an uncertain future with funders. 
Nevertheless, both organisations have continued in their different ways.  
  
Street UK based in the Midlands was supplying personal loans and Street North 
East was still lending to enterprises. The Midlands operation concentrated on 
small loans averaging £600, debt advice and back office services. It followed 
the available funding streams and has achieved longevity by changing its 
original purpose. Street UK never achieved targets of forty offices and a loan 
portfolio of £40 million. Recently, the Street UK website claimed that it had lent 
over £1.5 million since 2001 (Street UK, 2007), which was a fraction of its 
expected total.  
 
In 2004, Street UK closed its London branch and its Newcastle branch became 
independent being renamed Street North East (NE). Potentially, keeping the 
Newcastle branch open was necessary, because it had raised significant sums 
locally for running costs (Newcastle Employment Bond £150,000 and NRF 
£225,000). In addition, the Northern Rock Foundation was willing to give them 
sums to be drawn down to lend on. After the split of Street UK and North East 
my research concentrated on Street NE, because it was still lending to 
businesses.  
 
The closure of the London branch was expected since the Community 
Development Finance Association had five CDFIs members all working in the 
poorer parts of London and offering similar products. There were potentially too 
many CDFIs competing for borrowers. Street UK based in Birmingham was 
supplying personal loans and offering debt advice. Since the focus of this 
research has been business finance it seems appropriate just to concentrate on 
the North East organisation. 
 
At a presentation in 2004, the organisation seemed to have a new found 
confidence and it announced that its interest rate was 26.8 percent. Previously, 
the organisation would avoid broadcasting this interest rate. It was explained 
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that the borrowers could not gain cheap bank finance and this rate was still 
cheaper than many regulated and unregulated lenders. An early leaflet never 
mentioned the interest rate, but a leaflet from 2004 contained a table very 
similar to Table 8. After four years in the region it was becoming accepted and 
had an understanding of its potential market.   
 
Table 8: Street NE’s Interest Rates 
The Cost of Borrowing from Street NE over Twelve months (2004) 
Loan Amount Interest Paid Interest Rate 
£1,000 £130 26.8% 
£2,000 £270 26.8% 
£5,000 £616 22.0% 
£10,000 £1,003 17.2% 
£30,000 £2, 659 12.4% 
Source: A Street NE leaflet 2004 and Copisarow, 2004.  
 
In an attempt to reduce the cost of loans, the organisation was offering larger 
loans to repeat customers and reducing the interest rates so that businesses 
would not move on to the high street banks. Table 8 shows the reduction from 
26.8 percent to 12.4 percent, but the lower rate would be for trusted repeat 
customers.  
 
In 2004 Street UK’s performance was disappointing compared with its intended 
targets. From 2001 to 2004 Street UK as a whole: 
 
• Lent over £600,000 to 260 self employed people and micro-enterprises in 
some of the UK’s most deprived areas. 
• Gave business advice to more that 1,000 micro-entrepreneurs. 
• Produced a repayment level of 83 percent on-time collection rate and 
less than 4 percent write-offs. 
• Helped safeguard at least 50 businesses and created 130 new jobs (NEF, 
2005). 
 
Street NE has continued and in 2007 was making around 5 loans per month. 
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As mentioned earlier, Street NE has continued as a supplier of micro-finance. 
As of May 2007, Street NE’s average customer was a male, aged 41 and most 
likely working in the service sector wanting a loan of around £5,250 (Street NE, 
2007). The majority of its lenders (63.2 percent) were in rented accommodation 
and 79 percent of its clients had been previously refused credit (Street NE, 
2007). The average turnover at application was around £80,000 per annum and 
after the loan this average increased to over £95,000. It has successfully 
increased the economic activity, because of its finance. By borrowing for 
vehicles, equipment or stock the businesses had increased turnover. Now 
Street NE offered larger loans, but seemed to have remained working with 
individuals excluded from bank finance.  
 
When interviewed again (in mid 2007), Street NE were increasing their staff 
from two to four. The organisation had concentrated upon one member of staff 
managing the business and seeking sufficient revenue and capital funding and 
the other building and sustaining the loan portfolio. They had managed through 
having a very lean operation to have a portfolio of around £600,000 and 
importantly were covering 20 percent of costs. In a research interview the staff 
noted that they ‘we’re setting the benchmark for microfinance’ (Street NE, 
2007a). They planned to cover more costs each year as the lending increased. 
Gradually, they had honed their systems down with six years experience and 
few staff. However, one of their major costs was the process of giving a loan:  
 
1. The initial conversation would take 20 minutes. 
2. Staff would make a site visit to the micro-enterprise, which would take 
two hours. 
3. Staff would analyse the figures from the business and fill out an 
application for the credit committee, which would take approximately two 
days. 
4. If accepted the borrower and their guarantor would come to the office to 
sign the legal agreements. 
 
The organisation had managed to gain some interest free funds to lend on, 
which helped them reduce their costs. It had 57 customers and a write off rate 
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of 5 percent, which was acceptable amongst CDFIs. They judged that there 
would always be some failures, because they were lending in a very risky part 
of the financial market. They would spend time with a borrower, who missed a 
payment and encourage them explain their difficulties.  In 2007 it was going to 
become registered for the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme giving it some 
protection from bad debts. 
 
When asked about the problems experienced over six years in the North East, 
long term funding was identified as an issue (Street NE, 2007a).  What was 
needed was long term funding of ten years to establish the organisation. Things 
had taken longer then expected and the organisation needed both revenue and 
capital funding. Overall, the organisation was optimistic about its new staff and 
the throughput of business. It believed it was heading in the right direction and 
hoped to increase its ability to cover its costs. Ideally it hoped to be eventually 
sustainable, but realistically expected to cover 50 percent of running costs 
within another three to five years. 
 
In 2008 Street North East, after seven years moved to a new address in the 
same building as Entrust, a local business support agency. Throughout the year 
there were discussions that Street NE would merge with Entrust, because of the 
synergies between the two organisations. Eventually in 2009, Street NE 
became part of Entrust as the business support agency and the Newcastle 
based CDFI Newcastle merged.   
 
Street UK: Conclusions 
 
It is important to note that, in relation to micro-finance, there was not the 
expected large-scale latent demand to be found in the economically developed 
UK, unlike Poland. It is possible that Street NE could become a successful 
model covering a significant element of its costs over time. Street NE may only 
have 57 lenders but it only had one member of staff processing loans. It was felt 
that with the additional staff the number of loans would increase to 20 – 30 per 
month. Aspire, a micro-finance organisation based in Northern Ireland 
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experienced similar difficulties to Street UK, which indicates that lending small 
amounts of money has intrinsic sustainability problems.  
 
Overall, the supply of this micro-finance service has increased economic activity 
for the lenders and increased opportunity to access finance for a particular 
group of people. By joining a larger organisation such as Entrust there will be 
synergies, economies of scale and potentially lower costs. 
 
Aston Reinvestment Trust: The expansion beyond Aston.   
 
This section will explore another of the ‘New Wave’ of CDFIs, the Aston 
Reinvestment Trust (ART). It was inspired by the South Shore Bank in Chicago 
and was ‘modelled on the Community Development Loan Funds in the US 
which are set up to regenerate targeted areas’ (House of Commons, 1998, 
section 2). In 2009, ART was in its twelfth year of its existence and had 
gradually grown beyond its original area, the district of Aston in Birmingham. It 
was set up in 1995, but was formally launched in June 1997 ‘in response to a 
recognised gap in provision of small-scale loans to small businesses and Third 
Sector organisations’ (House of Commons, 1998, section 2). ART can be seen 
as an innovative organisation and also an opportunistic follower of funding. This 
section is based on an interview with Steve Walker, the Chief Executive, the 
annual reports, newspaper articles, parliamentary papers and various sources 
on the Internet.  
 
What is ART? 
 
ART’s original market was to support enterprises that were ‘viable business and 
enterprises which provide social or economic benefit to local people’ (House of 
Commons, 1998, section 1). These businesses would be too risky for the banks, 
but could be seen to be trading sufficiently to produce a surplus to repay a loan. 
Steve Walker suggested that his organisation was not part of the social or micro 
credit part of the market like the Prince’s Trust or WEETU, but, ‘we are at the 
next area with ART, near bankable’ (House of Commons, 2000, question 382). 
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Unlike Street UK, ART’s loans were not entirely at the micro-finance level and 
ranged from £2,000 to £40,000 in 1997 and from £10,000 to £50,000 in 2007.  
 
Early in its life, ART had two main products, a business loan and the Key Fund 
aimed at social enterprises. In the early years of this lending organisation the 
rate was 1.25 percent over base reflecting their social aspirations. Commercial 
lenders at the same time had a rate of around 8 percent over base 
(Renewal.net, 2002). In 2007, ART’s had increased the rate to 5 percent over 
the base rate, which would be a more sustainable rate. In 2009, the interest rate 
was 6 - 12 percent over the base rate reflecting the low Bank of England base 
rate. There was a setting up fee of between 2 - 4 percent to pay for some of the 
initial work by ART to assess the borrower. In the late 2000s this arrangement 
fee had increased to 3 - 5 percent. In addition to these rates and fees, 
borrowers have to become members for the duration of the loan. The fee of 
£250 was returned after the loan is repaid.  
    
A Brief History of ART 
 
As its name suggests, The Aston Reinvestment Trust was an organisation that 
began its life in Aston, a disadvantaged district of Birmingham. The Aston 
Commission, a community initiative made up of local groups, voluntary 
organisations and business identified a need for a community financial 
institution (LEDI, 2002). The organisation was seen as being innovative, 
because it was using a North American CDFI model (Gosling, 1994) even 
before it had began trading. Some years later, Steve Walker stated the: 
 
 ‘People in Aston and Newtown were looking for some link between 
the banks and building societies that were moving out of the area. 
There were 28 banks in the area and there are now only three’ (Naqvi , 
2002, p. 25).  
 
 
This was a similar story to those that occurred in many disadvantaged areas, 
with the banks closing down and leaving an unsatisfied need for both personal 
and commercial finance. What followed was a feasibility study, which eventually 
produced a business plan in 1992. This led to the development phase 
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supported by the Newtown South Aston City Challenge (LEDI, 2002). Steve 
Walker admitted that ART was influenced by ICOF with a history of lending to 
co-operatives with an office in Birmingham and the Newcastle based Shared 
Interest (House of Commons, 2000). Both these organisations had been 
supported by share issues with individuals and organisations making social 
investments for little or no financial gain.  
 
In 1997 ART begun with a donation of £40,000 from the Barrow Cadbury Fund 
for a guarantee fund. This sum was supported by approximately £300,000 being 
raised by a public share issue. ART’s target of £500,000 was reached after nine 
months ‘led by personal investors followed by banks, housing associations and 
local businesses’ (ART, 1998, p. 6). ART’s structure followed ICOF and Shared 
Interest being an industrial and provident society. Since ART was a mutual 
society one of the conditions of an ART loan was that the borrower had to 
become a member. ART had a similarity with ICOF in its multi-organisation 
structure. The initial company was an industrial and provident society called 
ART Share (Social Help Association for Reinvesting in Enterprise) Ltd. Its 
purpose was to accept shareholdings, loan money and receive capital 
repayments. In addition, there were two wholly-owned subsidiary companies, 
Aston Reinvestment Co Ltd and the Aston Reinvestment Guarantee Co Ltd, 
which both played additional important roles. Aston Reinvestment Co Ltd 
worked as the trading company receiving grant funding from a number of 
sources (House of Commons, 1998). This company can be seen as giving 
social value to ART through working with clients to give them suitable loan 
finance. Finally, there was a Guarantee Company, which supported the original 
share issue. Both the CDFI sectors in the USA and the UK have recognised the 
importance of having a guarantee as the first line of loss (Canale, 2003). ICOF 
has successfully used its guarantee fund to protect investor’s money for losses.  
 
During this early period, Pat Conaty and Danyal Sattar were part of the 
Birmingham Settlement (Walker, 2003). Both have gone on to work with other 
CDFIs and write publications for NEF. Danyal Sattar worked for Investors in 
Society, a national CDFI lending to the social enterprise sector and later the 
development of the Charity Bank. Pat Conaty worked with the London 
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Rebuilding Society and has produced a number of documents in the area of 
social finance (Mayo et al., 1998; Brown, et al., 2003).  It has been suggested 
that Pat Conaty was an inspired social innovator (Walker, 2003), but his role 
can also be seen as a conduit for North American ideas for community leading 
organisations fitted to UK circumstances. It has been recognised that the South 
Shore Bank of Chicago and community development loan funds were the 
inspiration for ART (Sustainability, 1998; House of Commons, 1998).  
 
In 1998 ART had loan funds for small businesses and social enterprises up and 
running and were planning others to aid energy reductions and housing 
improvements. In the early years of ART the Sustainability website (1998) 
stated the organisation aimed:  
 
‘to build up self-sustaining funds with money raised from socially 
concerned investors, including endowed trusts, some High Street 
banks and the public sector.’  
 
In ART’s first annual report the Development Manager, Pat Conaty wrote; 
 
‘The American Community Development Loan Funds which ART has 
modelled itself on, highlight the potential to which we aspire. One 
example established fifteen years ago, the Delaware Valley 
Community Reinvestment Fund (DVCRF) achieved a capital base of 
$250,000 and made half a dozen loans in its first year. Today, its 
community reinvestment funds exceed $25 million and DVCRF is 
making more than one job creating investment every week. More 
than 30 other community development loan funds in the USA have 
successfully followed this development strategy’ (ART, 1998, p.7).  
 
At this point in time the ART Group and the Society had capital and reserves of 
around £300,000 and £250,000 respectively.  
 
ART’s innovation  
 
During this time of development ART was calling itself a ‘Local Social 
Investment Society’ (Sustainability, 1998; ART, 1998), linking local investors 
with the localised problem of financial exclusion. This descriptive title seems to 
have gone out of favour to be replaced with the ubiquitous title of CDFI. In the 
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early years, ART had two main products, the Business Development Loan Fund 
and the Key Fund. Both these funds were aimed at trading businesses, with the 
Key Fund being for charities and social enterprises and the Development Fund 
for commercial enterprises. ART had spread its remit across a series of 
disadvantaged wards across Birmingham. In the early years, these loans were 
between £2,000 and £40,000 repayable up to ten years. The two funds were 
quite similar, but the social lending was charged at 1.25 percent over base 
(1997) and the commercial firms 8 percent over base (Renewal.net, 2002).  
 
In 2000, the Parliamentary Select Committee for Trade and Industry looked at 
community finance institutions and the potential for the Phoenix Fund and Steve 
Walker was asked to give evidence. During giving evidence he explained why 
ART’s commercial lending rate was above that of the bank. His first reason was 
that borrowers would eventually move from CDFI finance to bank loans with 
lower rates. The second reason for the higher rate was to aid the financial 
sustainability of ART (House of Commons, 2000). Borrowers were being offered 
a sensible rate that could give the CDFI some level of sustainability.  ART had 
some bad debts and Steve Walker explained to the select committee that if they 
had not they would have failed in their purpose (House of Commons, 2000).  
 
ART’s goal was to become sustainable by having sufficient funds and 
developing further products. ART learnt that certain pilot funds did not entirely 
work. The Self Employment Loan Fund failed to become established. At the 
same time another organisation, Enterprise Link gave grants of up to £2,500 to 
start ups, so making loan finance unattractive (Sustainability, 1998). In the late 
1990s when Pat Conaty was acting as Housing Investment Consultant, ART 
was piloting a Mortgage Rescue scheme with help from the Charities Advisory 
Trust and partnership with the National Debtline (ART, 1999). This pilot project 
did not become a mainstream product of ART. However, it is an example of 
ART trying new products, attracting additional funds and working with partners.  
 
ART’s proficiency of bringing in funds and developing partnership made it an 
example of innovation and best practice. In 1997/8 ART’s revenue funding 
came from the Birmingham City Council, Barclays, NatWest, the Co-operative 
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Bank, the Charity Aid Foundation and the Energy Saving Trust. A briefing 
document cited that ART had partnerships with twenty eight organisations and 
was a member of ten citywide, regional and national organisations (ART, 
2002a). In 2003 ART signed a contract with Birmingham and Solihull’s Business 
Link to formalise the support for ART to compliment its loan provision with 
enhanced business support for borrowers – both before and after receiving a 
loan. The extent of the contract was unknown, but the statement would suggest 
that ART was receiving financial support for their business development work. 
When I interviewed Steve Walker in 2003 he knew ART had to work across 
Birmingham to aid sustainability.  
 
Since ART’s beginning it had a strong relationship with the banks. Steve Walker 
stated ‘the banks have been heavy supporters of ART in terms of revenue costs. 
I was seconded from Barclays Bank, and NatWest themselves have been 
supportive’ (House of Commons, 2000, question 385). In 2001 ART received a 
£200,000 guarantee from the Phoenix Fund and it levered in an additional 
£600,000 from Barclays. ART’s publicity materials stated Barclays bank gave 
ART a discounted loan rate for £500,000 and a donation of £100,000. Barclay’s 
money can be considered as being quite secure and a low risk, because the 
£200,000 guarantee would absorb the bad debts first. Barclays Bank has 
supported ART Homes and ART’s Business Development Fund consisted of 
£100,000 as mentioned above from Barclays.  
 
Steve Walker’s ability to develop external relationships has given ART a 
national reputation. Steve has given evidence to a select committee looking at 
the establishing of the Phoenix Fund. Since then the organisation seems to 
have been regularly consulted by government, social enterprise committees and 
other CDFIs. ART accessed the Phoenix Fund in the first and second rounds 
gaining a £200,000 guarantee fund, £875,000 for their loan fund and £150,000 
for running costs. In 2003 ART was one of the first seven lenders to become an 
accredited CDFI. This accreditation would allow ART to offer investments that 
would benefit from Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR).  CITR gave the 
investor a 5 percent tax reduction on tax liability. In 2005, ART was looking to 
raise £200,000 from private and corporate investors and offering tax relief (BFE, 
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2005; Reinvest, 2005). When interviewed in 2002, Steve Walker explained that 
ART’s ability to bring in additional investments from individuals had failed. The 
introduction of the tax relief was equal to 6.3 percent interest per annum on the 
sum invested, which has made ART a more attractive financial investment.     
 
An example of ART’s innovative nature was its acceptance of a £200,000 loan 
from the EFF, another loan for £80,000 from the Polden-Puckham Foundation 
(PPF) and another from Shared Interest. The Guardian journalist, McCurry 
(2002) highlighted that the PPF invested their spare funds in ART as a social 
investment rather than a commercial return. By attracting funds to lend, ART 
could both receive the interest from the loans and have money in the bank to 
improve its sustainability.  
 
It may seem that ART has been a highly successful organisation attracting 
finance and establishing partnerships with many organisations. Nevertheless, 
the organisation has had its difficulties and in 2000 Steve Walker stated: 
 
‘We have had losses. If we had not had losses we would have been 
failing already. The loss rate at the moment is in the region of the six 
percent’ (House of Commons, 2000, question 384). 
 
When I interviewed Steve Walker in 2003 the default rate had increased to 
around twenty percent. In both the annual reports from 2005 and 2006 it 
was highlighted that the organisation had problems with bad debts. In 
2006, the annual report announced that the bad debts were running at 22 
percent of total loans, but with the support of its partners it had this sum 
covered. ART had recognised that business support was necessary to 
improve the chances of success, and in 2006 it established ART 
Development Services, a business support pilot to help aid enterprises. 
This would bring in additional funds to help the businesses grow and 
diminish bad debts. 
 
In 2008  / 2009 ART had received a £1m loan fund from the RDA and had a 
series of large and high profiles investors, such Jaguar, Severn Trent, Natwest, 
Barclay’s and Sir Digby Jones (Reinvest, 2009).  
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The Performance of ART    
 
By 2008 / 2009 ART had lent a total of £7m to over 400 borrowers since 1997. 
This enabled them to create or protect in excess of 3000 jobs in the Birmingham 
area. However, ART has had more than one loan fund and some did not survive 
because they were under used.  
 
In 2001, ART had their social enterprise (Key Loan) fund, independently 
evaluated. The fund had been in existence for approximately two and a half 
years. During this time the Key Loan Fund had made 14 loans averaging 
£28,913 with a total value of £404,785 (Enterprise and Tym, 2001). It had 
created 30 new jobs and safeguarded 79. The evaluation attempted to assess 
the potential market for loans within the social enterprise sector. From the Third 
Sector support agencies it was identified that Birmingham had 27 large scale, 
168 small to medium and 138 community organisations totalling 333. However, 
it was found that ART had enquiries from 49 social enterprises unlisted by the 
support organisations. This gave Birmingham a total potential market for finance 
of 382 social enterprises. ART’s Key Loan Fund received 63 enquiries in total 
(16.5 percent of all social enterprises in the city) and gave loans of 14 (3.7 
percent of all social enterprises in the city). The number of enquiries to loans 
given produced a conversion rate of 22 percent (Enterprise and Tym, 2001).  
 
These figures highlight some of the problems with demand within the social 
enterprise sector. Firstly, there were a limited number of organisations. 
Secondly, the enterprises listed by the support organisations contained a large 
number of voluntary organisations that may have relied purely upon grant 
finance. Thirdly, there was the question of was ART too expensive? The 
arrangement fee and membership fees were added to the interest rate. 
However, the product of a loan 1.25 percent over the base rate plus 1 percent 
arrangement fee (in the late 1990s) was potentially being highly subsidised. The 
report noted ‘that the majority of enquiries, loans approved and potential loans 
from open enquiries’ came from enterprises not linked to support agencies 
(Enterprise and Tym, 2001, p. iii). This would indicate that social enterprise 
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support agencies would point organisations towards grants and therefore would 
not be a good source of referrals. The 2001 evaluation gave a snapshot of a 
loan fund after three years. It was not as successful as hoped, but ART has still 
continued lending to social enterprises. 
 
By 2009, ART was in its twelfth year, so it has achieved longevity and some 
form of sustainability. In an evaluation from 2006, ART had lent £4.67m and had 
created or preserved 2310 jobs. These figures seem quite substantial, lending 
on average around £0.5m and creating or preserving approximately 250 jobs 
per annum. These figures have continued at a similar rate. However, figures in 
Table 9 show that for five years it made very few loans. Between 2005 – 2006 
ART made 80 loans, whereas previously it was always less than 50 per annum. 
ART’s performance seems to have stuck at around 80 loans per annum. This 
could indicate that ART has begun achieving some recognition by the banks 
and business support agencies signposting customers, or it may now be 
sufficiently established to attract borrowers through its longevity within 
Birmingham. 
 
Table 9: Performance of ART 
31st 
March  
Capital 
and 
Reserves 
(Group) 
Number 
of 
Loans 
since 
1997 
Cumulative 
loans 
since 1997 
Average 
loan 
amount 
Jobs created and 
job preserved 
since 1997 
2001 £500,639 70 £1,239,385 £17,705 124 Created 
440 Preserved 
2002 £863,097 93 £1,749,695 £18,814 193 Created 
567 Preserved 
2003 £955,474 141 £2,694,110 £19,107 320 Created  
636 Preserved 
2004 £1,263,596 200* £2.7m* £13,500 347 Created  
783* Preserved 
2005 £1,379,915 241 £3,773,540 £15,658 1545 Created and 
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safeguarded 
2006 £1,605,157 321 £4.67m £14,548 2310 Created and 
safeguarded 
2007 £1,674,598 360 £6m  £16,666 2900 Created and 
safeguarded 
2008 £1,812,360 375 £6.3m £16,800 3000 Created and 
safeguarded 
2009 £1,680,019 438 £7.5m £17,123 3715 Created and 
safeguarded 
*Source: The Annual Reports 2001 to 2009 and The Report of the Birmingham 
Strategic Partnership, 2004. After 2005 ART combined their job creation and 
safeguarding figures. 
 
Table 9 shows that over time ART has increased its capital and reserves per 
annum, but the average loan amount has fluctuated. With Street UK in 
Birmingham concentrating on personal finance after 2004, ART may have 
absorbed the demand for smaller business loans.  
 
Evidence in the 2005 and 2006 annual reports show that the organisation still 
had monies from the Phoenix Fund, Single Regeneration Budget, City 
Challenge and New Deal for Communities. It thanked the EFF, Tudor Trust, 
George Cadbury Fund and Newtown Business Group for their donations and 
indicated the need to cover revenue costs. In 2006, operating income (£596,515) 
was covering their expenses (£584,845) and creating a small surplus. However, 
£311,184 of the expenses was assigned for bad debt provision. This would 
indicate the risky nature of working with borrowers in the sub-prime market. 
Interestingly, the organisation still had £723,591 as cash at the bank, £453,600 
capital reserves and just over £1 million in other reserves indicating that ART 
was still not getting enough enterprises wishing to borrow. 
 
In 2008 / 2009 ART was still struggling to find sufficient borrowers for its loan 
funds. During the recession, Advantage West Midlands gave ART a £1m loan 
fund, because enquiries had increased (Scotney, 2009). The Chairman’s report 
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found in 2008/9 there had been a substantial increase in bad debts, but the 
systems were adjusted to reflect this (ART, 2009).  
 
It would seem that business loans had similar problems. In 2000 at the 
Parliamentary Committee, Steve Walker mentioned that ART relied on 
Birmingham Business Link and Enterprise Link, but was finding that the banks 
were becoming good sources of referrals (House of Commons, 2000). However, 
two years later he commented that the local bankers had further to go in the 
area of referrals (ART, 2002). This was a very specific area of work with ART 
having a business conversion rate of one in eight (House of Commons, 1998). 
Time would be spent looking at eight enquiries with only one enterprise 
receiving finance. The reason for this low rate was because applications were 
not viable, had ill-prepared plans or only offered limited benefits for the area. 
Often ART would be the sole lender, but would on occasions work with the 
enterprise and a bank to share the loan between itself and the bank (Parliament, 
2000). In an interview to celebrate the fifth birthday of ART, and when 
questioned what had he learnt over the last five years, Steve Walker replied; 
 
‘It’s taken longer than we thought! Partnership is the most difficult 
thing, because of the changing facets of partnerships. We started 
saying five years ago that what we really needed, as well as financial 
support, was referrals, referrals, referrals and we’re still saying that’ 
(ART, 2002, p. 7).  
 
Similarly in late 2006, the ART website hoped for referrals from accountants 
stating;  
 
‘It can be hard to attract the attention of busy small to medium sized 
business owner/managers, but that’s where accounting professionals, 
who are likely to have routine contact with them, have a golden 
opportunity to ensure that they don’t miss out on sources of finance that 
could help them grow or diversify’ (Reinvest, 2006).  
 
Since ART’s market was sub-prime customers unsuitable for the banking sector, 
there would be some losses working within this more risky area. In 1999 ART 
reported its first bad debt, which gave it a bad debt ratio of 6.2 percent and in 
addition it had a number of enterprises struggling to make the repayments (ART, 
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1999). In an interview from 2002 it was noted that this rate had increased to 20 
percent. However, it is not known if this figure was for the previous year or a 
cumulative total. Later in 2003, ART recorded a more stable situation with a 
default rate of 8 percent overall (measured as a percent of all loans delivered to 
date) (ART, 2003b). This loss rate indicated that ART had been lending to more 
risky enterprises (but not to the extent of the Prince’s Trust who had a failure 
rate of 40 percent after two years). ART had lent a cumulative total of £1.7 
million in its first five years and at a rate of 8 percent this would have meant that 
£136,000 had been lost. In the 2006 Annual Report Steve Walker stated that 
businesses had failed to find their markets, which led to a series of bad debts. 
However, its partners / funders were covering the bad debts and ‘even at a rate 
of 22% of total loans delivered since launch, fall within the range anticipated for 
our model of finance provision’ (ART, 2006, p. 7). The organisation could have 
lost over £1m in bad debts and still survived. ART had a substantial buffer 
protecting the investor’s money and sums borrowed by ART.  
 
During the recession Steve Walker in his Chief Executives report stated: 
 
‘In spite of an increase in bad debts and a necessary review of our 
decision making processes, we remained true to our mission and 
looked to each borrower to not only exhibit viability but also reveal 
economic and social benefits of their business in terms of support for 
local jobs and services’ (ART, 2009, p. 6). 
 
He argued that there was value in the businesses that succeeded and also the 
ones that failed. In 2009/10 with the reduction in public sector expenditure and 
the end of the Regional Development Agencies, ART aimed to show its social 
and economic value to Birmingham. 
 
Conclusions 
 
ART has been successful in surviving for twelve years and recycling funds 
through lending. It has been innovative in trying out home improvement loans 
and lending to reduce energy usage. However, these funds seem to have only 
been short lived pilots. By testing the markets for improvements or energy 
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efficiency, ART has proved that there was insufficient demand. The early years 
were a period of trial and error. In this initial period, it was doing very little 
business and was potentially relying heavily on grant funding. It only allocated 
seventy loans, but had administrative expenses of over £500,000. ART has had 
an income from the interest from their debtors and funds in the bank, but it was 
potentially an expensive way of spreading financial inclusion. Since ART has 
greatly increased its annual loans it is now more cost effective in giving potential 
customers access to finance. ART has been managed to show funders the 
potential of a lender such as ART. Over the years it has gradually achieved a 
greater financial sustainability, but it still not reached the point of covering all of 
its costs from the interest earned. It is possible that because of its chosen 
market - with higher rates of defaults - ART and other localised lenders will 
never become sustainable purely from loans. 
 
Community Loan Fund North East: Lending to Social Enterprise. 
 
The Community Loan Fund North East (CLFNE) makes up the final 
local/regional case study. CLFNE lends to a single market, social enterprises. 
These could be Third Sector organisations, such as trading charities, mutuals or 
social enterprises. Unlike ART and Street NE it works within a particular region, 
but is also part of a national organisation (England only) called the Local 
Investment Fund (LIF) (SITF, 2000; Bryson and Buttle, 2005).  
 
This regional lender has been in operation since 2001. However, LIF was 
established early in 1994 by a partnership between the Department of the 
Environment and the private sector. LIF was set up to finance voluntary 
organisations with loans for economically viable enterprises in areas of 
regeneration where loans could not be raised from conventional sources. The 
North East fund was set up in response to an invitation from ONE North East, 
(the Regional Development Agency) to work in conjunction with its Regional 
Investment Fund. ONE North East in its Regional Economic Strategy identified 
community enterprises as having a role in the regeneration of disadvantaged 
areas.  
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Unlike ART and Street NE, this regional lender can lend between £15,000 and 
£100,000, beyond the micro-finance level. In addition, loans can be linked with 
the national lender and LIF can bring in match or additional loan funding starting 
from £25,000 to £250,000. Unlike the other local CDFIs, CLFNE lends larger 
amounts, which allows the borrowers to potentially invest in property. This loan 
fund works not within a city or a county, but across the whole North East region 
of England, which could provide for economies of scale. 
 
The following section is based upon two interviews with Rod Jones the loans 
manager, the first held in 2003 and the second in mid 2007. It explores the 
process of making a loan and some of the failures and successes. Unlike other 
organisations the CLFNE has not produced reports, received attention from the 
national press or given evidence to select committees. 
 
The Market for Loans 
 
The remit of CLFNE has been to provide loans to not-for-profit organisations 
such as charities and social enterprises based in the North East region. In 2003 
and 2007, the potential borrower had to fulfil the following four criteria: 
  
• Be unable to access funds from traditional sources (banks) or need 
further funding.  
• Be able to produce a business plan showing an ability to repay the loan. 
• Be able to show that the enterprise or organisation would aid economic 
regeneration and social inclusion in the locality.  
• And be keen to build sustainability and reduce its dependence on grants.  
 
Financial exclusion was important to CLFNE and the potential borrowers had to 
be unable to access bank finance. This could be a total rejection by a bank or 
the bank would only offer part of the loan needed. However, the loans manager 
did not see his organisation as the lender of last resort or the final lender that an 
enterprise would approach. He believed that CLFNE’s role was more part of ‘a 
cocktail of finance’ (CLFNE, 2003).     
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In the early 2000s, and again in 2007, the banks found it difficult to lend to 
social enterprises, charities or the voluntary sector, because they were 
uncertain of their company structures. The introduction of the Community 
Interest Company may have added to the confusion for banks. At an early CDFI 
conference it was noted that the banks were fearful of lending to charities and 
later finding out about their financial problems.  The example of closing a charity 
was cited as problematic in terms of creating bad publicity. For the banks, 
lending to the Third Sector could be difficult, but not impossible and part of 
CLFNE’s role would be to show that an organisation would be able to repay a 
loan. In 2002, I contacted by email a number of Barclay’s Bank business 
lending managers across the North East of England and received three replies. 
I asked about lending to social enterprises, charities, community organisations 
and co-operatives and one manager had five enquiries over a six year period. 
From this small sample there was little demand for loan finance from this sector.     
   
Previously, Rod Jones (like Steve Walker of ART) had worked for Barclays 
Bank. Rod Jones had been seconded into the position of loan manager. He had 
a number of years experience lending to enterprises and perceived the 
business plan as being very important, because it would show that the 
organisation would have the ability to repay the loan. The plan would be 
questioned and challenged by him to confirm that the organisation could repay. 
However, what was equally important was to see the manager of the 
organisation face to face. In the first interview Rod Jones stated that: 
  
‘A kind of judgement on people I am making, because we are largely 
unlike a conventional banker, we are looking to lend to people who 
can manage a business and an idea to help with regeneration’ 
(CLFNE, 2003).  
 
The plan and the people within the organisation were seen as important factors. 
CLFNE offered bridging loans to organisations between contracts or grants. If 
an upcoming grant or contract was confirmed then this would help to show that 
the organisation could repay the loan. Occasionally, the process of improving 
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the business plan and proving the ability to repay a loan allowed some potential 
borrowers to return to their bank for the loan.  
 
This loan fund has gone beyond the scope of the regular banking sector, 
because it would spend time clarifying issues. The manager would carry out the 
process of due diligence, making sure that everything was correct before a loan 
was put forward to the lending board.  
 
Originally, the loans were from £15,000 to £50,000 but this was increased to 
£100,000 during the decade. In addition, the national fund could be used to 
double this amount and spread the risk across two loan portfolios. Potentially, 
this increase reflected the rises in the cost of property over the time period.  As 
the price of property rose, then the national fund could also share the risk of a 
loan. The minimum of £15,000 was chosen because anything under that 
amount would not be cost-effective given the time spent in discussions, visiting 
the enterprise and checking the business plan. Interest was charged at between 
2 percent and 3 percent over base (around 5 percent at the time of the first 
interview). This interest rate changed to around 3 percent or 4 percent over 
base in 2003. The repayment time was usually between two to five years, but 
could go up to ten years. A repayment holiday could be taken, so that the 
organisation could have time to see the benefits of the cash injection. A lending 
fee of between 1.5 to 2 percent was paid at the start of the loan. This was an 
attempt to cover the costs of writing the proposal by the loan manager to the 
loan board and the time spent seeing the client.  
 
Even though potential borrowers had their business plans tested there was a 
need for security. The manager did not wish to reduce his loan fund through 
bad debts, so security was important to maintain the size of the fund. When 
interviewed the loan manager stated he ‘was not a pawnbroker, but needed 
security’, which meant the borrowers needed to have assets such as a building. 
The Newcastle based NRF lent the CLFNE money to lend to charities and 
social enterprises. Potentially, this would make security even more important, 
because the fund would be liable for any losses.  
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The original loan fund was made up of monies supplied by Barclays, Home 
Housing, the Community Fund and European money (Table 10). The initial 
funding from Barclays and Home Group were five-year loans at an interest rate 
1.5 percent over Barclays Bank Base Rate. The loan was unsecured, but was 
structured so that the public sector monies are the first line of loss. This funding 
brought in also European money, which did not have to be repaid.   
 
Table 10: The Original Finance Structure of CLFNE (2001) 
Funding Organisation Amount 
Barclays Bank plc. £80,000 
Home Group £40,000 
LIF National Fund £160,000 
ERDF Objective 2 (European Regional Development 
Fund). 
£120,000 
Total £400,000 
Source: The Community Loan Fund North East, Roger Brocklehurst, Director of 
LIF, 2001. 
 
The £120,000 of ERDF European funding as shown Table 10 had produced 
some difficulties. The Objective 2 programme:  
• Excluded retail activities,  
• Had geographical boundaries, 
•  And the ERDF could claw back repayments that were not re-lent on the 
expiry date of the ERDF programme.  
 
Nevertheless, it was hoped that over the five years the money would be 
borrowed and recycled a number of times. CLFNE hoped to become 
sustainable through the repayment of loans and interest. In interviews with the 
loan manager it was mentioned that with the Government’s announcement on 
Community Investment Tax Relief that the national organisation would become 
a source of investment. In 2003 LIF the national organisation became an 
accredited CDFI accepting Community Investment Tax Relief. It had received 
finance from the Phoenix Fund in 2005 and in 2006 the North East fund 
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received a boost with an interest free loan of £300,000 from the NRF (2006). 
Having a local and national fund allowed larger loans, shared risks and ensured 
sufficient funds to lend on. 
 
Performance at a local level 
    
In the first three years the CLFNE had made seven loans totalling £310,000. 
These loans were secured and created 49 jobs across the region. At that point 
in time the small amounts being borrowed indicated sustainability could be 
problematic. During the early research period the loan manager was a Barclay’s 
Bank secondee and therefore CLFNE did not have the cost of a salary, so costs 
were kept low. From this early interview it seemed as though the fund was 
having little impact. However, when interviewed in 2007 about the problems of 
the last few years the manager noted that when he started there was no money 
to lend and this had to be raised. The first year of the fund was spent creating a 
fund and hence the slow start and poor performance. 
 
By 2007 things had changed and the fund had nearly £1m out on loan and the 
fund was the most successful LIF regional fund (CLFNE, 2007). The fund was 
creating a small surplus and covering some of the overheads.  The majority of 
loans were for smaller amounts, but there were the occasional £100,000 deal. It 
made around twelve loans per annum at an average of £45,000 per loan. 
Ninety-five percent of enquiries produced a loan. This success rate was aided 
by another organisation working in the region. CapitaliSE prepared 
organisations for lending larger amounts. CapitaliSE funded by ONE, the RDA 
was heavily linked with the North East Social Enterprise Partnership and 
worked with CLFNE to filter out the poor quality potential borrowers. The 
CLFNE gained a high level of successful loans, because some of the due 
diligence was carried out before hand. A presentation by CapitaliSE highlighted 
the interest in the fund with the organisation receiving 487 enquiries over a four 
year period (Probert, 2007). This had created 51 loans worth over £3 million. 
However, CLFNE was one of a number of lenders with the Charity Bank, Unity 
Trust Bank and Triodos Bank and Future Builders all contributing. CLFNE had 
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successfully worked with the Unity Trust Bank to lend St. Aidan’s Community 
Trust £120,000 to renew a community pub (Social Economy, 2006). 
 
The future for the organisation pointed towards sustainability and the possibility 
of employing an additional staff member. The Community Loan Fund and the 
Local Investment Fund had thought about rebranding. It was planned the 
CLFNE would become the North East Social Enterprise Loan Fund (NE-SELF).  
In 2008, the organisation was renamed The Social Enterprise Loan Fund 
(TSELF) for the North East.  
 
A Changing Environment 
 
After some uneven early performances, by 2008 things had significantly 
improved. Potentially, the environment for loan funding has increased and it has 
become more acceptable. 
 
When interviewed in 2003, the Loan Manager stated that: 
 
‘the benefits of the community loan fund are that for the first time an 
organisation can look at sustainability and independence. Most of the 
organisations we have dealt with have been around a while and are 
totally grant funded. Grant funding has a limited life, dependency is at 
the political whim of the grant provider and who is to say that 
particular grant funding will be available next year for example … part 
of our position is to help organisations get established and wean them 
off grant funding, not to take it out completely, but to start to give 
them a commercial product.’  
 
Hence, loans could be seen as part of a process of reducing, but not eradicating, 
grant dependency. By 2006, CLFNE was working with other funders such as 
the Unity Trust Bank and being helped by CapitaliSE. Due to the help of 
CapitaliSE the North East fund was the most successful LIF regional fund even 
though it was in an area with the lowest amount of Third Sector organisations in 
England.  
 
The CLFNE planned for borrowers to become more business orientated. Once 
a financial track record has been achieved these organisations will be suitable 
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and acceptable for the formal banking sector. During research in the early 
2000s, many socially-minded organisations had a mixed response to the 
opportunity to access loan finance and preferred to gain total grant funding. 
 
In 2007 there were signs that the barriers to loan funding were gradually being 
reduced. Rod Jones suggested that grants were being reduced and 
organisations were becoming more prepared to take on loan finance. In addition, 
the manager mentioned that loans were not tied to producing the required 
amounts of social outputs or strict criteria. This could have made a loan slightly 
more attractive. As mentioned previously, the CapitaliSE had helped prepare 
social enterprises to take on larger amounts of debt.  
 
CLFNE: Conclusions 
 
Over a six year period the CLFNE seems to have had some success with 
increased loans from 2007 onwards. By lending larger amounts across the 
whole North East region the organisation was going to have a better chance of 
becoming sustainable than if it was smaller amounts in a single city. When the 
loan manager was interviewed in 2007 he was only working part time, which 
would reduce the costs of the organisation. By having an external organisation 
filter out the less suitable clients CLFNE had achieved an exceptional success 
rate with many clients receiving loans. Overall, this CDFI had survived the last 
eight years, but there had been a number of problems to face during this period. 
 
Three Local Case Studies: An Overview 
 
From these three case studies it is apparent that all of the organisations had the 
expectation of becoming sustainable. The quality of businesses wishing to 
borrow has been an issue across the three organisations. They have all had 
demand problems (at times too little) and changed in some ways over time. 
Finally, they have all survived into 2010. The CLFNE has made the most 
progress in sustainability by being a one person operation (and part time) and 
lending larger sums across a region. All of these lenders have gradually 
increased their loan portfolios. As time has passed these CDFIs have become 
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more accepted and recognised as a valid source of funding. However, ART has 
been the only local CDFI that has not changed its name.  
 
Some of these CDFIs over estimated the demand for loan funding for 
businesses excluded from bank finance. There were hopes for referrals from 
banks, business support agencies and accountants that never materialised. 
There was a wish to supply group loans that was foreign to the developed world. 
A lot of aspirations have not fully worked out. However, their funders have given 
these CDFIs longevity. The funders have accepted the importance of financial 
inclusion for entrepreneurship. The funding bodies have accepted the outputs 
and have continued supplying funds to increase economic activity and create 
jobs and even individual wealth.  
 
All three lenders under estimated the amount of work involved proving that a 
business can repay a loan. In a time of technology, where personal loans can 
be given in minutes CDFIs processes and procedures hark back to an earlier 
age. The CDFI loan managers act like ‘old’ bank managers building a 
relationship with the borrower. Potentially, the human interaction and the build 
up of trust between the lender and borrower becomes an important factor in 
receiving a loan. The CLFNE achieved some success through having a 
separate organisation, CapitaliSE, promoting the loan fund and rejecting the 
poor quality business plans. However, even though extra time has been 
invested, all three CDFIs have experienced businesses failing. If they had not 
experienced any failures would they have been lending to financially excluded 
businesses? This question will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
During the research it became apparent that these CDFIs had over time 
become more realistic about their chances of sustainability. There was still 
optimism about success, but in interviews the loan managers agreed it would be 
hard to cover all costs. Some partnership working had occurred with CDFIs, 
other lenders and support agencies working together. Overall, local CDFIs were 
not perfect, but had services to offer. It just needed a number of funding bodies 
to appreciate their role in regeneration and building social and economic value. 
 
 161
Chapter Seven: Mapping the Sector 
 
In this chapter I will geographically map out the membership of the CDFA in 
2004. This research was carried out in 2005 to ascertain the character of CDFIs 
in the UK. The aim was to produce a benchmark for comparison and create a 
database to monitor the development of CDFIs. A longitudinal approach was 
taken comparing the CDFA membership from 2004 and 2009. During five years 
organisations will have changed, strengthened and even disappeared.      
 
The research methodology of mapping the CDFA membership was chosen 
because it was systematic and would be visually interesting. Mapping can be 
used to create an overall image of a sector and illustrate characteristics. It has 
been used to identify inequalities in education (Gillborn and Mizra, 2000) and 
social programs (Radke and Mu, 2000). Both local and central government 
have used mapping to ascertain the size and character of certain organisations 
such as social enterprises (East Lothian Council, 2005; ECOTEC, 2003; Forster 
et al., 2009). Similarly, the government has mapped out financial exclusion (HM 
Treasury, 2004) and compared the location of credit unions and CDFIs with the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (2004). These maps show the level of deprivation 
for an area and their distance from a credit union and highlight some gaps in 
services (HM Treasury, 2004).   
 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will contain a 
map illustrating the membership of the CDFA in England, Wales and Scotland. 
It will discuss the potential gaps and duplications of services in a number of 
areas. The second section will discuss the change in membership from 2004 to 
2009. Finally, the chapter will draw out findings about the development of the 
CDFI sector and the CDFA membership. 
 
Mapping the CDFA Membership 
 
Annually the CDFA has produced a report containing the names of its members. 
As part of the research process I decided to map out and list the membership of 
2004. The aim of this research was to: 
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• Identify where CDFIs were located 
• Determine their markets 
• And find out when they were established. 
 
I decided to identify if there was a correlation between the setting up of a CDFI 
and poverty and financial exclusion in a region. I extracted data on the level of 
multiple deprivation and financial exclusion for England.   
 
Table 11: The Number of Super Output Areas (SOA) in the most deprived 20 
percent in England using the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 and CDFA 
membership 2004 
 No. of SOAs 
in the most 
deprived 20% 
of SOAs in 
England 
% of SOAs in 
each region 
falling in most 
deprived 20% of 
SOAs in 
England 
The CDFA 
membership 
working in the 
area 
East 220 6.2 1 
East Midlands 482 17.6 2 
London 1,260 26.4 5 
North East 631 38.1 2 
North West 1,461 32.8 7 
South East (excluding 
London) 
271 5.1 3 
South West 278 8.6 2 
West Midlands 917 26.3 4 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
976 29.6 3 
Source:  The English Indices of Deprivation 2004: Summary (revised), ODPM 
and CDFA Annual Review 2004 
 
The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) showed areas of deprivation were found 
in many of the large English cities. The IMD found that the North East had the 
highest percentage of SOAs in the most deprived 20 percent in England. Table 
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11 shows that the North East had 38.1 percent or 631 SOAs in the bottom 20 
percent. London had more SOAs (1,260) in the bottom 20 percent, but this only 
equated to 26.4 percent. The IMD showed that the ex-mining and heavy 
industry areas such as Easington, Hartlepool and Middlesbrough had increased 
levels of deprivation. Similarly, areas of Newcastle, Gateshead and Sunderland 
had some of the most deprived areas in England. The CDFA had two members, 
Project North East (PNE) and Street UK based in the North East region. These 
members were both located in Newcastle and had regional remits. From 
interviews with PNE and Street UK, they mainly worked in Tyne and Wear 
leaving a large area of the region not served by any CDFIs. In the North East 
there was no correlation between the levels of deprivation and number of CDFIs. 
 
In the North West there were high levels of deprivation and seven CDFA 
members:  
 
• The Blackburn based East Lancashire Moneyline (ELMS).  
• Manchester had the Enterprise Fund and Salford Moneyline. 
• Bolton Business Ventures worked in Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Wigan, 
Rochdale and North Manchester. 
• Preston Moneyline 
• Around Liverpool the Merseyside Special Investment Fund and Train 
2000 operated a number of loan funds.  
 
The North West had high levels of deprivation in districts of Liverpool and 
Manchester and some of the areas around Wigan, Rochdale and Bolton (ODPM, 
2004).  Bolton Business Ventures administered five different loan funds 
including a general business loan fund for the Bolton Metropolitan Borough. The 
3D loan fund was directed at three disadvantaged communities in Bolton and 
another fund was aimed at business women across the whole North West 
(CDFA, 2004a). Only the 3D loan fund was directly linked to areas of 
deprivation.   
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In London areas such as Tower Hamlets, Newham and Hackney in the North 
East, Haringey, Camden and Westminster in the West and Southwark and 
Lambeth, South of the Thames were shown as boroughs of multiple deprivation. 
The East London Small Business Centre focused on BME businesses in the 
inner boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Newham and three outer boroughs of 
Barking and Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge (CDFA, 2004a), which all had 
high levels of deprivation. Other CDFIs such as the London Rebuilding Society 
and ONELondon worked across the city. 
 
Similarly, in the West Midlands areas of Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Walsall 
and Sandwell were identified as having high levels of deprivation (ODPM, 2004). 
An office of Street UK, Aston Reinvestment Trust and Black Business 
Birmingham (B3) were all based in Birmingham. B3 and Sandwell Advice and 
Moneylink had different markets but both worked in Sandwell, an area singled 
out for its high level of deprivation.     
 
The two regions with fewer areas appearing in the top 20 percent of IMD were 
the East and South East and they still had CDFIs. WEETU was based in 
Norwich in the East supplying business loans and advice to women. The Suffolk 
Regeneration Trust (SRT) offered a generic loan open to businesses unable to 
access mainstream finance. This CDFI took into account its environment and 
was invested in lending for agricultural diversification (CDFA, 2004a). In the 
South East both Fund2Grow and the Portsmouth Area Regeneration Trust 
(PART) targeted both BME groups, the disabled and older people. Looking at 
the IMD, Fund2Grow worked in the moderately affluent counties of Berkshire 
and Wiltshire. PART definitely worked in areas of high deprivation. 
 
The membership list of CDFA would give the impression that all CDFIs worked 
in cities. However, the South West Investment Group offered five types of loan 
including a Rural Enterprise Fund. It had an emphasis on manufacturing and 
service businesses exporting outside the South West (CDFA, 2004a).   
  
Figure 4 broadly shows the location of a sample of the CDFA membership in 
2004 and areas of financial exclusion. By comparing the membership of the 
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CDFA of 2004 with the IMD (2004) there was little or no correlation between the 
level of deprivation and the number of members in a region. 
 
Figure 4: Areas of financial exclusion and a sample of CDFA members 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on the CDFA membership in 2004 and HM Treasury (2004) 
Promoting Financial Inclusion. 
 
Some CDFIs worked across cities or areas that would have districts within the 
IMD top 20 percent. However, by examining the target markets of individual 
CDFIs a picture of exclusion can be shown. The Bank of England identified 
ethnicity as a factor in gaining business finance (BoE, 2002) and many CDFIs 
focused on this market. In addition, it found in disadvantaged areas the self-
employed were younger than in wealthier places, which was another target 
market for CDFIs. Women have found it difficult to receive loan finance (Buttner 
and Rosen, 1989; Harding, 2007) and this was the area of work for a number of 
 
 
Areas of financial exclusion 
 
Areas with a large number of CDFIs 
 
Areas with a small number of CDFIs  
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CDFIs (BoE, 2002). Overall, the membership was tackling different forms of 
exclusion. In figure 4 the black areas indicate locations where more than 50 
percent of the population were financially disengaged (HM Treasury, 2004). The 
financially disengaged group were low paid and unemployed that would use 
cash (HM Treasury, 2004). In the 1990s Leyshon and Thrift (1994, 1995) had 
highlighted the withdrawal of banking services from certain areas. However, the 
Treasury’s own research found no overall correlation between financial 
exclusion and a lack of physical banking services (HM Treasury, 2004). The 
Treasury’s research found that financial exclusion was concentrated into certain 
areas especially:  
 
‘parts of East and South-East London, Middlesbrough, Manchester, 
Bradford, Birmingham, Glasgow and Liverpool’ (HM Treasury, 2004, 
p. 14). 
 
Many of the CDFA membership were working in these areas. Figure 4 shows a 
select sample of CDFI members. London had five and the North West had 
seven CDFIs, which would be cluttered and confusing. However the map 
highlights the gaps such as the CDFA having no members in North Wales or 
Cumbria. Around Carlisle the black area indicates wide spread financial 
exclusion.  
 
Figure 4 shows that pockets of financial exclusion occurred across from 
Glasgow to Edinburgh and around Dumfries and Galloway. In Scotland the 
CDFA had two members: Developing Strathclyde (DSL) and Social Investment 
Scotland (SIS). DSL served Glasgow and gradually Edinburgh, while SIS 
worked across Scotland. Similarly, Northern Ireland had two CDFIs, Aspire 
working in Belfast and Londonderry and the Ulster Community Investment Trust 
(UCIT). Both the SIS and the UCIT gave loans to community business and 
social enterprises across Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. The 
limited membership in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland will have been 
caused by powers being devolved to the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish 
Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. CDFIs outside England would 
have approached their governing bodies for funding and therefore would be less 
interested in a national membership organisation. DSL was the only CDFI 
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outside England to receive a Phoenix Fund grant. The funding for these lenders 
would have come from different sources. In 2004 when there was a debate 
about the transfer of funding to the regional development agencies it was 
argued that: 
 
‘The impact of the fund becomes obvious when one considers the 
geographical spread of CDFIs. The Phoenix Challenge Fund 
provides support in England, which has the highest density of CDFIs 
in the UK. In Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, where there are 
no equivalents, the density of CDFIs is relatively low’ (Palmer, 2004, 
p.12).  
 
That premise could have an element of truth about it. However, the CDFA has 
attempted to encourage membership in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
through their annual conferences. In the early years of the CDFA (started in 
2002) it held annual conferences in Glasgow, Cardiff and Belfast (table 12). 
 
Table12: The Community Development Finance Associations Annual 
Conferences 
Year Location Name of Conference 
2000 Norwich Small Change for a Better Future* 
2001 Birmingham Money for Change: The Second Annual 
Community Finance Conference 
2002 Glasgow Money £or Change 02: The Third 
Annual Community Finance 
Conference 
2003 Cardiff Money £or Change 03 
2004 Belfast Money £or Change 04 
2005 Melton Mowbray Money £or Change 05 
2006 Bristol Money £or Change 06 
2007 Ashford Money £or Change 07 
2008 Leeds Money £or Change 08: 
Evolution or Revolution? 
2009 Newcastle Upon 
Tyne 
Money £or Change 09 
Crisis or Opportunity? 
Source: Conference literature and the CDFA website 
 
                                                 
* Small Change for a Better Future was the first annual conference of CDFIs even though the 
Association was not formed until 2002. WEETU helped host the event and the conference chair 
was Malcolm Hayday (Director of Investors in Society and President of INAISE).   
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The Phoenix Fund aided some national CDFIs and the CDFA had seven 
members working nationally; Bridges Community Ventures, the Charity Bank, 
ICOF, the Local Investment Fund (LIF), the Prime Initiative, Prince’s Trust and 
Triodos Bank. Street UK was listed as a national organisation, but it only had 
offices in East London, Newcastle and Birmingham, which offered:  
 
‘loans advice and support to micro-enterprises and small businesses 
within a 20 mile radius of each of these offices’ (CDFA, 2004a, p. 15).   
 
ICOF was a national lender, but administered separate funds in the West 
Midlands, parts of South Wales, Manchester, London and Wakefield (CDFA, 
2004a).  Nationally, the Prince’s Trust and the Prime Initiative were offering 
loans to people under thirty and over fifty respectively. Age was seen as a factor 
impeding business people from accessing finance. On a national level there 
were four CDFIs offering loans to social enterprise; the Charity Bank, ICOF, LIF 
and the Triodos Bank. However, at the same time there was no national micro-
finance, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) or woman focused CDFIs.  
 
From examining the CDFA’s forty-six members and associates from 2004 it is 
noticeable that there were gaps in services. The following section will examine 
the CDFA membership and compare the members from 2004 and 2009.  
 
Comparing the CDFA membership: 2004 with 2009 
 
This section will examine and then compare the two membership lists. I propose 
that by comparing the two groups, themes and trends will be identified. The 
CDFA’s membership had grown to sixty-three active organisations answering 
their 2009 survey. This raises a series of questions; for example which 
organisations have remained in the association and have organisations 
changed? 
 
Firstly, this section will be made up of a sample table to illustrate the array of 
lending organisations. It will be followed by an examination of their 
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characteristics and the development of the sector. Finally, it will compare both 
memberships and discuss the sector. 
 
Table 13: A Select Sample of Ten CDFA Members from 2004 and 2009  
Name Location Products 
and services 
Established Additional 
information 
Bees Knees North 
Lincolnshire
Business 
loans up to 
£15,000 
Not known It works in 
partnership 
with 
Business 
Link 
Yorkshire  
Black Business in 
Birmingham (3b) 
Birmingham 
and the 
Black 
Country 
Start up loans 
up to £7,500 
and £20,000 
for existing 
businesses 
Not known Not listed in 
CDFA 2009 
Products for 
African 
Caribbean 
owners. 
Bolton Business 
Ventures 
Bolton, 
Bury, 
Oldham, 
Rochdale 
and Wigan 
Business 
loans £1,000 
to £15,000.  
Islamic 
finance and 
loans for 
women. 
1983 
Renamed 
Business 
Finance 
North West 
A CDFA 
2009 
member 
Cumbria 
Community Asset 
and Reinvestment 
Trust  
Cumbria  A rural CDFI 
offering small 
business 
loans £1,000 
to £50,000 
Became a 
member in 
2005 
A CDFA 
2009 
member. 
An IPS  
East Lancashire 
Moneyline (IPS) 
Ltd (ELMS) 
East 
Lancashire 
and Wales 
Personal 
finance 
2002 as an 
IPS 
A CDFA 
2009 
member. 
Renamed 
ELMS and 
expanded 
into Wales.  
East London Small 
Business Centre 
Districts of 
London -
Tower 
Hamlets, 
Newham 
etc 
Loans (up to 
£10,000) and 
venture 
capital and 
grant 
programmes. 
1978 Still a CDFA 
member. 
Worked with 
clothing 
industry 
 
Ethnic Business 
Development 
Corporation 
and the Ethnic 
Districts of 
London - 
Lewisham, 
Southwark, 
Loan fund, 
training and 
support 
1997 Not listed in 
2009 
Renting 
space, 
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Mutual Newham, 
Bromley, 
Lambeth 
etc 
support  
Loan 
finance 
uncertain  
HBV Enterprise London 
Boroughs 
£3,000 to 
£25,000  
2000 as 
Hackney 
Business 
Ventures 
A CDFA 
2009 
member.  
Preston Money 
Line 
Preston, 
but now 
Central, 
North and 
West 
Lancashire 
Personal, 
small 
business 
(£300 - 
£5000) and 
home 
improvement 
loans 
2005 A CDFA 
2009 
member. 
Renamed 
Lancashire 
Community 
Finance, an 
IPS 
Salford Moneyline Salford now 
Greater 
Manchester
Personal 
loans 
2000 Not listed 
2009. 
Renamed 
Greater 
Manchester 
Moneyline 
Source: Taken from the individual websites and the CDFA. A full version of the 
table can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
The select sample of CDFIs in table 13 was chosen because they illustrate 
similarities, differences and change. The first similarity between many of the 
CDFIs listed in table 13 has been the size of the loans available. Many of the 
CDFA’s membership in 2004 and 2009 concentrated on a main business loan 
suitable for micro-businesses (up to nine employees) and small businesses 
(between ten and forty nine employees). For start up businesses it was up to 
£10,000 and existing businesses to around £20,000. The analysis of the 
products showed that over 50 percent of the CDFA membership in 2004 and 
2009 offered small business loans. Even through this could be a generic 
product some loan funds were specific to particular places, BAMEs, genders or 
social groups. An example of CDFI with specific funds would be Bolton 
Business Ventures Ltd (BBV), which offered small business loans in the Bolton 
Metropolitan Borough. In addition, it had a ‘Culture Finance’ and the ‘Women in 
Business Loan Fund’ (CDFA, 2004a, p. 42).  
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The BBV had a number of loan funds ring fenced to certain areas such as the 
Derby, Daubhill and Deane wards of Bolton. The action of ring-fencing loans 
funds was obvious in London. In 2004 the East London Small Business Centre 
(ELSBC) offered small business loans not across the whole of the city, but in 
the boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Newham and the outer boroughs of 
Barking and Dagenham, Havering and Redbridge (CDFA, 2004a).  Similarly, 
the Ethnic Business Development Corporation linked with to the CDFI Ethnic 
Mutual worked in Lewisham, Southwark, Newham, Bromley, Lambeth and 
some other London boroughs.   
 
A generic product such as a business loan could be developed into a very 
specific product. The ELSBC, ONE London and Business Finance North West 
offered Muslim or Shariah compliant loans. The development of this product 
reflected the needs of their populations. In 2004 the ELSBC had expertise in 
helping small fashion and clothing businesses and Indian/Bangladeshi 
restaurants.   
 
In comparing the products and services from 2004 to 2009 there has been little 
change. A few CDFIs such as Train 2000 Limited based on Merseyside have 
stopped lending and have ceased being members of the CDFA. The important 
differences between the two sets of CDFIs have been the expansion of a 
number of CDFIs and the accompanying change to a more appropriate name. 
The geographical expansion can be denoted by the change of name: 
 
• Salford Moneyline to Greater Manchester Moneyline 
• Portsmouth Area Regeneration Trust to South Coast Moneyline 
• Derby Loans became the Midlands Community Finance (MCF Loans).  
• Preston Moneyline grew into Lancashire Community Finance 
• Suffolk Regeneration Trust was renamed Foundation East in 2006. 
• Hackney Business Ventures became HBV Enterprise to work across 
London. 
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Similarly, East Lancashire Moneyline Ltd was renamed the less specific ELMS 
and gradually expanded into Wales. The Ulster Community Investment Trust or 
UCIT crossed the border into Ireland. The management boards of these growth 
CDFIs should reflect where they work and there are still links with local 
communities.  
 
Between the years 2004 to 2009 the CDFA gained new members. Attempts 
were being made to address rural financial exclusion. In the North West of 
England, the Cumbria Community Asset and Reinvestment Trust was 
established. Impetus offered loans across rural Herefordshire, Worcestershire 
and Shropshire, the South West Investment Group lending in Cornwall and the 
Scilly Isles and the Wessex Investment Trust working in Devon, Dorset and 
Somerset (Regeneration South West, undated).  
 
The CDFIs from 2004 and 2009 do not have a uniform legal structure. Both 
ART and ICOF used the Industrial and Provident Society (IPS) as their legal 
structures. The use of IPS of these early CDFIs has been influential, but not 
prescriptive. Karl Dayson and Bob Paterson of CFS based at Salford University 
established Salford Moneyline and PART using an Industrial and Provident 
Society structure (CFS, undated).  This was a model for other ‘moneylines’ such 
as Blackpool, Derby and Preston. Salford University acted as an ‘honest broker’ 
between the high street banks, local authorities and regional development 
agencies (Tysome, 2004, p. 6). Community Finance Solutions had a 
‘community investment trust’ model (Tysome, 2004, p. 6), which used the IPS 
structure be duplicated in different areas. 
 
Social enterprises have been attracted to the IPS and the limited company 
structures (Spear, 2002; Haugh and Kitson, 2007). One advantage of IPS 
structure was it allowed members to buy shares (Brown, 2006). Both ART and 
ICOF have sold shares to help raise loan funds and the structure has allowed 
supporters to make social investments in these CDFIs.  
 
The 2009 membership only contained two Community Interest Companys; the 
London based Community Money CIC and Scotcash CIC (both established in 
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2007). This structure was created as an alternative to becoming a charity and to 
allow organisations to show their social benefits (Dunn and Riley, 2004). CDFIs 
have not converted to this structure to prove their value. Overall, the structures 
of CDFIs can be complex with organisations having a mix of legal statuses. 
Both Salford Moneyline and PART were registered with the Charity Commission 
and PART had an income of between £200,000 and £450,000 into this element 
of the organisation (Charity Commission, 2010). Regulators such as the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Charity Commission have made 
sure that CDFIs have carried out their purposes. The failure of one CDFI, the 
Ethnic Mutual reached the national broadsheets because of potential fraud 
(Dewar, 2008; Owen, 2008). The FSA suspended this CDFI and announced on 
its website that:  
 
‘this action was because Ethnic Mutual Ltd has been unable to satisfy 
the FSA that it is operating for the benefit of the community and so 
fulfilling the condition of its registration.’ (FSA, 2008) 
 
This CDFI IPS failed to satisfy the community benefit criteria and was closed 
down (FSA, 2008a). At a local level, Blackpool Moneyline has had a number of 
problems, but is still active (Blackpool Gazette, 2008). 
 
However, comparing the memberships from 2004 and 2009 CDFIs leave the 
CDFA because their funding alters. Based in Liverpool, Train 2000 had a loan 
fund for female entrepreneurs and in 2009 this service was not shown on their 
website. In 2004 Change, part of the London and Quadrant Housing Trust had 
joined the CDFA and was piloting a number of lending schemes. In 2009 the 
organisation was no longer a member, but was working with the local credit 
union. The remit of organisations shifted over time as funding priorities altered.  
 
In five years the CDFA’s membership has both rationalised and increased. 
Coverage is not universal, but less fragmented than 2004. The sector has 
developed and is still changing. The following will draw out ideas about the 
sectors development.  
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A Discussion of the Findings 
 
I have chosen three areas of discussion; who has joined the sector, are there 
signs of CDFIs being local and the potential for duplication of services. The 
membership has increased, but what types of organisation have joined the 
CDFI sector? By analysing the membership lists and examining the activities of 
the individual CDFIs what became apparent was many of these organisations 
had additional functions.  
 
Many CDFIs from the 2009 list were offering business support and advice. An 
example of this would be Croydon Enterprise which offered pre-start courses, 
training and advice, grants to test the market and loan finance. It was part of 
Croydon Economic Development. Similarly, Enterprise Loans East Midlands 
was part of East Midlands Development Agency. I would argue that some of the 
CDFA’s members were business development agencies with loan funds. The 
idea of a one stop shop offering a range of business services is nothing new 
and has potential benefits (Bryson et al., 1997). However, having a loan fund as 
a secondary or tertiary service would diminish its importance. Potentially, these 
organisations could act like the soft loan funds of the 1990s (Collin et al., 
2001b). The loan funds would not be permanent, but part of an array of 
measures to aid businesses. A number of members were offering rented 
workspace, which would be a valuable source of revenue. CDFIs such as the 
Charity and Triodos Banks and LIF have focused on lending rather than 
business support. 
 
Both types of CDFI, those concentrating purely on lending and the others 
offering business support, have value to entrepreneurs seeking funding. 
Diversification would create additional income but possibility cause mission drift. 
In the developing world micro-finance lenders have suffered from mission drift 
as they become more commercial (Christen, 2000; Schreiner, 2002; Copestake, 
2007). In the UK, as CDFIs have diversified, their aims could be diluted or lost.  
 
CDFIs have expanded into new areas such as Derby Loans changing into 
Midlands Community Finance. This growth would have created economies of 
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scale and back office facilities would not be duplicated. Many CDFIs have 
offered generic business or personal loans, which could be exactly what their 
markets want. Many CDFIs offered larger loans for social enterprises, which 
were less generic. With the rises in property prices some of the maximum 
amounts available would be insufficient to purchase a building. Potentially, a 
regional CDFI would have to work with a national lender to offer a large social 
enterprise loan.   
 
In Norwich WEETU still has its lending circles and has remained centred on 
female entrepreneurship. Many CDFIs have taken into account their local 
population and have offered Shariah compliant loans. The East London Small 
Business Centre had very specific knowledge and offered a short-term loan to 
clothing manufacturers, so they could bridge the gap between production and 
payment (CDFA, 2004a). In 2009 the website contained a section on the 
clothing industry.  
 
The CDFI sector contains a mix of generic products and highly specialised loan 
funds. With the generic small business loans there will be more opportunity for 
duplications. In London there were CDFIs working in particular boroughs and 
also citywide lenders. The number of CDFIs could produce competition 
amongst lenders. As mentioned previously, four national CDFIs offered loans 
for social enterprise. The mapping process showed that the North West, London 
and the West Midlands all had a number of CDFIs working, so there were 
certain parts of the UK with a duplication of services with similar loan funds 
being offered. An example of working in partnership was found in Yorkshire and 
Humber Developments (YHD). The YHD website stated that the organisation 
was: 
 
‘a partnership of organisations in Yorkshire and The Humber that 
works to support businesses across the region which cannot obtain 
any, or enough, finance from banks.’  (YHD, 2009)  
 
In 2009 the Partners were the Business Enterprise Fund, the Bees Knees Loan 
Fund, the Goole Development Trust, the Key Fund Yorkshire and West 
Yorkshire Enterprise Agency. There was still the possibility of duplication with 
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the Business Enterprise Fund working in West and North Yorkshire and the 
West Yorkshire Enterprise Agency making loans in Kirklees, Calderdale and 
Wakefield. Unlike the others, the Key Fund was concentrated on social 
enterprise and charity loans. However, the back office services would be 
replicated in the five offices. The Yorkshire regional had its own regional 
strategy group made up of Business Link, the RDA, the high street banks and 
YHD partners. In 2009 they reported their sixth regional meeting and the YHD 
received £1.2 million from Yorkshire Forward for small business loans. These 
loans were accessed through Business Link giving a joined up service. 
 
The mapping process unearthed two partnerships; the Yorkshire based YHD 
and the Fair Finance Consortium in the West Midlands. This could be a positive 
sign of CDFIs working together at a regional level. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The mapping process succeeded in highlighting the range of CDFIs, but also 
their generic small business loans. At the same time some offered niche 
products specific to their local communities. There were signs of CDFIs working 
in areas of deprivation and financial exclusion. However, these lenders worked 
across a range of urban and rural settings, so CDFIs were not exclusively 
based in a single type of location.   
 
The growth in the CDFA membership can be viewed as giving strength and 
importance to the sector. However, the CDFI sector is dependent on external 
funding and lenders have been lost because of changes in grants. The number 
of enterprise agencies with loan funds is both beneficial in that they can be a 
‘one stop shop’ and negative because lending may be a secondary or tertiary 
consideration.  
 
Examining the CDFA membership in 2004 and 2009 has shown that the 
national CDFIs focused purely on lending have continued their membership. 
The smaller local or regional CDFIs have either expanded out of their original 
locations or disappeared. With expansion the generic small business loans 
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have been offered in new districts and regions. Not all CDFI were established 
as IPS, but a significant number have been. However, the sector showed signs 
of flux as CDFIs were linked to companies limited by guarantee or charities. 
These lenders were attempting to find a structure suitable for their social aims. 
This chapter and others show a sector developing and growing to offer 
financially inclusive products.  
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Chapter Eight:  Conceptualising CDFIs  
 
While acknowledging that much of the development of CDFIs predates the 
arrival of New Labour into power in 1997, this chapter argues that there are still 
valuable and informative inter-connections to be made between New Labour 
thinking and the later phases of CDFI development.  The key ideas shaping the 
Blair government’s have been extensively covered in the literature on the Third 
Way (Blair, 1998; Powell, 1999; Driver and Martell, 2000, White, 2001; Goes, 
2004; Hale et al., 2004) and Communitarianism (Driver and Martell, 1997; 
Barlow and Duncan, 2000; Bevir, 2005; Hale, 2004; 2005; 2007). 
 
While there has been no political attempt to directly link support for CDFIs to 
Third Way or Communitarian ideas, New Labour’s support for the community 
sector, their attempt to join up social policies (Clark, 2002) and to tackle social 
exclusion have served to influence the growth of CDFIs. However, the 
relationship between Third Way and Communitarian ideas and the post 1997 
development of CDFIs is complex and characterised by tensions. In other areas, 
New Labour policies have a less positive impact on the sector.   
 
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first places the ideas within 
an historical context. The second section explores the main features of Third 
Way and Communitarian ideas.  The next section will focus on New Labour’s 
approach to community (Raco, 2003; Goes, 2004; Fremeaux, 2005). Since 
Communitarian authors have suggested how communities should act and 
achieve cohesion (Etzioni, 1995; Tam, 1998), community based CDFIs should 
help support these goals. The fourth section will look at how the Third Way 
could inform our understanding of finance and business support for CDFIs. 
  
The Development of Ideas 
 
In 1997, the Labour Party had been out of power for seventeen years and had 
little or no experience of being in government. At this point, unemployment was 
the third most important electoral issue behind education and health. New 
Labour had promised to stick to the spending plans of the previous 
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administration for the first two years (Labour Party, 1997) and was not going to 
tax and spend (Hills, 1998). In the late 1990s the Government had limited funds 
available and was looking at public private partnerships as a form of finance for 
public capital projects (Stoker, 1998; Harding, 1998; Falconer and McLaughlin, 
2000).  
 
The government, before investing its limited funds in social and economic 
problems carried out extensive research on ‘what works’ through Policy Action 
Teams (PAT). The first PAT researched issues around jobs and the second 
PAT focussed on skills. The third PAT focused on Enterprise and Social 
Exclusion (PAT 3, 1999). It found obstacles stopping enterprise in 
disadvantaged areas namely:  
 
• ‘Not enough accessible, high quality business support – like 
advice and training on marketing and money; 
• “Market failures” in access to finance, which means that not 
enough capital is available for projects with high returns to society; 
• A weak culture of support for enterprise, across the whole range 
of local and national institutions; the benefits and tax system is 
perceived as complex and difficult to understand.’ (PAT 3, 1999, 
pp. 2 – 3) 
 
The report made a series of recommendations and noted that the public and 
voluntary sector were too dependent on a grant culture and suggested that 
loans could replace grants where there were financial benefits. The continuation 
of grants was understood as a barrier to organisations becoming financially 
independent. The report also stated that large businesses needed to be 
encouraged to help to increase enterprise. Overall, there was recognition that 
for entrepreneurship to increase, supporting policies would have to be in place. 
On a larger scale, New Labour also introduced a series of welfare reform 
measures (Powell, 1999; 2000; Hirsch and Miller, 2004). Work including self 
employment was made potentially more attractive through Welfare to Work 
Family Tax Credits and the minimum wage (Driver and Martell, 2003). New 
Labour’s 1997 Manifesto mentioned rewarding work and encouraging enterprise. 
Any interventions to aid CDFIs would fit neatly into the policy of encouraging 
enterprise.   
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The timeline in figure 5 illustrates many of the actions by the Government since 
1997 to support CDFIs. The measures to help the sector included the setting up 
of the Phoenix Fund, which financed CDFIs through a combination of grants for 
capital, revenue and loan guarantees. Every grant or loan guarantee was 
specific to the individual organisation and could include an element of match 
funding. Many of the CDFIs also had to access additional funds from the banks 
or charitable foundations.   
 
Some of the published figures of government investments (figure 5) and policies 
towards CDFIs must be taken with an element of caution since the Phoenix 
Fund was to last from 2000 to 2008 (Ramsden Freiss, 2005), but after 2006 
responsibility for CDFIs was transferred to the RDAs.  
 
Figure 5: Timeline of measures to aid CDFIs in UK.  
 
Source: * Ramsden Freiss, 2005, ** HM Treasury, 2001, *** CDFA, 2007, **** 
CDFA News, 2006, ***** BERR, 2007 and HM Treasury, 2008 and ******Bridges, 
2009 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
The Phoenix Fund 2000 to 2008 valued at £189 million* 
 
Bridges Community Ventures (Bridges) was introduced in 2002 with original 
targets of £20 million of public money and £20 million of private finance. In 
2009 it had £150 million in two funds.** 
 
The announcement of the Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) scheme 
worth up to £1 billion. 
 
£38 million raised by CITR by 2006*** 
 
Decentralisation with £11 million to be distributed by the Regional 
Development Agencies rather than from central government**** 
 
In 2006 CDFIs were allowed to join the Small Firms Loan Guarantee 
Scheme and it was made easier for banks to invest in CDFIs**** 
 
In 2009 the Office of the Third Sector promises up to £5 million to 
Bridges****** 
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In its first years of government, New Labour said little about CDFIs, but the 
announcement of the £1 billion tax relief gave Gordon Brown the chance to 
connect New Labour’s policies with support for CDFIs. He announced in a press 
release:  
 
‘Business creation in our most disadvantaged communities lags far 
behind the rest of Britain. We need to build a stronger enterprise 
culture that opens up opportunities for all.  
To tackle the causes of unemployment and low economic activity, 
we need a radical new approach to encourage enterprise and 
stimulate business-led growth in our most challenged communities. 
We want to put in place the best possible incentive structure to 
open up enterprise and employment opportunities to all. 
This new tax credit aims to attract greater flows of private 
investment into new business creation in high unemployment 
areas.  It would support the start up and growth of small for-profit 
enterprises in these communities, as well as social and community 
enterprises.’  (H M Treasury, 2001).  
 
So while Gordon Brown did not proclaim CDFIs as part of a Third Way, their 
role can be located as a mechanism to increase enterprise through more 
opportunities for self employment and expansion to take on additional staff. The 
rest of this chapter will aim to show that CDFIs can be viewed as being 
interlinked with Third Way and Communitarian ideas. Gordon Brown has not 
been a strong advocate of a Third Way (Lee, 2006), but Giddens thought of 
Brown as a Third-Wayer (Giddens, 2007; 2007a).  
 
The Third Way and Communitarian ideas  
 
By the early 2000s, a series of potential Third Ways in politics was recognised 
and much discussed (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998; 2000; 2001; Novak, 1999; 
Blair and Schröder, 2000; Brennan, 2001; Callinicos, 2001, Driver and Martell, 
2000; Leggett, 2002; 2004; O’Conner, 2002; Hale et al., 2004). This dialogue 
was not just within the USA and the UK, but across Europe and the wider global 
context (Gould, 1998; Blair and Schröder, 2000; Giddens, 2001; Keman, 2003). 
Barrientos and Powell (2004) suggested that it was politically important, but also 
difficult to define. It would be impossible to fully explore Third Way ideas in a 
single section, so the following paragraphs will focus on a broad definition. 
 182
 
The Third Way was offering a change, an alternative from the ‘Right’ and the 
‘Left’. Giddens proposed it as an attempt to ‘transcend both old style social 
democracy and neoliberalism’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 28). Brennan simplified this to 
going beyond the successful first way, capitalism and the failed second way, 
socialism. In Tony Blair’s Third Way, he linked democratic socialism with 
liberalism in the form of the free market (Blair, 1998). The free market was 
tempered with social responsibility. Similarly, Giddens discussed the idea of a 
new mixed economy both using the market, but preserving public interest.  
 
New Labour was defining itself as different from previous Labour governments. 
Later, Giddens discussed New Democrats, who offered opportunity in life-
chances rather than a redistribution of wealth (Giddens, 2007). This change 
from wealth distribution to creation was a big element of New Labour’s direction. 
Commentators have suggested that Labour’s reformers have accused the ‘Old 
Left’ as being: 
 
‘too statist; too concerned with the distribution (and tax-and-spend 
policies) and not the creation of wealth; too willing to grant rights but 
not to demand responsibilities; and too liberal and individualist in 
terms of social behaviour and social relationships such as the family’ 
(Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 70).  
 
It was recognised that New Labour’s form of Third Way was intended to:  
 
‘promote wealth creation and social justice, the market and the 
community; that will embrace private enterprise but not automatically 
favour market solutions; that it can endorse a positive role for the 
state’ (Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 70).   
 
New Labour found it acceptable to use the market and give people opportunities 
to create their own wealth. Blair, Giddens and Midgley saw opportunity as being 
linked to equality. Giddens called for equality through inclusion, civic liberalism 
and the social investment state (Giddens, 1998). Midgley found barriers 
stopping people from engaging in employment and playing roles in society 
(Midgley, 2001). Both Midgley and Giddens suggested their ideas for 
investment at community level and removing barriers to social and economic 
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participation. Giddens linked generous welfare benefits with high unemployment, 
while calling for welfare reform (Giddens, 1998). Blair viewed the government 
as an ‘enabling force, protecting effective communities’ (Blair, 1998, p. 4) and 
offered a range of strategies including New Deals, the Minimum Wage and Tax 
Credit (Blair, 1998).  Giddens would have called these measures positive 
welfare that tackled dependency and the lack of self-fulfilment (Giddens, 2000).  
 
In the Blair government’s list of Third Way values, opportunity was inextricably 
linked to responsibility (Blair, 1999). Over time he argued that rights had been 
separated from duties and mutual responsibility. Previously, Bill Clinton had 
attempted to tackle aspects of this welfare problem with the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996 (O’Conner, 2002).  
For Blair, rights and opportunity without responsibility had a moral aspect calling 
them ‘the engines of selfishness and greed’ (Blair, 1999, p.4 ). Third Way ideas 
and Communitarian themes can be seen as closely linked and this idea of 
responsibility has been one of the guiding aspects of Communitarianism.  
 
Amitai Etzioni based at George Washington University, has written extensively 
about his ideas of Communitarianism. In the preface to the British edition of his 
book, The Community Spirit , he stated: 
 
  ‘Communitarians call to restore civic virtues, for people to live up to 
their responsibilities and not merely focus on their entitlements, and 
to shore up the moral foundations of society’ (Etzioni, 1995, p. ix). 
 
Again, it is difficult to sum up Communitarian ideas within a few paragraphs, so 
only a few succinct points will be made. Similarly, it would be easy just to 
concentrate on the ideas of one author, Amitai Etzioni, because of his cited 
connection with New Labour and Tony Blair in the UK broadsheets, such as the 
Guardian (Freely, 1998; Riddel, 2001) and the Independent (Coote, 1995; 
Cohen, 1995). Earlier, writers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, 
Charles Taylor and others had contributed to Communitarian ideas by 
criticising liberal policies (Buchanan, 1989; Neal and Paris, 1990; Hale, 2004). 
These authors criticised liberalism for being too focussed on the individual, 
devaluing community and ignoring obligations towards one’s community 
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(Buchanan, 1989; Neal and Paris, 1990). Thus, Communitarianism gives value 
to community and expects individuals to uphold responsibilities within their 
communities (Etzioni, 1995; Tam, 1998).    
 
Etzioni looked back for a ‘Traditional Community’ (Etzioni, 1995, p. 116) and 
wished for it to balance both ‘diversity and unity’ (Etzioni, 1995, p. 122).  His 
communities were based within families, cities, the suburbs, industries and 
institutions and held importance. From a UK pespective, Henry Tam suggested 
that people lived in overlapping communities with different levels of bonds (Tam, 
1998). The strength of the individual would be realised through the strength and 
health of the community (Etzioni, 1995; Bellah, 1998). Tam suggested that the 
Communitarianism agenda sought to repair problems, caused by individualism, 
by developing inclusive communities.  
 
Tam went on to identify three Communitarian principles: 
 
1. Co-operative inquiry; 
2. Mutual responsibility; 
3. And citizen participation (Tam, 1998).  
 
These principles attempted to distil ideas from various Communitarian thinkers 
into a cohesive form. Firstly, co-operative inquiry or community investigation 
was a way of confirming truth. An informed community rather than an individual 
would be able to confirm truth within the community or common values. 
Through this selection process people could choose specific beliefs and values 
to anchor their strong community. Etzioni (1996, p. 1) claimed that ‘Authentic 
communities’ were responsive to the ‘true needs’ of all members of the 
community.  
 
Secondly, once common values have been identified then the community 
would have mutual responsibility and act accordingly. This principle required ‘all 
members of any community to take responsibility for enabling each other to 
pursue common values’ (Tam, 1998, p. 14). Etzioni did not deny that individual 
rights were important, but saw reciprocity between rights and responsibilities 
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(Etzioni, 1996). He used Trial by Jury as an example of this balance with the 
individual expecting Trial by Peers and also having the responsibility of sitting 
on a jury (Etzioni, 1995).   
 
Thirdly, for Tam citizens had to participate at equal levels with an equality of 
power across the community. Both Etzioni (1996) and Bellah (1998) saw 
Communitarianism as democratic. Another Communitarian author, Selznick 
(1998) recognised the personal differences in talents, power and resources, but 
saw an equality of justice with people being equally as important.  
 
There has never been a precise form of Communitarianism but more a series 
of common ideas. Driver and Martell identified six dimensions on which 
different forms of Communitarianism could diverge. These were: 
 
1. Conformist versus pluralist, 
2. More versus less conditional,  
3. Conservative versus progressive, 
4. Prescriptive versus voluntary, 
5. Moral versus socio-economic and, 
6. Individual versus corporate (Driver and Martell, 1997)  
 
Driver and Martell also found that New Labour tended towards the former of 
each pair. The Labour Party has headed towards:  
 
‘a conditional, morally prescriptive, conservative and individual 
Communitarianism at the expense of less conditional and 
redistributional, socio-economic, progressive and corporate 
Communitarianisms’ (Driver and Martell, 1997, p. 27).  
 
In later sections these characteristics will be identified in New Labour’s policies, 
but a broad interpretation of Communitarianism could be characterised as: 
 
• Recognising the value of communities and not being purely focussed on 
the individual, 
• Finding common values, 
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• And combining rights with responsibilities. 
 
Third Way and Communitarian ideas often overlap and support each other.  
Hale suggested that ‘Communitarian politics is often presented as an antidote 
to the selfish individualism perceived to have been engendered under 
Thatcherism’ (Hale, 2004, p. 99) while both sets of ideas have focussed on the 
importance of change for communities.     
 
New Labour and the Community 
 
This section will concentrate on New Labour’s ideas and policies towards 
communities. Ideas around community and devolution will be discussed 
connected to the development of CDFIs. Finally, this section will explore 
whether UK communities would be able to fulfil Third Way and Communitarian 
visions.  
 
Tony Blair saw community as having a major role and being a big idea left in 
politics (Blair, 1996). It was seen by New Labour as an ideology that separated 
themselves from the Conservative Party (Goes, 2004). In their Manifesto of 
1997, New Labour wished to have fairness and justice within strong 
communities. This form of community produced mutuality, where both interests 
and obligations rose above a narrow view of self-interest (Blair, 1996). Early in 
New Labour’s first term, Tony Blair recognised that community had a pivotal 
role in bringing about a nation wide equality of opportunity (Levitas, 2000).  
 
The importance of community was reinforced by Tony Blair’s speech to the 
Women’s Institute:  
 
‘At the heart of my beliefs is the idea of community. I don’t just mean 
the local villages, towns and cities in which we live. I mean that our 
fulfilment as individuals lies in a decent society of others. My 
argument … is that the renewal of community is the answer to the 
challenges of a changing world’ (Blair, 2000).  
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The then, Prime Minister, saw community as offering change and solutions to 
problems. Blair’s renewal of community could be an answer to Margaret 
Thatcher’s speech that asserted that there was ‘no such thing as society’ and 
there ‘are individual men and women’ (Thatcher, 1987). In the same interview, 
Thatcher asked people to look after themselves and secondly their 
neighbourhoods. There was still a need for some form of reciprocity between 
people. 
  
Within Tony Blair’s idea of community, individuals were potentially more 
interlocked and reliant upon each other and in his mission statement he 
asserted that New Labour aimed: 
 
 ‘to promote and reconcile the four values which are essential to a 
just society which maximises the freedom and potential of all our 
people – equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility and 
community’ (Blair, 1999, p. 1). 
 
Blair wished to maximise freedom and potential, but still offer fairness and a 
sense of community. Goes (2004) suggested that Tony Blair used community in 
a number of ways.  Community could be linked to a traditional socialist ideology 
and people having common values (Goes, 2004). From Blair’s rhetoric his 
community was active, not static and producing solutions for a changing world.  
 
If communities were to solve problems then the government needed more 
information to inform policies. New Labour set up a series of PATs to research 
and offer solutions to the problems affecting the UK. Some of the findings from 
the various reports led to policies. The PAT 9 Report: Community Self Help 
identified a number of meanings of community from geographical location, 
family and the use of public buildings such as churches or schools. It suggested 
that an ‘individual may be a member of several communities, based on 
geography, politics, faith, social interaction, cultural interest, ethnicity’ (PAT 9, 
1999, p. 2), which chimes with Communitarian ideas of being part of various 
communities.  
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The report looked at the ‘philosophy of community self help’ and suggested it 
needed to be organically grown from the grassroots rather than externally top-
down. However, communities would still have to work with external bodies to be 
successful. Potentially, a locally based CDFI could fit into the ‘philosophy of 
community self-help’. Even though, PAT 9 accepted differences within 
communities, policies could be more generalised. One way of addressing 
community problems was to empower communities and allow them to have an 
input into the solutions.  
 
New Labour has tried to empower communities and devolve power through the 
parliament in Scotland and the Welsh Assembly on one level, and local 
strategic partnerships on another. A new localism had impacted upon New 
Labour’s idea and policies (Raco, 2003). The Government introduced Local 
Strategic Partnerships to bring about inclusion and a strategic focus for 
regeneration with mixed results (Bailey, 2003; Johnson and Osborne, 2003). 
Similarly, when New Labour was looking at welfare reform it introduced local 
initiatives to create employment (Theodore and Peck, 1999; Jones and Gray, 
2001). In New Labour’s vision for regeneration there was a belief that an 
empowered and mobilised community was needed to assist policies (Raco, 
2003). Participation by the community was necessary for the success of these 
regeneration initiatives (Dinham, 2005; Evans, 2008).  Other policies such as 
the New Deal for Communities have included some degree of involvement by 
the local population (Foley and Martin, 2000; Lawless; 2004, Dinham; 2005; 
Robinson, Shaw and Davidson, 2005). For a number of years, New Labour 
looked at ways to change communities through the introduction of the Social 
Exclusion Unit and developing the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy (Wallace, 
2001) and created smaller initiatives such as Health Action Zones, Sure Start 
and Employment Zones (Lawless, 2004).  
 
Even though there was a wish for grass roots development to regenerate areas, 
many policies were introduced from outside the area. New Labour expected 
communities to become involved in accepting employment, training, 
volunteering and contributing to local issues. Both Etzioni and Blair had 
prescriptive tendencies, expecting community members to take up opportunities 
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and be responsible to their area (Etzioni, 1995; Blair, 2000).  In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, there were New Labour ideas connecting community and 
citizenship with obligations. Savage and Atkinson (2001) illustrate New Labour’s 
idea of citizenship by using Blair’s statement that citizenship: 
 
 ‘gives rights but demands obligations, shows respect but wants it 
back, grants opportunity but insists on responsibility. So the 
purpose of economic and social policy should be to extend 
opportunity, to remove the underlying causes of social alienation’ 
(Blair, 1996, p. x).  
 
New Labour’s ideas of community offer opportunity with the expectation of 
responsibility. In his speech to the Women’s Institute Blair stated:  
 
‘Give people the opportunity to get on and make something of 
themselves, give each of us a stake in Britain and we have the 
means and the moral authority to demand the responsibility’ (Blair, 
2000).  
 
While in 2000, Amitai Etzioni suggested: 
 
 ‘cultivating communities where they exist and helping them form 
where they have been lost … should be a priority for future progress 
along the Third Way’ (Etzioni, 2000, p. 18).  
 
In the same year, rebuilding communities was also a theme in the SITF’s 
Wealth Beyond Welfare, which presented a CDFI ‘wish list’ to government. In 
this largely non political document there were some signs of Third Way and 
Communitarian thinking. Both the market and the public sector had failed in 
disadvantaged communities. Private investment avoided these communities 
and public sector grants stifled entrepreneurship. The Task Force called for 
social investment to achieve social objectives and financial returns. It wanted a 
reduction of public money and a reintroduction of the market through the supply 
of suitable finance. Since the financial investment would contain a social 
element it could be thought of as being equidistant between the market and 
philanthropy and therefore a potential Third Way.  The Task Force stated that 
its aim was to: 
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‘achieve a move away from this culture of philanthropy, paternalism 
and dependence towards one of empowerment, entrepreneurship 
and initiative.’ (SITF, 2000, p. 4) 
 
Communitarianism wished individuals to move away from dependence and 
aimed to empower communities. One CDFI called itself the London Rebuilding 
Society in an attempt to express its aim. Within the jigsaw of localisation and 
the empowerment of communities, CDFIs had their role recognised by the 
government. New Labour’s contribution to these lending organisations through 
the Phoenix Fund can be seen as an investment into particular communities. 
These communities could be geographical such as ART based in Birmingham. 
Alternatively, a combination of location and an additional characteristic, such as 
the Muslim Loan Fund based in London and WEETU working across Norfolk. 
The specific character of a CDFI could be an element to solve a local or 
regional problem. Some CDFIs could be considered as grass-roots 
organisations, because they have created by the communities themselves. For 
example, ICOF was created by the co-operative movement to help other co-
operative businesses. ICOF and other CDFIs could be thought of as Third Way 
organisations working between the public and private sectors and offering 
finance to an excluded community. A loan from a CDFI could be interpreted an 
introduction into the market; a supportive version based on people’s ability to 
repay a loan. Overall CDFIs can be understood as part of a battery of tools to 
aid communities.  
 
The development of a CDFI within a community and financial support from 
government would give local inhabitants the opportunity of loan finance. The 
supply of opportunity within communities was important to New Labour. Tony 
Blair suggested:  
 
‘the constitution of the Labour Party commits us to seek the widest 
possible spread of wealth, power and opportunity. I want to 
highlight opportunity as a key value in the new politics. Its 
importance has too often been neglected or distorted’ (Blair, 1998, 
p.3).   
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Blair had seen opportunity freeing individuals from the State. However, he 
thought ‘for most people, opportunities are inseparable from society, in which 
government action necessarily plays a large part’ (Blair, 1998, p. 3). This 
connects to Giddens, who called for the government to have an essential role 
‘investing in human resources and infrastructure needed to develop an 
entrepreneurial culture’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 99). The themes of supporting 
enterprise, removing barriers to employment and promoting economic 
participation were reiterated in James Midgley’s ideas on social development 
through social investment (Midgley, 1999). An investment in a CDFI could be a 
social investment bringing benefits for the community.  
Blair suggested that the Left had: 
 
‘in the past too readily downplayed its duty to promote a wide range 
of opportunities for individuals to advance themselves and their 
families’ and it had at worst ‘stifled opportunity in the name of 
abstract equality’ (Blair, 1998, p. 3).  
 
What was needed was a progressive Left to tackle these inequalities removing 
obstacles to the ‘true equality of opportunity’ (Blair, 1998, p. 3). Giddens thought 
that this model of ‘equality of opportunity, or meritocracy’ was the ‘neoliberal 
model’ (Giddens, 1998, p.101). Blair and Giddens seem to diverge on ideas 
around meritocracy (Driver and Martell, 2000). Giddens warns against it, but 
Blair seemed to value meritocracy through his support for entrepreneurship.   
 
The government’s policies aimed at the removal of barriers to employment and 
economic participation could be seen in the context of Third Way ideas (Midgley, 
1999). In Third Way thought, opportunity in education and employment would 
bring about economic and social inclusion. Opportunities were necessary to get 
people into employment, whether this would be access to childcare provision, 
improving educational standards or supplying better information about vacant 
employment positions. Tony Blair suggested in a speech ‘opportunity to all and 
responsibility for all equals a community for all’ (Blair, 2000). In the world of 
New Labour, the State created opportunities and it was the responsibility of the 
individual to seize these and conform to an acceptable form of behaviour. In his 
Third Way, James Midgley highlighted that welfare benefits could diminish 
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growth and reduce economic participation through both employment and self-
employment (Midgley, 1999). The role of CDFIs in the supply of opportunity is 
potentially small, but could be linked to the State facilitating economic activities. 
With CDFIs bringing about financial inclusion and potentially being locally based, 
either geographically or within a given niche sector (co-operatives, social 
enterprises or charities), they can be seen as a small element of New Labour’s 
entrepreneurial agenda. 
 
New Labour’s support for entrepreneurship shows a change from wealth 
distribution to wealth creation (Driver and Martell, 1999).  This was a change in 
policy from previous governments propping up industries with grants or giving 
incentives to get multi-nationals to relocate in areas of high unemployment. 
Gordon Brown in discussing Enterprise and Fairness stated that:  
 
‘Thirty years ago governments responded to the productivity 
challenge with top down plans, and tax incentives and grants 
primarily for physical investment. Today it is more complex – 
involving the modernisation of capital, labour and product markets, 
and creating an economy with an enterprise culture open to all’ 
(Brown, 1999, p. 50).  
 
This statement would suggest that the old idea of allocating money to problems 
such as enterprise and employment was to be rethought.  In New Labour’s first 
term in office, the BBC (1999) reported on a change from traditional Labour 
Party ideas on wealth. The Cabinet Minister, Stephen Byers stated that ‘wealth 
creation is now more important than wealth redistribution.’ He went on to state 
that ‘if we don’t create wealth there is no opportunity to provide real hope for the 
future to many people who are left out at the moment’ (BBC, 1999). A case was 
put forward that without enterprise there would not be money to improve 
people’s opportunities. Entrepreneurship was viewed both as an opportunity to 
be taken up and a source of finance for further opportunities in health, 
education or enterprise. During the 1990s New Labour rejected its old policies 
from the left (Shaw, 2003). 
 
The policy of wealth creation was important to New Labour’s doctrine as a 
policy that separated them from ‘Old’ Labour and a policy that had produced 
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conflict amongst its ranks (BBC, 1999; Driver and Martell, 2002). This was an 
important policy that broke with the traditional perspective that Labour was a 
party of wealth redistribution to wealth creation. CDFI finance could be 
understood as a mechanism for wealth creation, allowing those previously 
excluded from loan finance access to start or expand enterprise and create 
wealth for themselves. The SITF thought that endogenous enterprise within 
disadvantaged communities would eventually reverse the cycle of deprivation, 
which has also been seen as an element of Third Way thinking (Midgley, 1999).    
 
Employment or self-employment would have the ability to change communities 
and create wealth. Employment, like community, was one of the big issues for 
New Labour in the early years. The Social Exclusion Unit’s first PAT report 
investigated employment. The PAT 1 looked at a wide range of employment 
policy issues and made more than sixty recommendations. It found that 
financial issues stopped people from taking up employment. In disadvantaged 
areas, there was a need for employment support and effective partnerships with 
businesses.   
 
Some of the recommendations were focussed upon the cycle of worklessness 
within deprived communities.  The Chancellor Gordon Brown at the Urban 
Summit in Birmingham announced there would be ‘an onslaught against the 
unacceptable culture of worklessness that grew up in some of our communities 
in the 1980s and early 1990s’ (BBC, 2002a). New Labour has used a battery of 
measures of incentives, such as the Minimum Wage, Tax Credits and New Deal 
policies to combat worklessness. New Labour had incentives and also more 
persuasive policies such as Employment Zones. James Midgley in discussing 
his ideas of a Third Way mentioned the need to make low paid jobs worthwhile 
(Midgley, 1999). In North America it was suggested that there has been 
sufficient employment opportunities available for ‘the poor’, but it was ‘an 
institutionalized culture of indolence that perpetuates an underclass of 
nonworking people’ (Midgley, 1999, p. 19). Potentially, Brown may have been 
speaking from a similar perspective on worklessness.  
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In the Ministerial foreword of Jobs and Enterprises in Deprived Areas, Jeff 
Rooker and Des Browne saw employment as ‘the foundation of human well-
being and willingness of people to work is the nation’s most important asset’ 
(ODPM, 2003, p. 5). Work could ‘provide stability, fulfilment, opportunities and 
self-respect’ and that was ‘why paid work has been a central element of the 
government’s strategy to tackle social exclusion’ (ODPM, 2003, p. 5). These are 
rather blunt statements from the Government, but illustrate that through its 
Social Exclusion Unit (once part of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) the 
government perceived employment to be vital in society. In New Labour’s 
rhetoric, work was seen as having stabilising effect upon communities with low 
unemployment areas having perceived stable, fulfilled and respectful 
communities.  
 
Tony Blair in his speech to the Women’s Institute in 2000 pointed out that his 
government produced 1.5 million extra jobs and had saved £8 billion on benefits.  
The policies work of introducing the Minimum Wage and the Working Family 
Tax Credits had helped get people into work. The Tax Credits and Minimum 
Wage could be seen as Third Way policies connected to thoughts on social 
development (Midgley, 1999). However, the Government has had an element of 
compulsion about their policies towards employment. In 1998, Tony Blair wrote: 
 
‘For too long, the demand for rights from the state was separated 
from the duties of citizenship and the imperative for mutual 
responsibility on the part of individuals and institutions. 
Unemployment benefits were often paid without strong reciprocal 
obligations’ (Blair, 1998, p. 4).  
 
 
The rights and responsibilities agenda has been strongly connected to 
Communitarian and Third Way ideas (Etzioni, 1995; Giddens 1998). Under New 
Labour: 
 
 ‘Responsibility means we no longer hand out social security benefits 
without conditions. Claimants have a duty to look actively for work 
and take jobs they are offered’ (Blair, 2000).  
 
 195
Blair’s policies persuading people into employment contains Communitarian 
and Third Way ideas. The supply of good business advice and suitable 
business loans could influence the unemployed into self-employment. Giddens 
suggested that in Europe there was too much reliance upon the public sector 
creating employment and it ought to be recognised that entrepreneurship was a 
direct source of employment (Giddens, 1998). In this way, self-employment 
through CDFI finance would be another way to achieve this goal.  
 
Paul Boateng, speaking at the 2001 CDFI conference, stated that community 
finance was important to the government and that it had a central role in 
delivering some priorities. In his speech he asserted that CDFI could aid in: 
 
 ‘creating a new culture of enterprise in Britain, and one that is open to 
all; building real prospects, and real hope, in some of our most 
disadvantaged communities; ending social exclusion and opening 
opportunities that have been closed to many people for too long’ 
(Boateng, 2001).  
 
With New Labour’s funding of CDFIs, new opportunities were created within 
disadvantaged communities which could aid entrepreneurs establish 
businesses. Figures from the Community Development Finance Association 
show that during the early 2000s the number of CDFIs increased. Potentially, 
these organisations would have taken into account the problems of their 
communities and offered support into self-employment. CDFIs could play a 
small role in a complex series of policies influenced by Communitarian and 
Third Way ideas. CDFIs would offer opportunity for all through business loans 
within local communities. However, as the previous chapter suggested, there 
was insufficient demand for CDFI loans. It would seem important to explore the 
potential problems associated with applying New Labour’s concepts and ideas 
of community, employment and opportunity.  
 
Third Way and Communitarian ideas: Tensions 
 
This section will explore three problematic areas; defining community, the 
tension between individualism and community, and the potential over-supply of 
funding to communities.  
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When writers discuss community, it is often in an idealised way. They have 
aspirations of how individuals and communities will act, expecting them to react 
positively and accept policies offering change. From the outset, there has been 
the expectation that communities will take up opportunities either voluntarily or 
through persuasion. But it can be argued that this may not be the case 
throughout all communities. PAT 9: Community Self Help identified that there 
were motivational, organisational, institutional, political/cultural and economic 
barriers stopping people getting involved in community activities (PAT 9, 1999). 
Similarly, others have argued that just because people have certain 
characteristics in common this does not make a community. Some of these 
common interests could be a ‘cultural heritage’, ‘social relationships’ ‘economic 
interests’ and ‘common experiences of power or oppression’ (Talyor, 2003, p. 
23). In discussing race, Etzioni recognised cultural diversity and suggested that 
every American could learn English and still keep hold of their ethnic subculture 
(Etzioni, 1995). His perspective was easy to suggest, but difficult to carry out. 
What would happen if the common culture within an area was receiving benefits? 
Ideas of community have permeated New Labour’s thoughts about opportunity, 
wealth creation and employment. These ideas do not fully connect-up with 
every community and this cannot be expected.    
 
It is possible that people will be part of many communities and various 
allegiances will apply at different times as there will often be fluidity within 
communities and members (Taylor, 2003; Goes, 2004). However, just because 
individuals have connections, such as kinship or a similar economic class, they 
may not feel responsible towards their community. Since New Labour’s 
Communitarian ideas have a prescriptive character (Johnson, 2001; Goes, 2004) 
it may ignore these gaps in community cohesion. Indeed, the Government itself 
found there were barriers to individuals getting involved in self-help projects 
(PAT 9, 1999). This has been an area of debate since prescriptive 
Communitarians suggest that the spirit of community must be promoted 
through ’moral persuasion’ and peer pressure, rather than governmental 
announcements (Goes, 2004, p. 110). New Labour’s rhetoric has suggested 
that individuals have a responsibility to take up opportunities and rebuild their 
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own districts. Just as the banks were withdrawing from communities in both 
urban and rural areas there was an increased interest in credit unions and 
CDFIs (Atkinson, 1999; Brown, 2000). These institutions may have been seen 
as community, grass roots solutions to market failures. The community could 
mop up the ill-effects of the market and the costs would be transferred to 
individuals, rather than the State (Levitas, 2000). Potentially, not all 
communities have the skills, knowledge and enthusiasm to establish CDFIs or 
other organisations to improve their location.   
 
The second area of potential problems would be the tension between 
individualism and community. Communitarianism has offered ‘a political 
vocabulary which eshews market individualism, but not capitalism; which 
embraces collective action, but not class or the state’ (Taylor, 2003, p. 40), 
which would be part of Third Way thinking. Driver and Martell in discussing New 
Labour’s Third Way suggested that supporting communities could offer a:  
 
‘Communitarian rather than an individualist view of society in which 
individuals are embedded in social relations which give structure and 
meaning to people’s lives; and that it is the role of governments to 
promote ‘the community’ as a way of enriching individual lives’ 
(Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 70).  
 
Government research suggested that opportunity was a way of turning an area 
around (PAT 9, 1999). Similarly, the Social Investment Taskforce thought 
entrepreneurship within communities would halt the spiral of ever increasing 
deprivation. It has been suggested that Communitarian politics could be 
presented ‘as an antidote to the individualism perceived to have been 
engendered under Thatcherism’ (Hale, 2002, p. 24). However, others have 
suggested individualism was a symptom rather than a cause of social-ills (Hale, 
2002; Leggett, 2004). This could be problematic since New Labour wanted 
people to be entrepreneurial, which would involve some form of individualism. 
Giddens seems to fudge what he calls ‘new individualism,’ a balancing act 
between individual and collective responsibility (Giddens, 1998, p. 16). Etzioni 
expected individuals to be part of business, but also have civic responsibility 
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(Etzioni, 1995). This could be difficult enough to create a successful business in 
a poor community without adding an additional community responsibility.   
 
Finally, there may have been a mismatch between funding streams.  The 
government have directed monies to CDFIs attempting to establish sustainable 
loan funds and on the other hand giving the most deprived areas grants to 
establish time limited projects.  For example the Community Chests allowed 
communities to run their own local projects in the eighty-eight most deprived 
local authority districts (SEU, 2001). Potentially, there have been a series of 
grant funds available to specific deprived areas such as Community Chests or 
the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. However, the Bridges Community Venture 
Fund was aimed only at the most deprived areas, but wished to create 
permanent businesses through returnable investment. The various 
governmental funds and the Bridges Community Venture Fund could offer a 
range of grants and equity investments to a disadvantaged area, but do the 
grants stifle entrepreneurship? Lawless (2004) suggested that the government’s 
New Deal for Communities was about delivering projects and importantly 
spending the budgets. Wallace highlighted the success of some grant based 
initiatives in disadvantaged areas (Wallace, 2001). However, CDFIs reported 
difficulties making sufficient loans (Nissan, 2008). 
 
Another example of policies not being successfully joined up has been New 
Labour’s interest in social enterprise, an area where CDFIs can help finance. 
Giddens (2000) suggested that the Third Sector (charities, the not for profit 
sector and social enterprises) if developed effectively could offer choice in 
delivering public services and promote a localised civic culture. Two years later, 
Tony Blair in discussing social enterprises was struck by the fact that social 
enterprises were: 
 
 ‘delivering high quality, lower cost products and services and were 
creating real opportunities for the people working in them and the 
communities that they serve’ (DTI, 2002, p. 5).  
 
This transfer of public services to the voluntary sector has been attractive to 
New Labour since the early 2000s (Shifrin, 2003), but the government has had 
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difficultly working out what to do with this ‘third-sector’. In 2003, the Treasury 
established the Future Builders Fund through a consortium of organisations to 
give minor grants and significant loans to charities and social enterprise 
organisations wishing to compete for public contracts. In 2007 to add to the 
confusion, the Department of Health established the Social Enterprise 
Investment Fund to allow third-sector organisations to build up social 
businesses within health care through grants. The government have given 
grants to social enterprises and also offered loans through CDFIs. Potentially, 
this could stifle entrepreneurship and keep social enterprises businesses 
following grants funding streams. This availability of grants would diminish the 
demand for loans from CDFIs. Research has shown that businesses choose 
internal funding first and equity finance last (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This is 
because it is easier and equity is not given away (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
However, a grant would be more attractive than a loan to a business or charity.  
 
Finally, in 2008 a social enterprise could approach four national funds for loans, 
which could mean competition between funds. Similarly, in the early 2000s 
entrepreneurs in some of the poorest districts of London had four loan funds for 
micro-finance and SMEs. Does this mean increased levels of opportunity to 
gain finance or CDFIs competing for the most financially viable customers? 
Potentially the latter, but Rod Jones, loan manager of a Northern CDFI saw his 
fund as ‘a cocktail of finance’ with borrowers accessing a number of CDFIs and 
spreading the risk across all of them. So there could be value in having a series 
of CDFIs all offering similar products. Overall, support for CDFIs can be seen as 
increasing the market for loans to a limited audience.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, CDFIs connect successfully with Third Way and Communitarian 
ideas, but communities do not work as idealistically as in Third Way or 
Communitarian examples. New Labour’s broad and generalised policies have 
been applied to individual communities and have ignored localised barriers. In 
addition, New Labour established grant funds, while promoting CDFI loan funds. 
This has caused competition and confusion between philanthropic and lending 
 200
organisations. For example, a developing social enterprise may choose to 
become a charity and receive a grant, rather than produce a business plan and 
seek a loan.  
  
CDFIs have reflected Third Way and Communitarian influences in two separate 
ways. The first is as a form of self-help and the second is as a mechanism to 
increase opportunity.  Etzioni’s Communitarian position stated that ‘people have 
a moral responsibility to help themselves as best they can’ (Etzioni, 1995, p. 
144). New Labour has supported this idea in both rhetoric and policies. The 
establishment of a grass-roots based CDFI can be cited as an example of a 
community working to help itself and a mechanism to help others. In the 1990s 
the formation of CDFIs was a recognition that the market for loan finance had 
failed within certain communities. CDFIs could be a return of the market but in a 
more supportive and possibly intelligent form. Giddens’ Third Way suggested a 
balance between the public and private sectors (Giddens, 1998). Similarly, 
Midgley suggested using social investment to encourage small business in 
disadvantaged communities in his form of the Third Way. CDFIs will use both 
public and private investments in the form of grants and loans to supply loan 
finance to those businesses perceived as too risky by the banks. The supply of 
opportunity was a big feature in New Labour’s rhetoric and these lending 
organisations offer communities opportunity to finance, which could lead to 
wealth creation. Overall, they have been mechanisms for economic inclusion.  
 
New Labour, and especially Tony Blair, have espoused Third Way and 
Communitarian ideas and introduced policies in support of these theories. They 
have had aspirations for communities, such as wishing them to take up 
opportunities in education, employment, the creation of wealth and 
entrepreneurship. CDFIs can play a role within these aspirations by helping 
individuals into self employment or business expansion. However, New Labour, 
Third Way and Communitarian writers have expected communities to act in 
certain ways and not all communities are the same, having a range of issues.  
The expansion of the New Deal to the people aged over twenty fine years old 
highlighted the ‘complex and multi-dimensional nature of the barriers to work for 
the long term unemployed’ (Lindsay, 2002, p. 417). Even though this New Deal 
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was strongly persuasive, the barriers have stopped some from the take up of 
employment (Lindsay, 2002). On a more minor scale, people have had the 
opportunity of using CDFIs, but have not fully used their services. Possibly, the 
loans have not been attractive or barriers have appeared.  
 
New Labour’s policies have not always been joined up - to the detriment of 
CDFIs. Through the Phoenix Fund the government has given money to CDFIs 
to lend. At the same time, they established Future Builders offering a mix of 
grants and loans to social enterprises. The government created a potential 
competitor for CDFIs looking for social enterprise borrowers. Similarly, the 
government has espoused the creation of an entrepreneurial culture, and 
alternatively offered significant grant funding especially in disadvantaged 
locations. It has been reported that CDFIs have had difficulty finding sufficient 
borrowers. Potentially, entrepreneurship may have been stifled by a patchwork 
quilt of competing funding streams.  The availability of funds, both grants and 
loans has reduced the take-up of CDFI loans. 
 
The following chapter will evaluate individual CDFIs and the UK sector as a 
whole. It will look into the successes and failures of these lending organisations. 
These outcomes will have been affected both by the expectations of the CDFIs 
and the policies of the government. 
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Chapter Nine: Assessing the Value of CDFIs 
 
This final chapter aims to provide an overarching analysis of CDFIs and, in doing 
so, brings together a range of material from the earlier chapters. It also aims to 
cover more recent developments in relation to CDFIs.  By 2008 these lending 
organisations were being threatened by a range of issues:  funding was 
diminishing as government found new priorities, and CDFIs had to restate their 
case for support (Brown and Nissan, 2007; Brown, 2008; Nissan, 2008). 
However, with the ‘credit crunch’ CDFIs have found some new support and a 
renewed interest from central government.  
 
The chapter comprises four (inter-linked) narratives which cover: an evaluation 
of the contribution of CDFIs; an assessment of the problems of micro-finance in 
the UK; a review of the impact of the uneven and variable nature of government 
support; and the impact of the recession on CDFIs, and the future sustainability 
of the approach.  
 
The key message of the chapter will be that the majority of UK CDFIs are 
financially unsustainable if they only look to offer loans within a limited market. 
Their true value lies (as suggested by Third Way and Communitarian ideas) in 
being responsive to the needs of local communities and helping to reduce 
financial exclusion. They have an economic value in creating and sustaining 
employment, and investing in additional social outputs.  
 
Assessing the Contribution of UK CDFIs  
 
The Community Development Finance Association (CDFA) has attempted to 
quantify the value of the CDFI sector through its sector surveys.  Since the 
CDFA’s survey methodology has been to focus on their membership, some loan 
funds that could be thought of as CDFIs will have been overlooked.  Similarly, 
not all of the membership will have replied to the survey. The 2008 and 2009 
surveys had a response rate of over 80 percent, so some of their membership 
may have declined to complete the survey and others may have closed. 
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However, this research has helped to give the separate CDFIs coherence and 
highlight a number of key issues.  
 
In the first survey conducted in 2003 around 75 percent of respondents worked 
within one market, often micro-finance or social enterprise. They were very 
locally-based, but there were signs that with maturity expansion would occur. 
The banks were the major suppliers of capital followed by the government’s 
Phoenix Fund. While the report does not state who supplied the majority of 
revenue funding the Phoenix Fund will have played a significant role, with the 
Phoenix Challenge Fund distributing over £11 million in revenue funding (SBS, 
2005). Until recently the CDFA’s annual reports found that the majority of CDFI 
funds were from the government (CDFA, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).   
 
In 2006, the Regional Development Agencies had been given the responsibility 
for CDFIs and the funding pattern changed. Since national funding had changed 
to regional funding, so those CDFIs with national coverage faced an additional 
funding problem. In 2007 the RDAs supplied 43 percent of revenue funding and 
by 2009 this had reduced to 30 percent (CDFA, 2007a, 2009a). This was a 
genuine reduction from £2.3 million to £1.7 million (CDFA, 2009a). The other 
major sources of funds were the local economic development and business 
support schemes and corporate grants and donations (CDFA, 2009a).  
 
Over time, the individual CDFIs have developed their own sources of income 
and have created new products. In 2005 there were signs of diversification with 
50 percent of CDFIs having more than one market (CDFA, 2005). At this time, 
the established CDFIs were consolidating their positions and expanding into new 
geographical areas (CDFA, 2005). Over the decade, some CDFIs were 
expanding into different markets and new districts as the funding streams were 
becoming more localised. The CDFIs were in search of economies of scale, but 
were coming across only regional and sub-regional funding opportunities.   
 
Each year, the CDFA membership has increased their capital assets and loan 
portfolio. By 2009, the gap between capital and loans had grown to around £387 
million. Between 2008 and 2009 the membership decreased slightly, but their 
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capital assets increased by over £100 million. In 2009, just under £800 million 
was held in capital assets (Figure 6), but approximately £100 million of this was 
committed for lending (CDFA, 2009). However, Inside Out 2009 stated that 
earned and invested income made up over 50 percent of CDFI income (CDFA, 
2009a). By having large amounts of money in the bank the CDFIs have become 
more financially sustainable.  
 
Figure 6: The Growth of Funds within the CDFA Membership 
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Figure 7 shows the number of charter members and members in the CDFA has 
also grown each year. However, the number of associates peaked in 2006. 
Broadly, the charter members were just CDFIs, whereas the members were a 
combination of CDFIs and business support agencies. The associates were 
even more mixed with CDFIs, loan funds, support agencies and even some 
housing trusts (figure 7). The previous mapping chapter and appendix 1 display 
evidence that many of the membership had additional roles. Some organisations 
were involved in business support, training or property management and have a 
loan fund. Some CDFIs especially the national lenders were more focused on 
solely lending.  
 
In 2006, associate membership reached its highest level, which was also the 
point when revenue funding for CDFIs through the Phoenix Fund closed. Some 
organisations may have moved into another membership category and others 
may have ceased their membership. In 2009 the CDFA’s Inside Out did not give 
a breakdown of members, but mentioned sending out 68 surveys. Their overall 
membership had diminished by a small number during the year (CDFA, 2009a).  
 
Table 14: CDFI Impacts as of 2009    * Since 2003 
 2007 2008 2009 Cumulative 
total 
Number of individuals 
financed 
3,726 
 
6,869 
 
8,794 25,832* 
 
Number of businesses 
financed 
1,599 
 
1,379 
 
2,143 9,148* 
 
Number of jobs 
sustained 
1,964 
 
2,321 
 
4,762 75,706 
 
Number of jobs 
created 
2,601 
 
1,567 
 
5055 20,884 
 
Total value of loans 
made £m 
£104.8 
 
£76.0 
 
£113.1 £474.0* 
 
Total value of funds 
levered £m 
£46.5 
 
£35.6 
 
£126.5 £492.4 
 
Source: Outside Out, 2008 and 2009: The State of Community Development 
Finance, CDFA      
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The table 14 illustrates the impacts of the CDFI sector up to 2009. The 
cumulative results are interesting in that around 96,000 jobs have either been 
created or sustained by the actions of the CDFIs. These employment figures 
may go back to the start of some organisations, with the Aston Reinvestment 
Trust beginning in 1997. Similarly, the cumulative total of loans includes both 
business and personal finance. In terms of the UK economy these figures are 
miniscule, but their importance comes from the fact that each entrepreneur or 
borrower was denied bank finance. Almost £500 million cumulatively has been 
borrowed by the financially excluded. 
 
Arguably, table 14 only supplies part of the story, i.e. the economic aspect. 
Ignoring the personal finance, a rough calculation shows that for each job 
created or sustained, £4,900 was borrowed. For each £1 borrowed another 
£1.04 was levered into the business. One figure that has not appeared 
anywhere would be how much revenue funding was needed to create or sustain 
a job. In interviews, loan managers mentioned visiting potential borrowers at 
least once. The visits and additional support work would be dependent on the 
quality of the potential borrower. Since the borrower had been rejected by the 
banking sector some additional work would be necessary, which would add to 
costs.  
   
Apart from employment, there would also have been additional social benefits 
produced.  The lenders could be in disadvantaged areas and the input of finance 
could have a great social and economic significance. During an interview with 
Street North East we discussed the gender and ethnicity of their borrowers. The 
organisation was inclusive and their borrowers came from a range of ethnic 
backgrounds. The original Street UK was opening up an area of hidden 
entrepreneurship and helping the grey economy become legal (Williams, 2006). 
The first Street UK manager in Newcastle when asked about the grey or black 
economy stated: 
 
Yes, that is who we’re aiming at. You get an awful lot of people 
signing on and perhaps working part-time and would very much like 
to go legitimate, but it is a big step (Mackey, 2002).  
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The manager was gaining knowledge of benefits and the New Deal for the Self 
Employed to help potential borrowers become legitimate. In 2004 at a 
presentation John Hall of Street UK stated that becoming legitimate was a 
prerequisite of gaining loan finance. An element of Street UK’s and North East’s 
work was getting people off benefits and legitimising their businesses. Aspire, 
another micro-finance organisation, found 75 percent of their loans were in the 
most deprived areas of Belfast and London Derry (CDFA, 2004). Both the 
Triodos and Charity banks have used case studies in their annual reports to 
emphasize their social benefits. 
 
One of the problems with the CDFA’s figures is that they rely heavily on two 
organisations, the Triodos and Charity Banks. In their most recent reports 
Triodos Bank (UK and Ireland) had lent £23 million and the Charity Bank almost 
£12 million (Triodos, 2009; Charity Bank, 2009). Many of the loans made in 
2008/09 came from these organisations. This left over 60 CDFIs with the 
remaining loan portfolio. Potentially, the growth within these two main CDFIs 
could be camouflaging the difficulties of others. 
 
In both the UK and the USA the evidence strongly suggested increased interest 
and usage of CDFIs caused by the recession (CDFA, 2009; CDFI Fund 2009). 
In the UK, the loan portfolio increased even though the number of CDFI 
decreased (CDFA, 2009). Demand for loans increased in the UK and USA, 
because businesses were being rejected by their banks (CDFA, 2009a; Vik, 
2009). During 2009, it was suggested that CDFIs did not have the capacity to 
meet the demand for loans due to being risk adverse (CDFA, 2009a). Since the 
CDFIs had large amounts of money in the banks there could be a complex 
range of issues. For instance, the quality of the businesses looking for loans 
could be problematic. As with previous years the CDFA supported their 
membership with a call for increased levels of revenue and capital funds. 
 
The individual RDAs may have addressed the call for increased grant funding 
from the CDFIs on a regional basis. Central government have been acutely 
aware of the ‘credit crunch’ and problems with business finance and have 
allowed CDFIs to join a loan guarantee scheme and contributed another £5 
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million to capital funding (Cabinet Office, 2009). This funding and the loan 
guarantee scheme could indicate that CDFIs were back on the national agenda. 
The government’s renewed interest in business financial exclusion has brought 
new opportunities for CDFIs.  
 
Overall, from annual growth in loans and capital assets the CDFI sector tend to 
be performing adequately and gaining stability each year. The UK branch of the 
Triodos Bank with large amounts out on loan will have been influential in 
creating a positive picture. The Triodos Bank would be earning interest from 
borrowers and investments to help them cover costs. The smaller CDFIs would 
be more dependent on revenue grants and other sources of income.  All these 
lending organisations have had to watch their costs and default rate to preserve 
their businesses. Alternatively, they could diversify and supply a portfolio of 
products and services to bring in additional income.  
 
The following section will critically discuss two CDFIs that have had high 
expectations but problems with their costs. Both these micro-finance lenders 
anticipated higher demand than what was really there. Their funders found the 
lack of loans problematic because of the amounts they had invested in revenue 
and capital grants. The problems of the two lenders highlight the difficulties in 
transferring micro-finance from the developing to the developed world.       
 
Assessing UK micro-finance 
 
Over the last decade, a number of CDFIs have ceased or changed dramatically. 
The following section will analyse two micro-finance organisations that 
experienced problems.   
 
Micro-finance has been an important product on offer by CDFIs (CDFA, 2003; 
2008; 2009). This form of finance has been successful in the developing world 
(Jain, 1996; Schreiner, 20002; 2003). In rural and urban Canada micro-finance 
has had mixed results (Frankiewicz, 2001). In the disadvantaged areas of 
Toronto the Calmeadow Metro Fund tried various ways to create an economy of 
scale, but their costs and defaults were too high (Frankiewicz, 2001).  However, 
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in Eastern Europe micro-finance experienced some success (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2000; 2007; Hartarska, 2005). Originally the driving force 
of Street UK, Rosalind Copisarow worked for the Polish-American Enterprise 
Fund. With a finance background the Fund allowed her to rethink: 
  
‘from first principles what banking really ought to be about, but it also 
allowed me to test in practice the validity of some growing convictions 
that had gradually taken root in my mind over the course of my career in 
commercial lending.’ (Copisarow, 2001, p. 53) 
 
The Fundusz Mikro (funded by the Polish-American Enterprise Fund) over four 
years lent $25 million in over 25,000 loans and produced a 98 percent 
repayment rate. Copisarow was hesitant to conclude that this form of micro-
finance could work across the whole of Europe, but suggested that there was a 
need to re-revaluate the premise that it would not work in the developed North. 
She set out a range of borrowing issues affecting micro-enterprises (businesses 
employing less than ten people), such as the need for small loans of around 
£3,000 in the UK, the speed of the process and finding the correct interest rate. 
However, Copisarow (2001) also recognised a mismatch between the issues of 
the borrower and the legislation affecting the lender. Some of the measures, 
she suggested, were the ability to take deposits, lend borrowed funds, lend out 
100 percent of the loan capital (even on unsecured loans) and forming a mutual 
society.  
 
Rosalind Copisarow was unable to repeat her previous success in Poland. As 
mentioned in an earlier chapter, Street UK’s main funding source, the EFF 
decided to review the organisation and eventually stopped their funding. NEF 
had long been a supporter of CDFIs, publishing a series of documents about 
the potential of these lending organisations (Mayo et al., 1998), and was 
contracted to evaluate Street UK’s successes and failures. 
 
Before NEF published their evaluation, Street UK put out their own document 
(Copisarow, 2004). In the foreword Maria Nowak from the French organisation 
ADIE stated: 
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‘what micro-finance is about – empowering people with hand-ups 
rather than hand-outs, and providing a sustainable solution to global 
poverty and financial exclusion’ (Nowak, 2004, p. 4).  
 
She suggested that at a European level policy and regulation made it more 
difficult for micro-entrepreneurs and micro-finance organisations. Copisarow 
found the potential borrowers lacked essential financial literacy skills and 
additional work was necessary (Copisarow, 2004). In one of the pilot stages 
there were high delinquency rates and the culture of group loans had not 
worked either. It would seem that in the UK environment micro-finance was not 
about ‘empowering people with hand-ups’. There was not the same relationship 
between the lender and the borrowers as in the developing world such as 
Bangladesh.   
 
Street UK had a series of difficulties such as: 
• Getting insufficient funding; 
• There was little support for its merger with Unltd (mentioned in the earlier 
case study); 
• And it was also rejected by the Phoenix Fund for a national CDFI grant 
(Copisarow, 2004).  
 
The combination of potential borrowers with limited financial literacy, a lack of 
additional funding and legislation for micro-entrepreneurs all worked against 
Street UK. Copisarow in the report accepted that micro-finance was 
unsustainable in the UK with a single loan product.   
 
 In 2005 the funding body EFF published the NEF evaluation of Street UK and 
then produced a report into Aspire, a Belfast based micro-finance lender 
(Forster et al., 2006). This time EFF got the CDFA to carry the research into 
Aspire and in both cases the authors have been supportive of CDFIs. Both 
reports provide a number of insights and lessons.   
 
The NEF report found that there was limited demand for micro-finance, but 
more positively there was need for business support and Street UK’s services 
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were valued highly by its customers. Similarly, Aspire had effective risk 
management and developed a transferable information technology system that 
could be sold to other CDFIs. At a social impact level it had carried out 
successful outreach work.  
 
Street UK’s original aim was to create a national lender with 20,000 clients and 
a loan portfolio of £40 million over a seven year period. After three years it had 
achieved only 259 loans and had a loan portfolio of £320,000. However, it had 
made £600,000 in loans, so money had been repaid and potentially recycled. 
NEF stated that ‘this was less than the initial targets for this phase, which were 
over-ambitious’ (NEF, 2005, p.3). Potentially, Aspire was more successful 
distributing £1.5 million to 400 borrowers, but again it had over estimated 
demand significantly (Forster et al., 2006).  In an earlier evaluation of Aspire by 
Colin Stutt Consulting it was noted that: 
 
‘Ultimately, the evaluation shows that Aspire is an effective, 
innovative and world class micro-finance institution. It delivers pivotal 
resources, both financial and technical, which have helped to liberate 
the economies of some of the most disadvantaged areas, sectors 
and clients in Northern Ireland’  (Colin Stutt Consulting, 2004, pp. 48 
– 49).  
 
However the evidence also showed that: 
 
‘the small size of the fund, the technical intensity of the work and 
associated transaction costs, staff turnover and the limits to 
developing a deal flow capable of producing sustainable yield are 
important structural problems to the development of the fund’ (Colin 
Stutt Consulting, 2004, p. 42).  
 
Similarly, NEF were critical of the micro-finance model explaining there was 
insufficient demand and therefore low volumes of fees and interest. As with 
previous reports about CDFIs, both evaluations looked towards the USA. It 
found that micro-finance had not been sustainable in North America and CDFIs 
had diversified to increase the size of their loan funds. In Street UK’s case, 
micro-enterprises needed more business support, which would cost time and 
money. NEF suggested that a contract with Business Link would be beneficial. 
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From interviews for the thesis with Street UK and later Street NE there was 
verification that paid business support would be necessary. The Street UK 
workers had to check the potential borrower’s income, calculate how much they 
could repay and make sure the business was stable. These negotiations would 
involve developing capacity in business planning, which incurred costs. 
 
In the North East, the initial Street UK worker tried to introduce peer group 
lending, which meant educating individuals to form groups. The worker wished 
to get a collection of micro-businesses to borrow and be responsible for each 
others loans. The group of micro-business owners would legally guarantee each 
others loans and peer pressure would be used to avoid defaults. This was 
abandoned, because it was an alien concept to many potential borrowers and 
took a long time to set up. Earlier in Canada, Calmeadow had tried introducing 
peer group lending and found it problematic. It also attempted to shorten its loan 
procedures and gained more clients, plus higher levels of defaults (Frankiewicz, 
2001). There had to be a balance between successfully working with the clients 
and the costs.    
  
Examining Aspire, the CDFA recommended that CDFIs have realistic targets 
and funders needed to agree on expectations and be patient as performance 
increased. The NEF report suggested that the experience of Street UK was part 
of a process of experimentation and innovation for the CDFI sector. The CDFA 
viewed Aspire as a pioneer and it was a ‘new era of product and organisational 
innovation and developing new business models’ (Forster et al., 2006, p. 4). 
Aspire has continued to trade and Street UK was spilt into two organisations. 
One based in Birmingham, Street UK, focussing on personal finance and debt 
advice and Street NE continued with micro-finance in the North East. In an 
interview with Street NE in 2007 the staff stated they had made some progress 
in moving towards covering more of their costs, but knew they could never 
reach a critical mass to become completely financially sustainable.  
 
It should be noted that in Newcastle, Project North East had a long established 
loan fund for young entrepreneurs and had received Phoenix Fund monies for 
another micro-business fund (the Challenge Fund) and for business support 
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(the Development Fund). Similarly, in Birmingham ART was lending similar 
amounts (under £10,000). So there could have an element of competition in the 
cities of Newcastle and Birmingham. However, at the same time as Street UK 
and Aspire were having problems, the United Nations announced 2005 as the 
International Year of Micro-Credit and was announcing some success (UN, 
2005). Similar to the UK, the UN was discussing ‘how or if they should subsidize 
the provision of financial services to poor people’ and finding there was ‘no 
simple answer’ (UN, 2005, p.6). Even in the developing world financial 
sustainability through micro-finance loans was not guaranteed.   
  
The lack of success of these two organisations, the discontinuation of the 
Phoenix Fund and the devolution of responsibility to RDAs, greatly affected the 
CDFI sector. The optimism of the early 2000s was replaced with the realisation 
that funding was becoming scarce. For example, in 2003 the Phoenix Fund 
distributed £42 million to 63 CDFIs and in 2006 the RDAs received £11 million 
for the transition (figures taken from Brown, 2008).   
 
Variations in Support and Funding 
 
As highlighted in an earlier chapter, the government established potential 
competition for CDFI loans. In late 2003, a consortium made up of Charity 
Bank, Unity Trust Bank, National Council for Voluntary Organisations and the 
NRF won the tender to run the Future Builders Fund. This fund offered an initial 
grant and then a loan to Third Sector organisations wishing to take up public 
service contracts. These were seen as social investments to be repaid. As of 
2009, the government had a new organisation, the Social Investment Business 
running the Future Builders and three other funds worth £394.5 million. This 
funding was in a combination of loans and smaller grants to Third Sector 
organisations including social enterprises to help them compete for public and 
health sector contracts. This was broken down into: 
• £215 million Future Builders Fund; 
• £100 million Social Enterprise Investment Fund; 
• £70 million Community Builders Fund; 
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• £9.5 million Modernisation Fund. 
 Source: The Social Investment Business website 
 
Similarly, CDFIs were receiving social investments through the Community 
Investment Tax Relief (CITR). By 2008, £52 million had been attracted to CDFIs 
through this method (CDFA, 2008). This was capital funding, so CDFIs were 
seeking their revenue funding from the RDAs, local government and charitable 
foundations (CDFA, 2008; 2009).  
 
When the government announced the end of the Phoenix and the transfer of 
responsibility to the RDAs, the CDFA found this highly problematic. Within the 
regeneration and social enterprise press, the change to the Phoenix Fund was 
significantly reported when it was announced (West and Palmer, 2004; Palmer, 
2004; Regeneration, 2004). The Phoenix Fund was seen as ‘the lifeblood for a 
large chunk of the sector’ (Palmer, 2004, p. 12). Bernie Morgan, chief executive 
of the CDFA: 
 
‘warned that being relatively young, the sector would need several 
more years of government funding before it was self-sustaining’ 
(Regeneration and Renewal, 2004, p. 1). 
 
She stated: 
 
Some RDAs are good, but others are less tied into the agenda. 
CDFIs are also vulnerable to the changing policies of RDAs. Even 
those that support them now might not in several years’ 
(Regeneration and Renewal, 2004, p. 1). 
 
At the same time, both the Newcastle based NRF and the EFF were looking to 
make social investments through loans rather than grants where appropriate 
(NRF, 2005; EEF, 2006; 2007). The NRF was influenced to establish their 
Building Better Lenders loan scheme after a CDFA study visit to the USA (NRF, 
2006). With these changes CDFI had to rethink their aims.    
 
After the various UK micro-finance reports, a subsequent research report into 
local enterprise agencies with loan funds found a more positive overall picture 
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of micro-finance (Irwin, 2006). This research partially funded by the EFF used 
information from local enterprise agencies some of which were members of the 
CDFA. It was found that there were barriers to young people getting business 
loans and for these borrowers micro-finance organisations were more important 
than the banks. However, micro-finance helped to lever in additional finance 
from commercial sources. Loans created social and economic benefits, but the 
cost of the most expensive loan was £1.23 to lend £1. It was costing a lending 
organisation over £1 to lend £1, which would be financially unsustainable in the 
long term. Irwin (2006) measured the median value and found it cost CDFIs 
thirty-two pence to lend £1. This central value indicates that lenders would have 
to charge over 30 percent interest to cover their costs. Nevertheless the report 
saw micro-finance as a valuable element of business support, rather than visa-
versa. Without the combination of support and finance some businesses would 
not be able to start (Irwin, 2006).   
 
In the same year, a Treasury Committee hearing collated CDFI information and 
gathered representatives from the sector. Derby Loans explained that his 
organisation was covering 60 percent of their overhead costs (House of 
Commons, 2006). Derby Loans benefits were both financial and social with 
money being circulated around the community. The committee asked about 
door step lending, basic bank accounts, personal debt and home improvement 
loans, which were not areas fully applicable to CDFIs. It is uncertain how 
successful the presentation of evidence was for the sector.  
 
Between 2004 to 2007 there were debates about the future of funding for CDFIs 
and at times there have been signs of additional funding being given to the 
sector. Established in November 2005 the Commission on Unclaimed Assets 
(CUA) was chaired by Sir Ronald Cohen, who had previously been heavily 
involved in the SITF. As stated on the website the CUA aimed: 
 
to propose recommendations for the use of monies in financial 
institutions in the UK that have been untouched by their owners for a 
considerable period of time’ (CUA, 2005). 
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The consultation went out to Third Sector organisations including CDFIs, 
charities and social enterprises. The CDFA and some CDFIs contributed to the 
consultation. The results of the consultation took over a year to appear and 
were published in 2007. It suggested the idea of a social investment bank to aid 
the Third Sector. The report stated: 
 
‘To be effective and able to operate credibly in capital markets, the 
Social Investment Bank will need founding capital of at least £250 
million, with an annual income stream of £20 million for a minimum of 
four years’ (CUA, 2007, p.1). 
 
The Social Investment Bank would undertake four initial activities:  
 
1. ‘Capitalise present financial intermediaries and fill gaps in the 
marketplace where lack of capital is restricting social impact;  
2. Develop the provision of advice, support and higher -risk investment 
so as to accelerate the growth of demand for repayable finance; 
3. Develop programmes of sustained investment in specific markets 
such as community regeneration and financial inclusion; 
4. Support existing and new intermediaries in their efforts to raise 
private capital. These activities should attract significant additional 
finance into the sector’ (CUA, 2007, p.1). 
 
Potentially, things looked quite positive for CDFIs with this report. The CUA 
chairman Ronald Cohen stated the report offered: 
 
‘A unique opportunity exists to create a new Social Investment Bank 
to act as a bridge between the social and financial communities’ 
(BBC, 2007).  
 
The optimism of the chairman was misplaced and the H M Treasury announced 
that the Financial Services Authority would retain unclaimed assets and attempt 
to contact the owners and in a press release it was announced: 
 
‘The rest of the money will be reinvested in the community, with the 
focus in England on funding youth services, particularly places for 
young people to go, financial capability, financial inclusion and, 
resources permitting, social investment. The Bill allows Ministers in 
the Devolved Administrations to determine the distribution priorities 
in their areas’ (HM Treasury, 2007).  
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So in November 2007 these funds were going to a range of organisations with 
social objectives including financial inclusion. However, things were not as clear 
cut as the proposal seemed to indicate. In terms of political actions the Social 
Investment Bank idea seemed to disappear during 2008. NEF still promoted the 
idea in support of CDFIs (Brown and Nissan, 2007). The dynamism of 
government policy and the CDFI sector working together faded during this mid 
period.  
 
In later research, NEF highlighted that it was a critical time for CDFIs with policy 
makers questioning whether they had they fulfilled the initial expectations 
(Brown and Nissan, 2007).  The research used interviews and a survey to 
assess the opinions of the CDFIs, banks, donors and policy makers, which 
produced a series of positive results, but also allowed some critical issues to 
emerge. In the survey, participants used a Likert scale to give their levels of 
agreement and importance to a series of statements. Over 80 percent of 
respondents thought that CDFIs had a positive impact on revitalising a 
disadvantaged area and 90 percent believed with the right amount of funding 
they could be ‘big enough to have a significant impact on enterprise in 
disadvantaged communities’ (Brown and Nissan, 2007, p.3).    
 
On the negative side, it was found that demand was lower than expected, but 
other issues such as the investment readiness of the potential borrowers and 
the provision of business support were influential factors. There was an amount 
of development work to convert an enterprise into ‘a viable loan’ that had not 
been accounted for (Brown and Nissan, 2007, p.20). Many CDFIs offered free 
business support to address the multiple deficiencies of ‘poor financial literacy, 
limited business skills and a lack of investment readiness’ (Brown and Nissan, 
2007, p.21).  Similarly, public funding was inadequate and some CDFIs thought 
that the Phoenix Fund had ended too early. Other CDFIs (who had developed a 
diverse range of funding) were not damaged by the closure of the Phoenix 
Fund. CDFIs suggested that there was ‘instability of public policy’ and funding 
had ceased before organisations matured (Brown and Nissan, 2007, p.22).  
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Importantly, it was found there were issues around funding with less than 5 
percent believing that the Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) provided 
appropriate funding. This meant one of the government’s main policies to bring 
investment into CDFIs was failing to achieve its goals. The initial expectations 
for CDFIs had resulted in an element of disillusionment amongst the donors, 
policy-makers and investors (Brown and Nissan, 2007). Over half of 
respondents thought that the devolution of responsibility to the RDAs had a 
negative impact (Brown and Nissan, 2007). The devolution of funding may have 
impeded expansionist CDFIs from spreading across a series of RDAs. In the 
recommendations, the CDFIs wanted both a national fund and long term 
funding. The research recommended unclaimed assets to support a ‘Social 
Investment Bank’ to help finance CDFIs (Brown and Nissan, 2007, p. 70). 
 
These lenders have complained about their funding and questioned one of their 
main aims. Previously, NEF, individual CDFIs and the CDFA had asserted their 
aim was to be sustainable. However, this report stated ‘their social purpose 
means that many cannot be, and never will be, completely sustainable’ (Brown 
and Nissan, 2007, p. 3). Financial sustainability bought the benefit of 
independence, but amongst respondents there was ‘no consensus on whether 
sustainability is achievable and desirable’ (Brown and Nissan, 2007, p. 27). 
Similarly, recent research from the USA found that a small sample of CDFIs did 
not know if financial sustainability was ‘possible or even desirable’ (Vik, 2009, p. 
5). Since these lenders were working with entrepreneurs excluded from bank 
finance there would be a higher default rate, less financial and more social 
benefits. The issue of sustainability has been problematic for the CDFA and the 
annual conference, Systems for Sustainability (2006) even had a debate called 
‘CDFIs should never be sustainable.’ In the CDFA’s annual report Inside Out 
(2008) it had dropped the word ‘sustainable’ from the definition of a CDFI.  
However, in 2010 the CDFA’s website still stated that ‘CDFIs are sustainable, 
independent organisations which provide financial services’ (CDFA, 2010). In 
2010 the CFS at Salford University recognised that CDFIs dealing in micro-
finance were not sustainable (Dayson et al., 2010). 
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CDFIs feared that policy makers were becoming disinterested in them (Brown 
and Nissan, 2007).  In 2008, NEF published another two reports raising similar 
issues, but keeping CDFIs on the political agenda. In one report the author, 
Jessica Brown returned to thinking about the issues raised by the SITF in 2000. 
She found that the ‘architecture for a social investment market’ was incomplete 
(Brown, 2008, p.3) and suggested that public funding had been too short term 
and inconsistent. Brown’s research was based on 24 interviews and found that 
some of the interviewees thought that social investment should be differentiated 
from bank finance. Radically, she suggested that:  
 
‘social investors should focus on high risk, unsecured lending and 
equity investment in social enterprises to avoid overlapping with 
traditional bank finance’ (Brown, 2008, p. 18).  
 
The report suggested that organisations aiming to be sustainable lenders had 
moved too close to the mainstream. This perspective could be problematic 
since some charitable foundations were looking to supply loans rather than 
grants to CDFIs.   
 
In the larger NEF report, UK CDFIs – From surviving to thriving, there was a call 
for a political ‘champion’ and concern expressed that CDFIs were going to 
withdraw from the micro-finance market (Thiel and Nissan, 2008). This report 
recognised that only certain CDFIs would be sustainable and funding from 
private sector investment ‘potentially threatened the social outreach’ (Thiel and 
Nissan, 2008, p. 2). Unlike other reports, the recommendations were to the 
CDFA, government, the RDAs and local authorities, banks and CDFIs 
themselves. It was recommended that both the government and CDFIs look for 
social impacts as well as financial returns.  
 
The reports from 2008 were published before the advent of recession and built 
on NEF’s interest in both CDFIs and social impacts (Raynard and Murphy, 2000 
and NEF, 2004). All of the reports show a general dissatisfaction with the 
funding streams. Brown’s comment that CDFIs were becoming too mainstream, 
both highlights potential mission drift and the need to be sustainable. 
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Assessing the future of CDFIs 
 
The government’s interest and support for CDFIs has been sporadic and 
uneven.  In 2001 Paul Boateng, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, spoke 
at the CDFA conference and Gordon Brown announced the consultation into 
CITR. In 2002 the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, invested in the Charity 
Bank. At the City Growth Strategies Forum, Gordon Brown revealed in his 
speech that: 
 
‘increased funding for the Phoenix Fund - providing support to 
thousands of small businesses with special help for women and 
ethnic minorities who face additional barriers to enterprise’ (HM 
Treasury, 2003). 
 
Later in the same speech -  after mentioning Bridges Community Ventures - he 
stated: 
 
‘And just as we are working with local authorities and regional 
development agencies to develop these enterprise areas – so too we 
need to make use of the creativity and flexibility that the private 
sector can bring.’ (HM Treasury, 2003). 
 
His speech promoted enterprise for all and that he wished to use both the public 
and private sectors. However, the speech also indicated a greater role for local 
and regional public agencies in supporting enterprise growth. 
 
In 2006, the responsibility for CDFIs was transferred to the RDAs and these 
lenders were no longer of interest to the national government. By 2009, things 
may have changed again. In the USA, President Obama had requested a 127 
percent increase for the year 2010 (Vik, 2009). Similarly, in the UK there was 
recognition of CDFI by the government. In a press release the Secretary of 
State for Business, Lord Mandelson announced: 
 
 ‘Community Development Finance Institutions play an extremely 
important role supporting small businesses and social enterprises in 
disadvantaged areas’ (Cabinet Office, 2009). 
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He promised their further involvement in the loan guarantee scheme and £5 
million additional loan funding.  
 
During 2008 the proposal of a Social Investment Bank seemed to fade from 
government policy, but with the recession things would change. In July 2009 the 
Office of the Third Sector introduced a second consultation, this time for a 
Social Investment Wholesale Bank (OTS, 2009). This report built on the work of 
the SITF from nine years previously and the Commission on Unclaimed Assets. 
The consultation: 
 
‘noted the importance placed on developing diverse sources of 
funding for the Third Sector, such as debt finance, quasi-equity and 
equity, and that grants remain crucial for many organisations, 
particularly small, grassroots bodies’ (OTS, 2009a, p.7). 
 
It did not ignore grant funding but was offering a range of funding types. The 
consultation questioned the structure of the proposed Social Investment 
Wholesale Bank  (SIWB) and would work with other organisations. In December 
2009 the responses to the consulation were summarised (OTS, 2009b). Liam 
Byrne, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury suggested they would be engaging 
with potential providers by the time of the 2010 Budget. Even after the 
consultation the structure was unceratin and the government had a vision of the 
SIWB as: 
 
‘a mission-driven, independent financial institution that operatives at 
a wholesale level to stimulate and support the development and 
sustainable social investment market in the UK, working through 
existing and new financial intermediaries’ (OTS, 2009b, p. 6). 
 
Investment was going to CDFIs and credit unions. However, the consultation 
suggested that ‘new financial intermediaries’ could be attracted to be brought in 
to administer funds. This would be problematic for existing CDFIs looking for 
funds. In the end this fund or SIWB could end up being similar to the Phoenix 
Fund with: 
• New entrants into the CDFI market; 
• CDFIs wanting revenue funding not capital funds; 
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• CDFIs finding insufficient demand for loans. 
 
In early 2010 the funding for the SIWB was vague. In 2007 the Commission for 
Unclaimed Assets proposed that the bank would be worth £250 million. The 
bank would be given £20 million per annum for four years for running costs 
(CUA, 2007). However, current literature has not been that exact, but CDFIs 
seems to be back on the agenda for many of the political parties. 
  
During a Parliamentary regional committee in 2009 looking at Advantage West 
Midlands, its Chief Executive, Mick Laverty stated that: 
 
‘We have put an additional amount of money into community 
development finance institutions—from memory, somewhere around 
£2.3 million. It has enabled them to increase the number and amount 
of loans that they are making. Regular interaction with them means 
that we understand what they are doing. We understand where they 
are making the loans, and that there is coverage right across the 
region. At this moment in time, all of them still have money to lend.’ 
(House of Commons, 2009, question 239).  
 
Previously, there was not universal coverage, but the RDA had rectified that.  
Again, illustrating a revival in interest in CDFIs, the MPs Mark Field 
(Conservative), Annette Brooke (Liberal Democrat) and Lindsay Hoyle (Labour) 
discussed the social and economic impacts of micro-finance early in 2010 
(House of Commons, 2010).  
 
Currently, there seems to be sufficient signs from national government and the 
RDAs that CDFIs will be supported in the future. However, this could be an 
opportunity to address the issue that the majority of these lenders will not be 
financially sustainable. The Triodos Bank has been an exception by being 
national and international and having large scale funds (compared with city wide 
and regional lenders). New Labour has had an agenda of localism (Ellison and 
Ellison, 2006; Rao, 2000; Deas and Ward, 2000), which allowed them to 
transfer responsibility for CDFIs to the RDAs and local authorities. This policy 
may have restricted the size of an organisation to a region or city and hindered 
any chances of creating economies of scale. NEF found that the funding 
became local before the CDFI sector matured (Nissan, 2008; Brown, 2008). 
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The CDFIs through reports and their association have always found issues with 
funding, for example the CITR was not suitable for small scale lenders and it 
was capital rather then revenue funding. Potentially, this dissatisfaction with 
funding will continue, but CDFIs and their supporters need to explore and 
promote their benefits. 
 
The Value of CDFIs: Local and Regional Lessons  
 
This section will look at the changing regional picture in the North East, and 
undertake a comparative analysis of themes occurring across other regions. 
Data collected for this thesis included a series of semi-structured interviews and 
telephone interviews with representatives from many of the lending 
organisations in the North East of England. The Street North East and the 
Community Loan Fund North East (CLFNE) staff were interviewed during the 
initial research period and again in 2007. The snowball sampling methodology 
was successfully used to gain interviewees.     
 
North East CDFIs 
 
In the North East region, five organisations received grant funding from the 
Phoenix Challenge Fund. Five Lamps is based in Thornaby on Teesside and 
both the North East Social Enterprise Partnership (NESEP) and Project North 
East (PNE) worked across the region. The Northern Oak Credit Union was 
situated in North Tyneside and the South East Northumberland Enterprise Trust 
worked around the Ashington area. Table 15 shows that the region received 
£0.7 million in revenue and £1.4 million in capital funding.  
 
Table 15: The Regional Figures for the Phoenix Challenge Fund 
North East Region Revenue Capital Total 
Five Lamps  £165,000 £200,000 £365,000 
North East Social Enterprise 
Partnership  £297,500 £500,000 £797,500 
Northern Oak Credit Union £20,000 £250,000 £270,000 
Project North East  £140,000 £300,000 £440,000 
South East Northumberland 
Enterprise Trust   £90,000 £200,000 £290,000 
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Totals  £712,500 £1,450,000 £2,162,500 
Source: The Small Business Service 
 
The Five Lamps organisation existed as business and community development 
organisation before it received the addition of the loan fund. It received a large 
amount of revenue compared to capital funding reflecting its development role. 
In 2009 it was still making loans and a member of the CDFA. In 2007 it attracted 
another £137,800 from the NRF to support its financial exclusion work (NFR, 
2007). The Northern Oak Credit Union (NOCU) was interviewed, but was not 
lending at that time. Since it only received £20,000 in revenue funding it could 
not employ anyone or produce publicity materials. Eventually, it was able to 
access funds from the NRF to pay for a worker. However, its core area of work 
has always been personal finance through the credit union with paid and 
voluntary staff. 
 
Both SENET and PNE were business support organisations. PNE had 
experience of soft loan funds and ran a loan fund for young people funded by 
Shell. When I interviewed Richard Clark of PNE the organisation linked their 
loans with the business training courses, which they were contracted to run. 
The company had a mixed portfolio of income including rented work space and 
contracts to supply business support. Their Phoenix Fund money was targeted 
on getting the unemployed, single parents and ethnic minorities to make a fresh 
start (PNE, 2005). Since it was a business development agency, it bid for 
support funding and received twice as much capital as revenue funding.  The 
PNE website offered: 
 
 ‘extensive practical support for people who haven’t considered self-
employment before’ and ‘step-by-step support with preparation for a 
new business start up including market research, business 
planning, loan applications, locating premises etc’ (PNE, 2005). 
 
When I asked PNE about sustainability the organisation expected their loan 
funds to be recycled for around ten years. They did not expect their young 
borrowers to have any security, so eventually the losses would be too great to 
continue. PNE has remained a member of the CDFA, but lending is only part of 
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their work. SENET was mainly a business support agency working in the 
Wansbeck district. It joined the CDFA, but has now ceased to exist. With 
changes in funding such as the introduction of Local Economic Growth Initiative 
(LEGI) business support moved to the Go Wansbeck project. Thus, the area still 
has a loan fund, but not a CDFI.       
 
NESEP is a networking organisation for social enterprise. It used the funding to 
support CapitaliSE mentioned earlier in connection with the Community Loan 
Fund North East (CLFNE). The combination of CapitaliSE and CLFNE working 
together has allowed more loan applications to be successful.  CapitaliSE gave 
additional support and planning to businesses applying to CLFNE. Importantly, 
it filtered out the social enterprises that were unable to support a loan.    
    
Of these organisations, PNE, Five Lamps, SENET and another organisation 
Financial Inclusion Newcastle (FIN) joined the CFDA. FIN was a business 
support and personal finance organisation directly linked to the credit unions in 
the city. Both SENET and FIN ceased their membership in the CDFA after their 
funding streams altered. In 2009 the Spirit of Enterprise Loan Fund was a 
member of the CDFA and was supplying loans to disabled people in the region.   
 
By re-examining the figures in table 15 the grants from the Phoenix Fund would 
be unlikely to bring about long term financial sustainability. As a guide, both 
PNE and NOCU had an interest rate of 10 percent, so the majority of these 
funds if fully utilised the interest from the loans would be unable to pay for a 
loan manager. Additional grant funding would be essential to sustain an 
employee and running costs. The regional funding was only part of the picture 
however, and the government funded a series of national and multi-region 
lenders (table 16). Some of these additional funds would have an influence in 
the region.  
 
Potentially, PRIME supplying loans to over 50s and Business in Prisons (in 
table 16) could have made some loans in the region. From the case studies, the 
national Local Investment Fund would match fund with its North East branch to 
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give joint loans. The money given to Street UK may have funded part of their 
North East branch before the split into the two organisations. 
 
Table 16: The National and Multi-Regional Figures for the Phoenix Challenge 
Fund 
National and Multi-Regional Funding Amount 
BigInvest £250,000 
Business in Prisons £455,000 
Local Investment Fund £500,000 
PRIME £1,373,858 
Street UK £630,000 
 £3,208,858 
Source: The Small Business Service 
 
The NRF has also contributed to the potential figures for the region. It gave 
Street NE and the Community Loan Fund North East loan funds of £250,000 
and £300,000 respectively (NRF, 2006). One North East, the RDA, has also 
contributed to CDFIs in the region and for a number of years had a micro-
finance loan scheme. In 2008/09, Entrust (another business support agency) 
absorbed Street NE and FIN (mentioned above as a member of the CDFA) into 
its organisation. In 2009, Entrust ran the Street NE brand, but also had a 
separate contract to run a £1.8 million loan fund. The RDA’s fund called the 
Regional Enterprise Loan Fund offered finance from £3,000 up to £25,000 
(Entrust, 2009).  PNE, NOCU and Five Lamps did not lend up to this level, so 
this product was slightly different.  
 
Table 17: Phoenix Fund Regional Grants 
 Revenue Capital Total 
North East £712,500 £1,450,000 £2,162,500 
North West £1,092,889 £5,842,000 £6,934,889 
Yorkshire and Humber £2,172,558 £4,103,633 £6,276,191 
East Midlands £244,300 £1,663,000 £1,907,300 
West Midlands £892,413 £3,250,000 £4,342,413 
Eastern £311,819 £685,000 £996,819 
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South East £625,155 £1,821,500 £2,446,655 
London £2,802,862 £6,374,486 £9,577,348 
South West £609,188 £2,450,307 £3,059,495 
Source: Small Business Service 
 
In comparing the regional picture of funding, the North East received twice as 
much capital grants as revenue funding (Table 17). This was similar to the 
Yorkshire and Humber, the Eastern regions and the London area. The East 
Midlands received seven times more capital as revenue funding. NEF has 
repeatedly called for more revenue funding (Brown and Nissan, 2007; Brown, 
2008; Nissan, 2008). The NOCU struggled to get loans out because of 
insufficient revenue funding and this same scenario may have occurred in East 
Midlands. The London area and the North West and Yorkshire and Humber 
regions received the three largest totals. The East London Small Business 
Centre was able to draw on the largest capital grant of £2.75 million. Very few 
lenders were able to access capital grants of £1 million and over.  
 
Table 17 shows that money has been invested into the North East region to 
support CDFIs and these lenders have had the opportunity to lend up to 
approximately £2 million and recycle these funds again. From CDFA’s figures 
the region has a loan portfolio of £678,000 in 251 loans (CDFA, 2009a). This 
was the lowest figure followed by South East with £1.9 million in 1,521 loans. 
The largest loan portfolio was found in the North West with £20.9 million with 
1,490 borrowers (CDFA, 2009a).  
 
These figures must be taken with some caution however, as they were taken 
from a membership survey and the North East only had three members in 
2008/09. As a rough guide, these figures would suggest that CDFIs in the 
region were not performing as well as other regions. In 2008 PNE lent nearly 
£200,000 in micro-finance loans to 41 businesses (PNE, 2009). Over a twenty 
five year period it had distributed £1.7 million in micro-finance loans, which 
levered in an additional £5.4 million and PNE helped 1,600 start-up businesses 
(PNE, 2009a). Street NE announced it had distributed 280 loans worth 
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£900,000 over an eight year period (Entrust, 2009). The CLFNE with 
preparatory help from CapitaliSE had nearly £1 million out on loan in 2007/08. 
The CLFNE was converting 95 percent of enquiries into loans, because of the 
support from CapitaliSE. Neither of these organisations were members of the 
CDFA. With this in mind the North East picture is not as problematic as the 
CDFA’s figures would indicate.  
 
Typology of North East CDFIs 
  
The North East CDFI sector does not have one single model of CDFI, but a 
complex range of organisations with differing characteristics and offering 
different products. Organisations such as PNE, NOCU, SENET and Five Lamps 
added a loan fund to an existing business. Some of them have had funding 
problems (such as NOCU) and struggled because it received insufficient 
revenue funding to attract borrowers and make loans. The CLFNE spent a 
number of years trying to create a loan fund, but went on to have a successful 
partnership with CapitaliSE, an organisation with significant amounts of revenue 
funding. The organisation SENET disappeared after their funding streams 
changed. The importance of business support was highlighted when Street NE 
was absorbed into the business support agency, Entrust. This micro-finance 
organisation always needed to give business help and by joining Entrust there 
could be a synergy between the services available.  
 
Apart from Street North East which expanded into giving larger loans, none of 
these Northern CDFIs introduced any new products. The majority of these 
regional examples aimed at supplying micro-finance. NOCU offered loans up to 
£3,000 and both Five Lamps and PNE had a limit of £5,000. Five Lamps, 
NOCU and SENET worked within their chosen small geographical areas. 
Across the region, products were being duplicated. In discussions with the 
various loan managers, they knew their own areas well and had local 
knowledge. So even though there was a duplication of products, there was 
added value through knowledge of local markets. At times, regional lenders 
competed with national organisations. PNE’s Shell Livewire Fund for young 
people vied for borrowers with the Prince’s Trust. CapitaliSE and the CLFNE did 
 229
not compete against each other for social enterprise borrowers, but worked in 
partnership. However, the Charity and Triodos Banks and ICOF were working in 
the same market nationally. The CLFNE had successfully worked with other 
lenders to spread the risk of a large loan.      
 
Overall, the North East of England case studies - and additional examples - 
illustrate a rationalisation of lenders and the necessity for business support. 
There was a need for diversification of funding and lending that could be viewed 
as a secondary or even tertiary aspect of the organisation. At PNE, the 
business support worker was interested in building up their property portfolio, 
because it produced a continual income once the units were rented. Whereas, 
the revenue stream for the loan fund had time limitations. For some of these 
organisations sustainability has been helped by not concentrating on loans, but 
other business. None of these North East examples seem to have tried to 
expand beyond the region. The CLFNE is the only really regional CDFI. PNE 
and Street NE have had regional funding, but they are based in the county of 
Tyne and Wear containing a large percentage of the North East population. So 
there has been little incentive to advertise their services on Teesside or the 
more rural areas. Any expansion plans may have been hindered by changes 
from national to regional funding and the opportunity to attract investment 
through tax relief.  
 
Learning lessons from the North East 
 
Could these findings be transferred to other regions and CDFIs? On one level it 
can be argued that, because certain CDFIs exhibit similarities to these Northern 
examples, meaningful comparisons can be made. The WEETU based in 
Norwich has been a long term member of the CDFA, but its main role has been 
supporting women into self employment. It has offered an ‘integrated approach 
to business start up and growth through advice, training, ongoing peer support 
networks and access to finance’ (CDFA, 2004a, p. 21). Like PNE, in WEETU 
the loan fund was part of the support services they had on offer. To illustrate 
their development role they succeeded in gaining £177,819 in revenue and 
£118,000 in capital funding from the Phoenix Fund (SBS, 2006). Another 
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example of a CDFA member having a strong link with business support would 
be First Enterprise Business Agency (FEBA) and it offered loans ‘to existing and 
start-up businesses within Greater Nottingham’ (CDFA, 2004a, p. 25). FEBA 
was willing to work with start-ups and supply up to 90 percent of the finance 
necessary for the business. Later the FEBA website stated it specialised ‘in 
providing business support and advice to people from disadvantage 
communities’ (FEBA, 2009). Over time it had expanded from Nottingham across 
the East Midlands to offer support and loans (FEBA, 2009). Similarly, ART 
expanded across Birmingham and Portsmouth Area Regeneration Trust 
changed into South Coast Money Line. Another CDFA member and recipient of 
Phoenix Fund grants was the Bristol Enterprise Development Fund (BEDF).  
Equally BEDF’s website explained it ‘was restricted to inner city Bristol but over 
the last decade it's changed and expanded to include the whole of Bristol and 
the surrounding areas’ (BEDF, 2009).  
 
Contraction has also been a characteristic of the sector, with Street UK closing 
its Glasgow and London offices and splitting into two separate organisations. 
Another CDFA member Ethnic Mutual (CDFA, 2004) was closed by the FSA 
because of irregularities (BBC, 2008; FSA, 2008; Owen, 2008). Both 
Fund2Grow and Suffolk Regeneration Trust appeared as CDFA members in 
2004, but Fund2Grow ceased its membership in the following year and the 
Suffolk Regeneration Trust left by 2007. Some change must have occurred 
within these lenders either as a result of them being absorbed into larger 
organisations or through alterations in their funding.  
 
Overall, some organisations in other regions have added loan funds to their 
existing support services. Other CDFIs expanded from their inner-city districts 
outwards across their cities or even regions. However, apart the national 
lenders it has been difficult to find examples of CDFIs working across a number 
of regions. So many organisations are still embedded within their own areas. 
The following section will explore the theories behind why the government has 
kept CDFIs locally based. 
 
Local versus national: CDFIs and policies 
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This section will briefly examine the results from the case studies to critically 
compare the local lenders with national CDFIs. It will then discuss how Third 
Way and Communitarian ideas that have been influential on policy making 
directed towards CDFIs.  
 
Three national (and three regional CDFI case studies) were selected for study. 
They were chosen because of their sizes, their ages and their locations. As of 
early 2010 all of these lenders were still working. Only ICOF and the Triodos 
Bank were financially sustainable. ICOF’s reports show that a failure of a loan 
diminishes their guarantee fund. The Charity Bank has made losses, but 
continued to trade. ART, CLFNE and Street NE continued through their receipt 
of grants. The case studies indicate that the national CDFIs may be able to be 
sustainable. While regional or local funds will always need revenue grants. 
 
The government tried using the CITR to attract private funding into CDFIs. 
Some of the national CDFIs (such as the Charity Bank) were successful in 
attracting large scale investment. However, the regional and sub-regional (city 
wide) CDFIs show a much less viable picture (Table 18). For example, the 
London Rebuilding Society only attracted £16,000 in investments and the size 
of this investment would clearly have been financially problematic. This form of 
investment has failed to attract large scale loan funds to the regional and local 
CDFIs. 
   
Table 18: Investment through Community Investment Tax Relief 
CDFI National, Regional 
or Sub -regional 
CITR 
Charity Bank National £25 million 
Triodos Bank National £3.8 million 
Social Investment Scotland National (Scotland) £2 million 
Co-operative and Community 
Finance (ICOF) 
National £1 million 
Big Invest National £1 million 
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Business Finance North West Regional £600,000 
Black Country Reinvestment Society Regional £63,000 
Aston Reinvestment Trust Sub-regional £58,000 
Aspire Sub-regional £50,000 
London Rebuilding Society Sub-regional £16,000 
Source: Hackett, P. (2006), Incentives for Growth published by The Smith 
Institute. 
 
Grants have been necessary for the majority of CDFIs. Their borrowers have 
been rejected by the banks, because they do not have a credit history, 
insufficient security or the loan may appear risky. The social purpose of CDFIs 
has been to fill this gap. The banks think they cannot to make a profit out of 
these borrowers. With experience, specialist knowledge and economies of 
scale, a CDFI like the Triodos Bank can make money for its shareholders. 
However, in the UK the Triodos Bank is an exception. The other CDFIs struggle 
to cover their costs. Importantly, the extra work and cost involved in a CDFI loan 
should be recognised by funding bodies.      
 
Many of the case studies were innovative and attempted to be responsive to 
potential markets. ART looked at supplying loans for improving energy 
efficiency and home repairs. At one point, the Triodos Bank had over 20 saving 
accounts on offer. CDFIs have tried to find products to make themselves more 
sustainable. Diversification has been another way bringing in additional income 
streams. ICOF managed loan funds for local authorities while running their own 
funds. However, CDFIs still need grants to carry out their work with financially 
excluded businesses. Overall, they have the social aim of bringing about 
financial inclusion. 
 
CDFIs: A Third Way  
 
The Third Way values of inter-dependence, responsibility, incentives and 
devolution (Latham, 2001) seem to be applicable to both CDFIs and Third 
Sector organisations. These organisations had community representation on 
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their boards, were responsible and embedded within their communities and 
were localised. One Third Way thinker suggested a move from passive welfare 
to an ‘active well-being – community-based employment, lifelong learning and 
social devolution’ (Latham, 2001, p. 27).  Both Tam and Etzioni supported 
active communities where participation in volunteering was essential.   
 
At the annual conference of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations in 
1999 Tony Blair recognised the importance of the Third Sector and stated: 
 
‘Each day, in communities across the country, people act out their 
vision of Britain - rejecting selfishness and embracing community…In 
the second half of the century we learnt that government cannot 
achieve its aims without the energy and commitment of others - 
voluntary organisations, business, and, crucially, the wider public. 
That is why the Third Sector is such an important part of the Third 
Way’ (Blair, 1999). 
 
The move away from individualism has been recognised as part of 
Communitarian and Third Way ideas (Tam, 1998; Taylor, 2003; Hale, 2007; 
Driver and Martell, 2002). Blair wanted all sectors to work in partnership and 
had to introduce policies to support this aim. On a local level New Deal for 
Communities and other sources of grants could supply funds for community 
projects. A DTI report on social enterprise highlighted their potential for 
delivering public services (2002).  
 
In the previous and this chapter I have argued that CDFIs can be understood as 
‘Third Way organisations’. Giddens’ idea of the social investment state was 
based on a mixed economy that: 
 
‘looks instead for a synergy between public and private sectors, 
utilizing the dynamism of markets but with public interest in mind’ 
(Giddens, 1998, p. 100). 
 
While he was not discussing a specific policy, this emphasis has a resonance 
with the introduction of the Community Investment Tax Relief some years later. 
New Labour introduced tax relief and made investments in CDFIs more 
attractive and this dynamism for social investments at around £34 million (Table 
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18). This could be viewed positively as bringing new money to the sector and 
allowing individuals and business to invest in their chosen CDFI. However, as 
this form of investment ignored the need for revenue funding, it could be argued 
that Third Way and Communitarian ideas have hindered the development of 
CDFIs.    
 
New Labour has attempted to get members of communities involved in their 
neighbourhoods (Pratchett, 2004; Aspden and Birch, 2005; Ellison and Ellison, 
2006) and suggested that without community engagement regeneration projects 
would fail (Imrie and Raco, 2003). With the dispersal of power to the regions, 
ideas of citizenship and responsibility have also grown (Lister, 2004). In this 
context, CDFIs, with local board members, can offer community participation 
and representation. In offering business support and loans CDFIs can help build 
communities and reduce financial exclusion.  
 
However, some of New Labour’s policies have come into conflict with other 
proposals to help develop CDFIs. Some policies have acted as barriers stopping 
CDFIs from expansion. 
 
While local revenue and capital funding can be an important factor in the 
establishing of a CDFI, if an organisation such as a CDFI wants to work citywide 
or regionally, the regeneration budget could be too localised.  In 1999, ART was 
being funded by Birmingham City Council and smaller district based 
organisations such as Newtown South Aston Challenge, Task Force Newton / 
Ladywood and Sparkbrook, Sparkhill and Tyseley Regeneration Team (ART, 
1999). This patchwork of funding may have made ART more responsible to the 
needs of each district, but limited its ability to serve the whole city or the region. 
The Newcastle branch of Street UK received funding from the Newcastle 
Employment Bond (Affleck and Mellor, 2005), which for a time restricted its work 
to just the city.  
 
Devolving power to smaller entities has not been without its problems. Pratchett 
(2004) identified a tension between local autonomy and democracy and 
McCulloch (2004) found power remained with the partner agencies rather than 
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the community. An example of New Labour’s devolution of responsibility would 
be New Deal for Communities, which has brought money to a sub-city level. 
NDCs have offered a level of democracy in regeneration of an area with mixed 
results (Foley and Martin, 2000; Lawless, 2004: McCulloch, 2004). Similarly, the 
Single Regeneration Budget was area based and boosting economic activity 
(Rhodes et al., 2003). However, localism can produce parochialism and 
nimbyism to local agendas (Coaffee, 2005). The interviews with loan managers 
and business development workers indicated that they preferred to have a 
universal product that could be used across a city or region. With localised 
funding streams they could not give full coverage and had to check the 
borrower’s or client’s postcode. By restricting funding to CDFIs it also diminished 
their potential market.  
 
Another problem with localism, in the context of CDFIs, is that it restricts the 
size of the organisation, because the lack of money restricts growth. The 
introduction of the CITR allowed investments to be made into registered CDFIs. 
Larger and more established CDFIs such as the Triodos and Charity Banks, 
ART and ICOF were quick to take advantage of this source of funds. However, 
the smaller CDFIs did not have the resources to register and attract individual 
and corporate investors (table 18). The CDFA and NEF research has found that 
this form of investment has been unsuitable for many organisations. The 
investing banks, corporations and individuals have received the benefits of a 
tax-credit and the knowledge that they have helped a CDFI. Having them 
participate in regeneration has been worthwhile. However, this money would 
have to be returned, and the CDFIs may have kept this money safe. A grant 
would allow for riskier loans with more potential social benefits. The loan fund 
would last as long as the defaults were kept to a reasonable level.  
 
In keeping CDFIs local and accountable, how could a small-scale CDFI with 
limited staff be able to establish itself as an investment opportunity? The CDFI 
would have difficulty, but by keeping CDFIs small-scale and linked in with a 
community it could have many social and economic benefits. Sadly, the 
government’s funding has been insufficient to keep all CDFIs within 
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communities. Overall, the idea of localism has benefits, but not for all 
organisations trying to be sustainable.  
 
There are also problems in looking at the government’s emphasis on 
competition. When the government introduced Future Builders and the Social 
Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF) it established competition for the CDFIs. 
Problems occur when the government supported the CDFIs and sources of 
grant funding. The aims of CDFI and the Future Builders fund are similar in that 
they both help potential businesses. However, one comes with a grant/loan 
combination and the other is purely a loan. The SEIF has been just grants. 
Overall, New Labour’s policies in terms of finance do not join up. Both PAT 3 
and 9 (1999) recognised the importance of a move from a grant culture into 
loans. The government has partially addressed this through their support for 
CDFIs and hindered this change through SEIF grants.        
 
Conclusions   
 
This chapter has assessed the value of CDFIs and illustrated their potential 
importance within communities.  By keeping funding local, rather than national, 
CDFIs have had the opportunity to integrate and produce the right products for 
their chosen communities. They can be considered within government’s focus 
on offering a Third Way to ‘promote wealth creation and social justice, the 
market and the community’ (Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 70).  This description 
could relate to CDFIs lending to social enterprises, co-operatives and micro-
businesses in disadvantaged areas. CDFIs can be seen as part of the financial 
market, but not driven by the need to generate excessive profits for 
shareholders. Currently, the UK public find banker’s bonuses and excessive 
profits distasteful (BBC, 2010; Guardian, 2010) However, CDFIs struggle to 
breakeven, because they lend to those businesses rejected by the banking 
sector. Since CDFIs are inclusive they have to work hard with their borrowers.   
  
Funding bodies have to recognise the attributes of CDFIs. These organisations 
offer an alternative to the state and the market. Giddens in writing about his idea 
for a social investment state suggested there was a path between the two 
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routes. State funding through Business Link has given business advice and start 
up grants. Similarly, New Deal for Communities and other local initiatives have 
given grants for enterprise and the creation of social benefits. Alternatively, the 
banks have given business loans to their eligible customers. CDFIs work 
between the two areas of grant culture and risk adverse lending. With the 
addition of business support, rejected entrepreneurs can become successful 
borrowers. Some of the loan mangers spoken to during the research period 
would very occasionally risk a loan on a potential business idea.  
 
CDFIs are committed to their community. The Street NE workers were interested 
in the success of the business over the length of the loan and beyond. Both 
Street NE and the CLFNE had invested in people with viable business ideas. 
Some of Street NE’s clients were making a break from the grey economy and 
directly moving from state welfare into trading. The value of harnessing the 
hidden entrepreneurship in the grey economy has started to be recognised 
(Williams, 2006). Micro-finance supplied by CDFIs acted as a financial buffer 
aiding the self-employed get out of poverty (Lenton and Mosley, 2005). Some of 
CLFNE and CapitaliSE’s borrowers were social organisations moving from grant 
dependency again into trade. Social investment to create of enterprises, improve 
education and healthcare have all been seen as ways of improving a community 
(Midgley, 2001). The government has invested in education and seen standards 
rise. It could also invest in business support and CDFIs combined and to see 
more businesses are begun and achieve growth.  
 
One argument is that there could be too many CDFIs and other non-banking 
lenders in the UK. From analysing the North East region, the RDA had three 
funds contracted to Entrust. Also Street NE was a part of the same organisation. 
Local authorities and charitable foundations had funded other CDFIs or created 
their own funds. Being accountable to a local area can have benefits, but there 
needs to be a balance made between community participation and the 
duplication of services. A number of adjacent local authorities and even RDAs 
could form partnerships and fund only one CDFI to avoid the duplication of 
products and services across a region. Some economies of scale could be 
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created and lending could become more cost effective. Funding will always be 
an issue, but what form of investment would help the sector?    
 
The government’s investment in CDFIs through tax relief has raised capital, but 
the CDFIs have needed revenue funding. A percentage of this social investment 
has remained in the bank earning interest for the CDFI. The right form of 
investment in CDFIs will help create social benefits. The CDFIs and CDFA have 
not fully explained their social benefits to support their claim for funding. 
Organisations with social aims may not have time or the resources to show their 
social impacts (Pearce, 2003; Gibbon and Affleck, 2008). In the new decade 
organisations were looking more at the social impacts of CDFIs, rather than their 
financial sustainability (Dayson et al., 2010).  
 
The term CDFI came from the USA and new ideas from abroad have helped to 
develop CDFIs in the UK. However, American CDFIs always had the advantage 
of home mortgages, which has supported their sustainability (Vik, 2009). In the 
UK, sustainability has been overly hyped and it is unrealistic to expect sufficient 
demand to support the number of CDFIs. The USA has had a positive influence 
in the re-branding of local enterprise funds or soft loan funds into CDFIs. It has 
potentially helped to galvanise disparate groups of organisations into a 
recognised sector with an association. 
 
At present, the evidence would suggest there are two types of CDFIs, the 
sustainable ones such as ICOF and the Triodos Bank and the grant maintained 
smaller lenders for example, Street NE. Both types have value and worth to the 
communities or the markets they serve. Until the banking sector serves 
everyone there will always be a need for CDFIs.  Since this is unlikely, CDFIs 
have a future and will develop further. In this new decade, there is even the 
possibility of more innovative examples being created and existing CDFIs being 
sustained.     
 
 
 
 
 239
Conclusion 
 
This final chapter will, firstly, analyse the changes that have occurred since the 
‘new wave’ of CDFIs appeared. The second section will then scrutinise how 
Central Government policies have served to both grow (and also diminish) the 
sector. Lastly, it argues that the way forward is to think of CDFIs as a part of 
Bruyn’s original definition of social investment.  
 
Development 
 
Since the ‘new wave’ were establishing themselves in the late 1990s, CDFIs 
and their association have talked a great deal about sustainability and many 
CDFIs have successfully reached their fifth (DerbyLoans, Street NE), tenth 
(ART, PNE, LIF) and even their thirtieth birthdays (ICOF). So, while they can 
achieve longevity, only a few - such as the Triodos Bank - have been able to 
achieve financial sustainability and have not relied on grant funding.   
 
Organisations like ART have managed to find sufficient funds to support their 
loans. They and other CDFIs have stuck to their original aims of bringing about 
financial inclusion. The Community Loan Fund North East started lending to 
social enterprises and it has remained their single aspiration. Other 
organisations had a diverse range of roles. The North East based PNE begun 
the millennium as a business support agency with a soft loan fund. However 
during the decade it received a Phoenix Fund grant,  joined the CDFA and 
offered loans ‘between £500 and £5,000 on lenient repayment terms ‘ (CDFA, 
2004a, p. 35). PNE gave training, owned and ran work space, supplied 
business support and offered loans. It can be argued that PNE’s longevity is not 
through its loan fund but via its property portfolio and multiple sources of income. 
In 2009 an analysis of the CDFA’s membership highlights that some of their 
members were business development agencies offering a secondary service of 
loan finance. Similarly many members offered work space and training in 
addition to loan finance. 
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In the developing world, it has been recognised that micro-finance lenders have 
suffered from ‘mission drift’ as they become more commercial (Christen, 2000; 
Schreiner, 2002 Copestake, 2007). In the UK, some CDFIs have kept to their 
core aims of financial inclusion and others have diversified with new services. 
When the ‘new wave’ such as ART, PART, the Charity Bank and Salford 
Moneyline appeared, there seemed to be more clarity with organisations having 
a single social purpose. 
 
Not many CDFIs have remained static and many have expanded outside their 
original areas. ART grew out of Aston and other disadvantaged areas of 
Birmingham to now cover the whole city. Similarly, Salford Moneyline developed 
into Greater Manchester Moneyline to gain economies of scale. Both expansion 
and change can be a good thing as long it takes into account the needs of the 
local community. In NEF’s study of Street UK (2005) and the CDFA’s evaluation 
of Aspire (Forster et al., 2006) their customers highly appreciated the services 
on offer. Both organisations were successfully addressing local needs. However, 
these studies recognised that the expected demand was over-estimated. 
Indeed, in the case of Street UK, its main funder withdrew because there was a 
lack of demand.  
 
One aspect of CDFIs has become established – the need for micro-finance and 
small business loans. Many of the CDFA’s membership now offer a simple 
business loan of between £1,000 to £10,000. The sector has grown and 
developed and the membership of the CDFA has generally increased annually.  
 
Policy 
 
The UK CDFI sector has always looked favourably towards the USA and 
wished to gain the same level of support (SITF, 2000). Gradually the UK has 
gained some of these supportive policies. In terms of policy, PAT 3 (1999) 
found that businesses, like individuals, experienced financial exclusion. This 
finding led to the establishing of the Phoenix Fund and by 2003 ‘over £42 million 
had been awarded to 63 CDFIs’ (CDFA, 2008, p.3). This acted like the USA’s 
CDFI Fund and even though George W. Bush withdrew funds from CDFIs 
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(Fogarty, 2001; Immergluck, 2004; Barr, 2005; Bergman and Osuri, 2005; 
Credit Union Journal, 2008) the Fund has become permanent. In the UK, the 
Phoenix Fund was discontinued in 2006 (Nissan, 2008). The Government took 
a short term approach and transferred responsibility to the RDAs. This created 
problems for the sector (Brown, 2008). 
 
The Government allowed CDFIs to raise money through the CITR scheme. This 
brought the Charity Bank millions of pounds and the London Rebuilding Society 
under £20,000. This funding was for lending and not revenue so the sector was 
being starved of funding. After eight years of the government supporting CDFIs, 
NEF published A model for funding and supporting CDFIs: Lessons from the 
United States (Nissan, 2008) which highlighted the gaps between support in the 
UK and USA. Things had changed but there were still problems remaining.  
 
In late 2009 and early 2010 there was interest in the Social Investment 
Wholesale Bank as a means of supporting CDFIs. However, this could be a 
short-term measure to get through the recession. Overall, the system of CDFI 
funding in the USA is not perfect, but on balance it can be seen as better than 
the UK’s system. 
  
A Definition of Social Investment 
 
This section will concisely examine the value of CDFIs. In the 1990s some of 
these CDFIs were part of the UK Social Investment Forum. ICOF and Shared 
Interest would promote their share issues as social investments. However, 
around 2004 the phrase social investment seems to have faded from the 
discussions about CDFIs. However, Giddens (1998) and Midgley (2001) wished 
to see a social investment state where individuals and groups had opportunity. 
At the Brighton Labour Party conference Tony Blair did not envisage a society 
where everyone was successful and stated: 
 
‘Not a society where all succeed equally - that is utopia; but an 
opportunity society where all have an equal chance to succeed; that 
could and should be 21st century Britain under a Labour 
Government’ (Blair, 2004). 
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He wished for equality of opportunity, which is something that CDFIs offer. 
Neither Giddens (1998), Midgley (2001) or Blair (1999) mentioned CDFIs as an 
instrument of opportunity. However, CDFIs offer a Third Way of addressing 
financial exclusion. They fill the gap between failure of the market and the public 
sector grants to encourage entrepreneurship. They could be interpreted as a 
support introduction to the market for loan finance unlike the sub-prime market. 
As PART announced on an early leaflet ‘We Lend for Needs, Not Wants’ (PART, 
2001, p. 1). 
 
Tony Blair’s vision for New Labour has been guided by Communitarian ideas, 
and CDFIs supplying local services would successfully be dovetailed into the 
theories of community. CDFIs can have strong links with communities and can 
be accountable at the local level. However, the localism agenda and the 
transfer of funding to the RDAs did stop some CDFIs from expanding. It kept 
lenders city wide or regional.   
 
Not all CDFIs will be financially sustainable, so government and charitable 
foundations have to think of revenue funding. As Bruyn’s definition of social 
investment makes clear:  
 
‘Social investment is the allocation of capital to advance the social 
and economic well-being of people’ (Bruyn, 1987, p. 13). 
 
Funding has to be continual and the performance of CDFIs should be annually 
monitored and measured. The social and economic benefits show the real 
importance of CDFIs. The market cannot make money from micro-finance and 
small business loans, so why should CDFIs?  
 
Research for this thesis involved scrutinising balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts – which often confirmed that many CDFIs were not financially 
sustainable. But CDFIs produce social and economic benefits within 
communities, allows for financial inclusion and equal opportunities, and offer a 
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Third Way between the market and the state. They should be strongly 
supported by public policy interventions.   
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Postscript 
 
This postscript was added after the Conservative/Liberal coalition government 
was established to show that Third Way ideas and CDFIs are still relevant. With 
the change of government Third Way debates disappeared from political 
rhetoric to be replaced with the concept of the ‘Big Society.’  
 
In Prime Minister Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ people would volunteer and 
communities would take control of more public services (BBC, 2010a). This has 
a resonance with the ideas of Etzioni (1995).  The Prime Minister wished to 
empower local communities (Conservative, 2010). Again the localism agenda 
and empowerment of communities are elements of Third Ways ideas.  Tony 
Blair saw social enterprise as an alternative to the public sector (DTI, 2002). 
Alternatively, David Cameron’s government views social enterprise and mutuals 
as an alternative to the private sector (HM Treasury, 2010).  The terminology 
has changed, but the policies have similar outcomes.  
 
New Labour had consulted about the unclaimed assets in bank accounts and 
was eventually going to distribute it to young people’s programmes. With the 
change in government a Big Society Bank will be created from these unclaimed 
bank assets. The Conservative website stated that it ‘will leverage private sector 
investment to provide hundreds of millions of pounds of new finance for 
neighbourhood groups, charities, social enterprises and other non-
governmental bodies’ (Conservative, 2010).  CDFIs could act as financial 
intermediaries between the Big Society Bank and the borrower. However, this 
thesis has shown that CDFIs have difficulty lending to charities and social 
enterprises and there is not enough demand for loan finance.  
 
The new government has the opportunity to support the CDFA’s membership 
through revenue grants rather than capital funding. To help the growth of 
enterprise, CDFIs will need funds for business support and development. If 
additional revenue funding is not found then this government will perpetuate 
existing funding problems of CDFIs.  
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Appendix One: The Membership of CDFA in 2004 and 2009 and additional information. 
Name Location Product and services Set up Additional Information CDFA 
Members 
2004  2009 
ABI 
Associates – 
Faith in 
Business 
London Business support, finance and 
property to rent 
Not 
known 
Joined 2007/8 No  Yes 
Aspire Northern 
Ireland 
Micro-finance 1999 Still lending in parts of Northern 
Ireland 
Yes Yes 
Aston 
Reinvestment 
Trust 
Birmingham Small business and social enterprise 
loans 
1997 Registered as CDFI to use the 
Community Investment Tax 
Relief 
Yes Yes 
Bees Knees North 
Lincolnshire 
Business loans up to £15,000  It works in partnership with 
Business Link Yorkshire to 
provide free business advice to 
help the client access finance. 
Joined 2006/7 
No Yes 
BigInvest National social 
enterprise 
Social enterprise loans Not 
known 
Still lending  Yes Yes 
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Black 
Business in 
Birmingham 
(3b) 
Birmingham 
and the Black 
Country 
African Caribbean small business 
loans and support 
Not 
known 
Social enterprise 
With business space for rent 
Yes Yes 
Black 
Country 
Reinvestment 
Society ltd  
Staffordshire 
and the Black 
Country 
Small business and social enterprise 
loans 
Not 
known 
Still lending and member of 
CDFA 
Yes Yes 
Bolton 
Business 
Ventures 
Bolton, Bury, 
Oldham, 
Rochdale and 
Wigan 
Business loans £1,000 to £15,000, 
Targeted areas, cultural businesses 
and women 
1983 Islamic finance, property, 
business support and advice and 
loans for women. 
Renamed Business Finance 
North West 
Yes Yes 
Bridges 
Community 
Ventures 
National Equity finance 2002 Now Bridges Ventures with a 
second fund 
Yes Yes 
Bristol 
Enterprise 
Development 
Loan (BEDF) 
Bristol and 
West Country 
Start-up and expansion loans for 
small business and social enterprise 
1992 BEDF is part of South West 
Business Finance, a partnership 
of agencies across the region. 
Joined 2007/8 
No Yes 
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Business 
Enterprise 
Fund 
North and 
West 
Yorkshire. 
Equity, business loans, guarantees, 
book keeping and advice  
Not 
known 
Joined 2008/9 No Yes 
Business 
Finance 
North West 
North West Small loans of between £3,000 and 
£50,000 
Shariah compliant loans available 
1983 Loans for new or small business, 
trading arms of charities, social 
enterprise and not-for-profit 
organisation. Joined 2005/6 
No Yes 
Business 
Finance 
Solutions 
North West Small business loans £3,000 to 
£50,000 
Not 
known 
Greater Manchester boroughs of 
Manchester, Stockport, Salford, 
Tameside, Trafford, and across 
Cheshire. Joined 2008/9 
No Yes 
Capitalise 
Business 
Support 
Sussex, Kent 
or Surrey 
Small business and social enterprise Not 
known 
Part of the local enterprise 
agency 
Yes Yes 
Change – 
London and 
Quadrant 
Housing 
Trust 
Lewisham and 
Greenwich 
loans 
A pilot in Waltham Forest would 
focus on loans and advice for social 
enterprise and small businesses 
More personal advice 
2004 Connections with credit union, 
but not the CDFA. Left in 2008/9 
Yes No 
Charity Bank National Social enterprise and charity loans 2002 Registered as CDFI to use the 
Community Investment Tax 
Yes Yes 
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Relief 
Community 
Money CIC 
London Affordable loans and grants for 
community groups 
2007 A Community Interest Company 
Joined in 2007/8 
No  Yes 
Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
Reinvestment 
Trust 
Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
Small business and social enterprise 
loans 
Not 
known 
Joined 2006/7 No Yes 
Croydon 
Enterprise 
Croydon Loans and business support Not 
known 
Part of Croydon Economic 
Development 
No  Yes 
Cumbria 
community 
Asset and 
Reinvestment 
Trust  
Cumbria  A rural CDFI offering small business 
loans £1,000 to £50,000 
Not 
known 
An Industrial and Provident 
Society and joined 2004/5 
No Yes 
Derby Loans Derby and 
within 20 miles 
of city 
Business, community and personal 
loans 
2003 Industrial and Provident Society 
Now MCF Loans (Midlands 
Community Finance) 
Yes Yes 
Developing 
Strathclyde 
Ltd (DSL) 
Mainly 
Glasgow and 
Edinburgh 
Small business loan / social 
enterprise 
1993 DSL moved beyond just 
Strathclyde.  
Yes Yes 
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Donbac Doncaster and 
South 
Yorkshire 
Business loans £15,000 to £50,000 
and micro loans £1,000 to £15,000 
1980s Joined 2008/9 No  Yes 
East 
Lancashire 
Moneyline 
(IPS) Ltd 
(ELMS) 
East 
Lancashire 
and Wales 
Personal finance 2002 An Industrial and Provident 
Society. Name change ELMS 
and expanded into Wales.  
Yes Yes 
East London 
Small 
Business 
Centre 
Tower 
Hamlets, 
Newham, 
Barking and 
Dagenham, 
Havering and 
Redbridge 
Loans and venture capital, grant 
programmes for fashion industry 
(short term loan for clothing 
manufacturing).  
1978 Still loans and Muslim Fund, but 
support and training. 
Generic business advice. 
Muslim Fund. Worked with Indian 
restaurants 
Yes Yes 
Enterprise 
Fund Ltd 
Manchester Small business Unkno
wn 
Ended membership 2006/7 Yes No 
Enterprise 
Loan Fund 
Limited 
Unknown Unknown Not 
known 
Unknown 
Left in 2008/9 
Yes No 
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Enterprise 
Loans East 
Midlands 
Nottingham  Loans £3,000 to £20,000 2008 A partnership between the East 
Midlands Development Agency 
and First Enterprise Business 
Agency (FEBA). 
No  Yes 
Ethnic 
Business 
Development 
Corporation 
and Ethnic 
Mutual 
Lewisham, 
Greenwich, 
Southwark, 
Newham, 
Bromley, 
Bexley and 
Lambeth. 
Loan fund, training and support 1997 Rented office space and support. 
The Ethnic Mutual ceased after 
fraud allegations. 
Left 2007/8 
 
Yes No 
Fact 2006 Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
Micro-finance loans 2006 Joined 2008/9 No  Yes 
Finance 
South 
Yorkshire 
South 
Yorkshire 
Loans £15,000 to £150,000 Not 
known 
Joined 2008/9 No Yes 
First 
Enterprise 
Business 
Agency 
Greater 
Nottingham 
Loan finance, BME businesses 1989 
council 
run 
Now called First Enterprise or 
FEBA and expanded across East 
Midlands 
Loans, grants, training 
Yes Yes 
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Five Lamps Thornaby on 
Teesside 
Loans and community support 
agency  
Not 
known 
Received Phoenix Fund money 
and joined 2004/5 
No Yes 
Future 
Builders 
Loans and 
grant  
The supply of loans and grants to 
the voluntary and community sector 
2004 Joined 2004/5 No Yes 
Gloucestershi
re 
Development 
Loan Fund 
Gloucestershir
e 
Start up loans from £500 to £9,500 
Loans for existing businesses up to 
£50,000 
2003 Joined 2004/5 No  Yes 
Goole 
Development 
Trust 
Goole and 
surrounding 
area 
Loans up to £10,000  Received Phoenix Fund money 
to set up their fund. Now offering 
training, advice and property to 
rent. Joined 2006/7 
No  Yes 
HBV 
Enterprise 
London 
Boroughs 
£3,000 to £25,000  2000 Originally Hackney Business 
Ventures. Currently working in 
Barnet, Brent, Camden, City of 
London, Enfield, Haringey, 
Hackney, Harrow, Islington, 
Waltham Forest. Joined 2004/5 
No Yes 
ICOF  National Co-operative and social enterprise 1973 Co-operative and Community 
Finance.  
Yes Yes 
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IMPACT 
Communities 
in 
Partnership 
for Action 
Sheffield Small business and personal finance Not 
known 
Membership ceased in 2004/5 Yes No 
Impetus Herefordshire, 
Worcestershire 
and Shropshire 
Lending in a rural area. Loans 
£1,000 to £50,000 
Not 
known 
Joined 2004/5 No Yes 
Innovative 
Finance 
(Hastings 
Trust) 
Hastings and 
surrounding 
area 
A back to work loan £1,000 Not 
known 
Part of the Hastings Trust, a 
development trust organisation. 
Joined 2008/9 
No Yes 
Isle of Wight 
lottery 
Isle of Wight Interest free loans of £2,000 to 
£50,000 
2001 The first lottery in England to be 
developed specifically to create 
employment opportunities. 
Joined 2006/7 
No  Yes 
Key Fund 
(South 
Yorkshire) 
Yorkshire Social enterprise – loan and grants  1999 Yorkshire and Humber Yes Yes 
Leicester- Leicestershire  Business loans up to £5,000 and Not Joined 2005/6 No Yes 
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shire 
Moneyline 
also home owner and personal 
loans. 
known 
Local 
Investment 
Fund (LIF) 
National with 
regional funds  
Social enterprise loans 1995 The Social Enterprise Loan Fund 
(TSELF) and still a CDFA 
member 
Yes Yes 
London 
Rebuilding 
Society 
London Social enterprise / ethical business 
and mutual aid 
2001 An Industrial and Provident 
Society 
Yes Yes 
Merseyside 
Special 
Investment 
Fund Ltd 
Liverpool  Small business loans 1996 Small business and now venture 
and mezzanine finance. 
Liverpool and now the North 
West 
Yes Yes 
Moneyline 
Yorkshire 
Sheffield Personal loans £50 to £5,000 2004 Working with the local credit 
union. Joined 2006/7 
No Yes 
      
Norfolk and 
Waveney 
Enterprise 
services 
(NWES) 
East Anglia 
Set up after 
closures in 
Great 
Yarmouth and 
Advice, training, property and loans 1982 Advice, training, property and 
loans 
Yes Yes 
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Lowestoft 
North London 
Enterprise 
Credit Union 
Based in 
Enfield 
Business based credit union  1992 Part of the North London 
Enterprise Club 
Joined 2006/7 
No  Yes 
North 
Staffordshire 
Risk Capital 
Fund plc 
North 
Staffordshire 
Small business loans £10,000 –  
£50, 000 
Not 
known 
2009 announced £1 million to 
lend 
Yes Yes  
One London Owned by the 
London 
Boroughs 
Loans, equity, venture capital and 
grants 
 Now called GLE One London  
Specific funds Bexley, Croydon, 
Lambeth and South Westminster 
Training and Shariah compliant 
loans. 
Yes Yes 
Portsmouth 
Area 
Regeneration 
Trust (PART) 
Portsmouth  Personal and small business 2000 South Coast Moneyline 
An IPS and two companies 
limited by guarantee 
Yes Yes 
Preston 
Money Line 
Preston, but 
now Central, 
North and 
Personal, small business (£300 - 
£5000) and home improvement 
loans 
2005 Now Lancashire Community 
Finance, an IPS 
Yes Yes  
 255
West 
Lancashire 
Prince’s Trust Loan to young 
people 
Loans and start up grants. 
Advice and training 
1976  Yes Yes 
Prime 
Initiative 
 
National Over 50s loans 
and lobbying 
 The Prince’s Initiative for Mature 
Enterprise offers loans, lobbying, 
Business clubs. 
Yes Yes 
Project North 
East 
North East Shell Young person’s fund and 
general loan fund 
1980, 
but 
loans 
came 
later 
Loans and property support 
dependent on funding 
Yes Yes 
Prya 
Partnerships 
Unknown Unknown Not 
known 
Unknown Yes No 
Robert Owen 
Community 
Banking 
Fund 
Mid Wales Business loans £1,000 to £10,000 
And home improvement loans 
Not 
known 
A sister organisation of the 
Robert Own Credit Union. 
Joined 2008/9 
No Yes 
Rootstock Finance for co-
ops 
Offers ethical investments in co-
operatives 
1998 Joined 2006/9 No Yes 
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Salford 
Moneyline 
Salford now 
Greater 
Manchester 
Personal loans 2000 Greater Manchester Moneyline Yes Yes  
Sandwell 
Advice and 
Moneylink 
(SAM) 
Sandwell 
Borough 
Personal, home improvement loans 
and micro enterprise 
2004 Membership ended 2007/8 Yes No 
Scotcash CIC Glasgow Personal loans from £50 2007 Opportunity to save through 
Glasgow Credit Union. 
Joined 2006/7 
No Yes 
Shoreline 
Housing Part.
East Lancs A Housing Trust Not 
known 
Working with ELMS and joined 
2006/7 
No Yes 
Sirius  Hull and 
surrounding 
area 
Loans from £500 to £25,000  1999 Joined 2008/9 No  Yes 
Social 
Investment 
Scotland 
Scotland Social enterprise loans   Yes Yes  
South West 
Investment 
Cornwall and 
Scilly Isles 
SMEs Growth, rural business  Less funds available Yes Yes  
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Group 
Spirit of 
Enterprise 
Loan Fund 
North East of 
England 
Loans available to physically, 
sensory and mentally disabled 
people. Loans between £1,000 to 
£5,000 
Not 
known 
Administered by the Pine Tree 
Trust offering a range of training 
and business support. 
Joined 2005/6 
No Yes 
Street UK London, 
Birmingham, 
Newcastle and 
Glasgow 
Micro-finance 2000 Split into Street UK (Birmingham) 
and Street North East 
(Newcastle), both still members 
Yes Yes 
Suffolk 
Regeneration 
Trust 
Suffolk Enterprise Loan Fund £3000 to 
£5000 
Micro Loan Fund £1000 to £3000 
2003 2006 became Foundation East 
working in Norfolk, Suffolk, 
Essex, Cambridgeshire, 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
now business, social enterprise 
and personal loans  
Yes Yes 
The 
Environment 
Trust 
Unknown Unknown Not 
known 
Unknown – left 2004/5 Yes No 
Train 2000 
Limited 
Merseyside 
Women 
‘Power loan fund’ and advice 1996 Now offering advice and not 
lending. Lefy CDFA is 2005/6 
Yes No 
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Triodos Bank National Social enterprise and environmental 
loans. 
Arrived 
in UK 
1995 
A range social and ethical 
investments 
Yes Yes 
UK Steel 
Enterprise 
Areas affected 
by changes in 
the steel 
industry 
Owned by the Tata Steel Group with 
loan funds for areas affected by 
changes in the steel industry. A 
mixture of business loans, equity 
and guarantees available. 
1980 
approx. 
Managed workspace available. 
Previously, owned by Corus.  
No Yes 
Ulster 
Community 
Investment 
Trust 
Ulster Social enterprise loans 2001 Expanded into Ireland from 
Northern Ireland 
Yes Yes 
WEETU Norwich Loans for business women  1998 Group loans Yes Yes 
Wessex 
Reinvestment 
Trust  
Devon, Dorset 
and Somerset 
Enterprise and home improvement 
loans 
2004 Loans through the Fredericks 
Foundation 
Yes Yes 
West 
Yorkshire 
Enterprise 
Agency 
West Yorkshire Advice and loans 2002 Advice and loans Yes Yes 
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Appendix Two 
 
Questions for lending organisations (CDFIs) 
 
1. Describe your organisation 
 
2. What is your role? 
 
3. How did it come about? 
(How was the organisation developed?) 
 
4. Where does the organisation get its funds from? 
 
6. What is the organisation’s market? 
 
7. Where do your borrowers come from (referrals etc.)? 
 
7. What are your products? 
 
8. What are your interest rates? 
 
9. Any additional fees? 
 
10. How successful have been so far? 
 
11. Do you have any results or figures available? 
 
12. Are there any problems or barriers with making loans? 
 
13. Is the organisation sustainable? 
 
14. Are there any future plans? 
 
15. Does the term social investment mean anything to the organisation? 
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Appendix Three 
Contacts and interviewees 
 
 
1. Angier Griffin – Philip Angier (Director), Social Enterprise Consultancy. 
2. AnybodyCan – James Dixon (Director), Social Enterprise Support 
Agency. 
3. Aston Reinvestment Trust – Steve Walker (Manager) CDFI. 
4. Barclay’s Bank – Andy Brown (Business Loan Manager), Bank. 
5. Barclay’s Bank – Harry D. Ferry (Business Loan Manager), Bank.   
6. Barclay’s Bank – David T. Gray (Business Manager), Bank. 
7. Bridges Community Ventures - Tom Matthews (Associate), CDFI. 
8. Business Link County Durham - John Probert (Manager), Business 
Support Agency. 
9. CapitaliSE – John Probert (Loan Manager), CDFI / Business Support. 
10. CDFA - Sarah McGeehan (CDFA and NEF). 
11. Charity Bank – Danyal Sattar (Assistant Manager), CDFI. 
12. Charity Bank – Malcolm Hayday (Chief Executive), CDFI. 
13. ComeCon, Bob Webb (Development Manager), Social Enterprise 
Development Agency. 
14. Community Enterprise Direct – Jim Gaunt (Manager), Business Support 
Agency. 
15. Community Enterprise Direct – Michael Dennison, Business Support 
Agency. 
16. Community Finance Solutions – Bob Paterson (Director), CDFI 
development. 
17. Community Loan Fund North East – Rod Jones (Loan Manager), CDFI 
18. Economic Partnerships – Dr Guy Turnbull (Partner/Director), Social 
Enterprise Development Agency. 
19. Economic Partnerships - Keith Richardson (Partner/Director), Social 
Enterprise Development Agency. 
20. Financial Inclusion Newcastle, Enterprise Support Team - Gerard Lundie 
(Senior Enterprise Support Officer), business support. 
21. ICOF – Andrew Hibbert (Loan Manager), CDFI. 
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22. Northern Oak Credit Union – David Hampton (Business Development 
Manager), CDFI. 
23. Northern Oak Credit Union –  David Hodgeson (Director), CDFI. 
24. Prince’s Trust – Anjali Daniels (Outreach worker for business 
development), charity working with young people. 
25. Project North East – Richard Clark (Loan Manager), Business Support 
Agency and CDFI. 
26. Shared Interest – Stephanie Sturrock (Chief Executive), Fair Trade Loan 
Organisation. 
27. Shared Interest – Geoff Moore (Board Member), Fair Trade Loan 
Organisation. 
28. Street UK –  Martin Hockley (Loan Manager), CDFI. 
29. Street UK –  Sarah Mackey (Loan Manager, Newcastle), CDFI. 
30. Street UK and Street NE –  Gary Watts (Loan Manager), CDFI. 
31. Street UK and Street NE –  John Hall (Manager), CDFI. 
32. Sunderland Homecare Associates – Margaret Elliot (Manager), Co-
operative enterprise. 
33. Social Enterprise Sunderland – John Blackburn (Business Advisor), Co-
operative Development Agency. 
34. TEDCO – Doug Scott (Director and Chief Executive), Economic 
Development Agency. 
35.  Triodos Bank – Avicia Baldock, CDFI. 
36. Triodos Bank – Rosl Veltmeijer (Sustainability Research), CDFI. 
37. Unity Trust Bank – Karen Gorman (Development Manager North East 
and Cumbria), Bank. 
38. Unity Trust Bank – Robin Blagburn (Principal Consultant), Bank. 
39. Weetu – Caroline Forbes (Full Credit Manager), CDFI. 
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